Political deadlock persisted despite headlines suggesting that rival factions reached agreement on election laws while selection of new interim govt remained controversial.

Stakeholders sent contradictory signals on elections and new govt. Following series of meetings in Moroccan town of Bouznika, members of 6+6 joint committee – composed of House of Representatives (HoR) and rival Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC) representatives – early June announced agreement on legal framework for presidential and parliamentary elections. HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh and head of HSC Khaled Meshri 6-7 June travelled to Morocco but failed to sign off on electoral legislation as points of contentions persisted, notably on whether military officers can run for president. Meanwhile, amid competing plans aimed at appointing new interim govt before elections take place, eastern forces commander Khalifa Haftar 16 June congratulated outcome of Morocco talks and called for formation of “technocratic” govt to oversee election preparation, suggesting that he may now favour parliament-led selection process, rather than keeping Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba in office as part of power-sharing deal. In briefing to UN Security Council, UN Envoy to Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 20 June said failure to reach agreement among major stakeholders on eligibility criteria for presidential election, linkage between presidential and parliamentary elections, and formation of new unified govt could “trigger a new crisis”.

Tripoli conducted fresh strikes in west. Dabaiba 1 June insisted drones strikes carried out late May in western Libya targeted sites used by “criminal gangs” for human trafficking, drug and fuel smuggling, denying HoR claims that strikes were aimed at “settling political scores”; Dabaiba also denied Turkish involvement in strikes. Forces loyal to Dabaiba 7-8 June conducted fresh strikes near Zuwara city, reportedly targeting fuel smuggling site.

Tensions over control of oil wealth threatened to escalate. Eastern-based PM Osama Hammad 24 June threatened to impose blockade on oil and gas facilities to prevent exports in protest at alleged unfair distribution of oil revenues by Tripoli-based authorities; 26 June said he discussed mater with Tripoli-based National Oil Corporation Chairman Farhat Bengdara.

In other important developments. Drone strikes 29 June reportedly hit Al-Kharruba airbase used by Russian paramilitary group Wagner; Tripoli-based authorities denied responsibility.

Political deadlock persisted despite headlines suggesting that rival factions reached agreement on election laws while selection of new interim govt remained controversial.

Stakeholders sent contradictory signals on elections and new govt. Following series of meetings in Moroccan town of Bouznika, members of 6+6 joint committee – composed of House of Representatives (HoR) and rival Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC) representatives – early June announced agreement on legal framework for presidential and parliamentary elections. HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh and head of HSC Khaled Meshri 6-7 June travelled to Morocco but failed to sign off on electoral legislation as points of contentions persisted, notably on whether military officers can run for president. Meanwhile, amid competing plans aimed at appointing new interim govt before elections take place, eastern forces commander Khalifa Haftar 16 June congratulated outcome of Morocco talks and called for formation of “technocratic” govt to oversee election preparation, suggesting that he may now favour parliament-led selection process, rather than keeping Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba in office as part of power-sharing deal. In briefing to UN Security Council, UN Envoy to Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 20 June said failure to reach agreement among major stakeholders on eligibility criteria for presidential election, linkage between presidential and parliamentary elections, and formation of new unified govt could “trigger a new crisis”.

Tripoli conducted fresh strikes in west. Dabaiba 1 June insisted drones strikes carried out late May in western Libya targeted sites used by “criminal gangs” for human trafficking, drug and fuel smuggling, denying HoR claims that strikes were aimed at “settling political scores”; Dabaiba also denied Turkish involvement in strikes. Forces loyal to Dabaiba 7-8 June conducted fresh strikes near Zuwara city, reportedly targeting fuel smuggling site.

Tensions over control of oil wealth threatened to escalate. Eastern-based PM Osama Hammad 24 June threatened to impose blockade on oil and gas facilities to prevent exports in protest at alleged unfair distribution of oil revenues by Tripoli-based authorities; 26 June said he discussed mater with Tripoli-based National Oil Corporation Chairman Farhat Bengdara.

In other important developments. Drone strikes 29 June reportedly hit Al-Kharruba airbase used by Russian paramilitary group Wagner; Tripoli-based authorities denied responsibility.

Violence broke out in west as efforts to form new executive heightened political tensions, all the while undermining UN moves to organise elections in late 2023.

Eastern-based PM Bashagha dismissed amid negotiations for unified executive. Eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR) 16 May suspended PM Bashagha as head of HoR-backed govt citing allegations of financial irregularities, and appointed finance minister and close ally of eastern army commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, Osama Hammad, as interim PM. Haftar’s sons and heads of militias close to rival Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba in May met in Egypt’s capital Cairo to forge deal on new unity govt that would leave Dabaiba in place, while conceding some ministries to Haftar affiliates; some MPs are opposed to this plan, however, and want Dabaiba removed. Meanwhile, as part of UN-backed efforts to hold presidential and legislative elections by year’s end, 6+6 joint committee – composed of HoR and rival Tripoli-based High State Council representatives – 23 May announced breakthrough on number of issues related to elections but conditioned further steps on agreement on new govt.

Political tensions fuelled violence between armed groups in Zawiya city. Clashes between rival militias who battle for influence and control of trafficking routes 21-24 April left at least four civilians dead in Zawiya city (west). Renewed clashes 11 May erupted, reportedly leaving two people dead. Precarious calm in following days prevailed following mediation by notables and community leaders, but tensions rose again after Tripoli-based govt 25 May ordered drone strikes on militia-held buildings in Zawiya, targeting factions close to MPs who want to dislodge Dabaiba. Fresh drone strikes in Maya port outside Zawiya 29 May killed two and wounded nephew of HoR MP Ali Bouzriba; HoR immediately condemned attack, and armed group close to Bouzriba same day closed off gas pipeline to local electricity plant in retaliation.

Concerns persisted over fallout of conflict in Sudan. State-owned National Oil Corporation 1 May denied media reports that it delivered oil from Sarir refinery to Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagalo’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, however locals claimed fuel smuggling from south-eastern Libya toward Sudanese border continued.

Efforts to unify country’s rival factions behind electoral roadmap remained in stalemate, making presidential and parliamentary elections in 2023 increasingly elusive; concern grew over potential fallout of Sudanese conflict.

Political process remained stalled. East-based House of Representatives (HoR) 2 April published in official gazette series of amendments to 2021 laws on presidential and parliamentary elections. Amendments provide for ineligibility for president of dual nationals, but otherwise do not significantly differ from original laws, suggesting their main purpose may be to show Libyans, UN and international partners that parliament is actively working toward elections as means of fending off a UN-backed alternative mechanism. In briefing to UN Security Council, UN envoy for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 18 April said he had offered UN technical assistance to HoR-High State Council committee working on electoral laws, made no mention of his previously announced proposal to create High-Level Panel for Elections that would take over drafting of election laws.

UN gathered rival military coalitions’ leaders on Libyan soil for first time in years. Bathily 26 March in capital Tripoli and 8 April in Benghazi city hosted meetings between commanders of rival military coalitions; another meeting between rival chiefs of staff held 14 April in Benghazi without participation of UN envoy. Bathily early April also toured Libya’s neighbouring states of Chad, Niger and Sudan to discuss repatriation from Libya of foreign fighters.

Potential fallout of conflict in neighbouring Sudan sparked concern. After conflict between Sudanese army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) 15 April broke out in Sudan, credible media reports, including from The Wall Street Journal 19 April, alleged eastern strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces delivered weapons to RSF, which Haftar denied; some reports claimed weapons delivered via airlift, but local sources alleged weapons hauled overland. Matter could fuel tensions between Haftar and its Egyptian ally, which supports Sudanese army (see Egypt). Amid growing concern about potential spillover of fighting into southern Libya, where Sudanese militiamen are present, Haftar forces 24 April closed border with Sudan and reportedly sent military reinforcements to southern town of Kufra.

UN initiative to provide constitutional framework for elections struggled to gain traction.

UN envoy’s plan for elections failed to secure endorsement. Special Representative of UN Sec-Gen for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 11 March said legislative bodies, House of Representatives (HoR) and High State Council (HSC), had agreed to form joint committee of six members each to draft electoral laws; also said presidential and legislative elections could be held by year’s end if clear roadmap and electoral laws are in place by June. Statement appeared to give centre stage to legislative bodies’ initiative to provide legal framework for elections, suggesting Bathily has backtracked on his recent proposal to establish High-Level Panel for Elections. HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh 13 March reiterated opposition to Bathily’s proposal, confirmed HoR is on track with its own roadmap and intends to appoint new interim govt once election laws are finalised; issue of new executive to replace Tripoli-based govt of PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba is major point of departure from Bathily’s plan. UN Security Council 16 March adopted presidential statement on Libya, stating that Council “recognises the continued role of the HoR and HSC” to securing legal basis for elections, while downplaying Bathily’s initiative.

Efforts to unify divided military institutions inched forward. Bathily 16 March hosted meeting of 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) – which brings together representatives of armed forces from eastern and western Libya – in Tunisia’s capital Tunis to discuss way forward in security track and reunification of military institutions; renewed commitment to create initial joint force (one unit) to be deployed in central Libya. Military leaders from both east-based Libyan National Army (LNA) and Tripoli-based military coalition, including some JMC members, 26 March met in capital Tripoli under UN auspices, committed to continue to work toward unification of military.

National oil company chairman allegedly under U.S. scrutiny. Allegations in March surfaced among Libyan businessmen that chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation, Farhat Bengdara, is under U.S. scrutiny for his alleged role in allocating funds to cover expenses of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s LNA forces, part of which might have bankrolled sanctioned Russian paramilitary Wagner Group.

Political deadlock persisted one year after Libya split into two rival govts.

East-based parliament continued to chart unilateral path out of political crisis. Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) 7 Feb approved constitutional amendment that could be used as basis for elections. Amendment calls for simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections to take place within 240 days of adoption of election laws by joint committee of HoR and Tripoli-based advisory High State Council (HSC) members. Tripoli-based critics of HoR, including some HSC members, accused body of seeking to buy time, notably opposing open timeline for drafting election laws and obligation to have presidential election. In another unilateral move, HoR President Aghela Saleh 16 Feb proposed formation of 45-member committee – including HoR, HSC and independent members – to decide on new executive to replace two govts now in place.

UN Libya envoy proposed new initiative to break stalemate. In briefing to UN Security Council, Special Representative for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 27 Feb criticised HoR’s constitutional amendment as “controversial”, underscoring that it does not stipulate clear roadmap, including timeline, for holding elections in 2023. Instead, Bathily proposed formation of high-level steering committee composed of representatives of political and security institutions, and other political, tribal and civil society leaders to facilitate adoption of legal framework and time-bound roadmap to enable elections in 2023.

UN welcomed coordination mechanism for withdrawal of foreign fighters. UN Support Mission to Libya 8 Feb said officials from Libya’s 5+5 Joint Military Commission – which brings together representatives of armed forces from eastern and western Libya – as well as liaison committees from Sudan and Niger, approved “coordination mechanism” for “withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign fighters from Libya” during two-day meeting in Egypt. Mechanism unlikely to affect presence of Turkish forces alongside Tripoli govt or Russian Wagner contractors alongside eastern forces.

Energy deal with Italian company ENI sparked controversy. Opponents of Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba, including his own oil minister and HoR members, early Feb criticised as “illegal” $8bn agreement struck late Jan between National Oil Corporation and Italian state-owned oil company ENI, arguing it required HoR buy-in; investment plan notably outlines steps to increase Libya’s oil and gas export capacity.

Dialogue between rival assemblies on amending draft constitution to chart roadmap toward elections reached dead end, and disputes around demarcation of maritime boundaries continued.

Rival assemblies’ dialogue track came to an abrupt halt. Heads of rival assemblies, Aghela Saleh of Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) and Khaled Mishri of Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC), 5 Jan met in Egyptian capital Cairo, pledged in vaguely-worded joint statement to refer amended constitutional draft to their respective chambers. Cairo 11 Jan hosted meeting between head of Presidential Council Mohamed Menfi and head of Libyan National Army, Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar; 15 January held another meeting between Menfi, Haftar and Saleh. Saleh in following days however refused to sign off on document outlining key agreements between HoR and HSC and reaffirmed HoR is Libya’s one and only legislative body and does not need HSC’s approval, suggesting that HoR amend 2011 constitutional declaration “before March”.

Diplomatic initiatives to press for elections continued. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns 12 Jan made first visit to Libya since 2012, met with PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba in capital Tripoli and reportedly also with Haftar in Benghazi city; Burns pressed on his interlocutors need to move forward with elections before year’s end. Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan 17 Jan also visited Tripoli and met with Dabaiba and Mishri to discuss political situation; reportedly also met with some armed groups’ leaders in Tripoli.

Controversies over disputed demarcation of maritime boundaries continued. National Oil Corporation 2 Jan protested against Athens’ ongoing oil and gas exploration in waters disputed between Greece and Libya. Tripoli’s Court of Appeals 9 Jan suspended implementation of Libya-Türkiye deal on oil and gas exploration that two countries had signed in Oct until final verdict on case. Meanwhile, Tripoli-based Govt of National Unity 28 Jan signed deals with Italian govt aimed at boosting Libyan energy supplies to Europe and clamping down on migrants attempting to cross Mediterranean Sea.

UN efforts to foster dialogue between rival parliaments faced new challenges, handover of terrorism suspect to U.S. sparked outrage domestically, and maritime borders riled Mediterranean waters.

Spat erupted between country’s rival parliaments after period of rapprochement. East-based House of Representatives (HoR) 6 Dec voted to set up constitutional court in eastern city of Benghazi. Tripoli-based advisory High Council of State (HCS) same day condemned move – which could invalidate recently reactivated Tripoli-based Constitutional Chamber – as unlawful, and 11 Dec suspended contact with HoR. HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh and HCS Chairman Khaled al-Mishri 23 Dec however agreed to drop plans to create constitutional court. Meanwhile, meeting between Saleh and al-Mishri scheduled for 4 Dec as part of UN-led political process postponed for “logistical reasons” and “political obstacles”. U.S. embassy in Libya 24 Dec called for “alternative mechanisms” to be considered as way of producing constitutional basis for elections if HoR-HCS talks fail.

Handover of Lockerbie suspect to U.S. sparked tensions. Media outlets, including British daily The Guardian 13 Dec, reported Tripoli-based govt (GNU) handed over Abu Ajila Masoud al-Marimi – key suspect in bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie town in Scotland in 1988 – to U.S. authorities after armed group in Nov kidnapped him in Tripoli. Head of rival govt, east-based PM Fathi Bashagha, 13 Dec called move “illegal”. Attorney general’s office next day announced investigation into Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba’s decision to extradite Masoud, and demonstrations against extradition 16 Dec took place in several cities.

Standoff persisted over maritime borders in Mediterranean Sea. GNU 7 Dec criticised as “irresponsible” Greece’s recent agreements with energy firms for oil and gas exploration near maritime borders with Libya. Athens same day retorted that GNU’s recent energy deals with Türkiye violated international law. After Egyptian President al-Sisi 11 Dec issued decree demarcating Egypt’s western maritime border, GNU 16 Dec and HoR 22 Dec said decision violated Libya’s territorial waters. Bashagha 14 Dec called on Egypt, Türkiye and Greece to not “take any unilateral steps” that would “worsen the situation in the Mediterranean”. Greek media late-Dec reported Athens plans to extend territorial waters south and west of Crete island.

Tensions between Tripoli-based institutions reached new heights as country remained divided into two rival govts with no political solution in sight.

Rival institutions remained at odds on means to resolve political crisis. Tripoli-based advisory High Council of State (HCS) Chair Khalid al-Meshri 14 Nov accused militiamen affiliated with Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba of “besieging” HCS headquarters; said HCS had convened session to follow up on tentative agreement with eastern-based legislature House of Representatives (HoR) to work toward forming new unity govt. Dabaiba, who is opposed to HoR-HSC negotiations, immediately denounced “incitement and exaggeration”, saying only “a few” protesters had gathered outside HCS building, accused Meshri of making secret “power-sharing” deals to delay elections. HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh same day condemned “threats and intimidation by armed groups using force” against HCS. Dabaiba 29 Nov reportedly accused Meshri and Saleh of “systematically obstructing elections”. East-based military commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar around 22 Nov weighed in on political crisis, saying “time has come for the Libyan people to put an end to failed experiments and dead ends”, accusing politicians of “worshipping their seats of power”.

Greek FM’s refusal to meet Tripoli-based govt minister sparked diplomatic spat. After Tripoli-based Govt of National Unity (GNU) in Oct signed deal with Türkyie on oil and gas exploration in areas of Mediterranean contested by Athens, Greek FM Nikos Dendias 17 Nov canceled Tripoli visit upon landing to avoid being welcomed by his Libyan counterpart, FM Najla al-Mangoush; Dendias claimed he had come to meet Tripoli-based Presidential Council head Mohamed al-Menfi. GNU subsequently recalled its ambassador from Athens and summoned Greek chargé d’affaires in Tripoli.

In other important developments. In his briefing to UN Security Council, UN sec-gen’s special representative for Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, 15 Nov renewed call for legislative and presidential elections but did not articulate how he planned to address sources of friction over electoral roadmap. International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan early Nov met with Haftar during first ever visit to Libya, 9 Nov told UN Security Council he expects latter to cooperate with ICC investigations into alleged crimes committed by Haftar’s Libyan National Army.

Series of deals between Ankara and Tripoli inflamed internal and regional tensions; UN Security Council extended political mission’s mandate as new envoy took office in capital Tripoli.

Energy deals between Tripoli-based govt and Ankara triggered uproar. Tripoli-based govt 3 Oct signed preliminary economic and maritime agreements with Türkiye, opening door to joint oil and gas exploration and drillings in Libya-claimed Exclusive Economic Zone in Mediterranean, disputed by Egypt and Greece. East-based PM Bashagha and House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aguila Saleh immediately rejected deal as null and void, saying Tripoli-based govt’s term expired in Dec 2021. Egypt and Greece 3 and 9 Oct condemned hydrocarbon exploration deal as “illegal”, with Athens vowing to oppose it “with all legal means”. EU 3 Oct reiterated that it considers 2019 agreement demarcating Turkish and Libyan Exclusive Economic Zones (which latest oil and gas deal builds on) as infringement of sovereign rights of other states. Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba 25 Oct travelled to Türkiye and reportedly signed two military deals with Turkish govt with a view to strengthening military cooperation.

Rival camps held military parades, adopted bellicose rhetoric. On occasion of military parade in southern city of Sebha, East-based military commander Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar 17 Oct called for popular “rebellion” against “governmental failure”; said his forces “are ready to protect the people in their uprising”. Forces loyal to Tripoli-based govt 22 Oct held televised military exercise in Dabaiba’s presence. Aguila Saleh and Khaled al-Mishri, head of Tripoli-based High State Council, 20-21 Oct met in Morocco, said they had agreed to take steps to unify rival govts and resume dialogue on holding elections; Dabaiba 21 Oct rejected “parallel paths”.

UN renewed efforts to help break political stalemate. New UN Sec-Gen Special Representative Abdoulaye Bathily 14 Oct arrived in Tripoli to assume his duties and in following days held talks with rival leaders, including Dabaiba, Aguila Saleh, Presidential Council Chairman Mohammed al-Menfi, and National Oil Corporation chairman Farhat Bengdara. UN Security Council 28 Oct unanimously extended political mission UNSMIL’s mandate for another year, urged parties to agree on roadmap to presidential and parliamentary elections.

Crisis of two rival govts remained intractable as Sirte-based PM Fathi Bashagha came out weakened of failed efforts to enter capital Tripoli.

PM Dabaiba continued to consolidate control in Tripoli. Militias aligned with Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba early Sept reportedly took over security headquarters in Ain Zara town south of Tripoli after repelling forces loyal to rival Sirte-based PM Fathi Bashagha in late Aug. Situation inside Tripoli remained calm in Sept, but renewed clashes between rival armed factions 2-3 Sept broke out in Warshafana area west of Tripoli with reports of mortar fire. Fighting 25-26 Sept also erupted in Zawiya town, 40km west of Tripoli, allegedly over fuel trafficking; at least five people killed including ten-year-old girl; UN Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) next day “condemned the use of heavy artillery in densely populated neighbourhoods”.

Parties sought to strengthen relations with Ankara. Dabaiba and Bashagha, 31 Aug-1 Sept made parallel visits to Türkiye to seek Ankara’s support. Turkish FM Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu 14 Sept said Türkiye seeks to “build good relations” with various Libyan parties amid media reports that Turkish drones turned late-Aug clashes in Dabaiba’s favour.

New UN envoy appointed. UN Sec-Gen António Guterres 2 Sept appointed Senegalese diplomat and former govt minister Abdoulaye Bathily as special representative for Libya and head of UNSMIL after obtaining Security Council’s approval, ending nine-month search. Dabaiba, who in Aug had reportedly objected to Bathily’s nomination, 3 Sept assured envoy of his “full support”. Bathily, who 25 Sept officially assumed duties, will have to mediate between Libyan factions now divided between those adamant that Dabaiba stay on until elections, those proposing new power-sharing deal and govt reshuffle under Dabaiba, and those calling for entirely new “third” govt. Foreign capitals also split on path ahead.

In other important developments. After power struggle erupted in Aug between Supreme Court and Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh 15 Sept announced appointment of Abdullah Abu Razizah as new chief justice of Supreme Court to replace Mohammed Al-Hafi; Abu Razizah few days later took office.

Worst fighting in years broke out in capital Tripoli between forces loyal to rival govts, raising prospect of a return to full-blown war. Fighting 26-27 Aug raged across Tripoli as forces aligned with Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR)-appointed PM Bashagha failed to take control of capital and oust Tripoli-based govt of PM Dabaiba; 32 people reportedly killed and 159 injured. Flare-up followed days of escalating tensions between rival factions. Smaller-scale clashes 5-6 Aug opposed Bashagha-aligned forces and militia loyal to Dabaiba near airport road in Tripoli. Amid build-up of forces outside Tripoli, UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) 23 Aug called for “immediate de-escalation”, warned that “current political stalemate [...] cannot be resolved through armed confrontation”. Bashagha 24 Aug called on Dabaiba to step down and peacefully hand over power to avoid bloodshed; Dabaiba rejected call, denounced “threats to ignite war” and vowed that no one would be allowed to meddle with security of Tripoli. Dabaiba 25 Aug urged head of Tripoli-based consultative High State Council, Khalid Al-Mishri, and HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh to approve constitutional basis for elections. Meanwhile, Supreme Court 18 Aug announced decision to reactivate its Constitutional Chamber, which had been inactive since 2016. Dabaiba same day welcomed move, saying it could act as “deterrent” to “abuses and violations” of 2015 power-sharing agreement. Opponents however denounced political manoeuvring in reaction to HoR session held 16 Aug, during which lawmakers voted on amending statutes of Supreme Court and ruled it could appoint advisers to top court. After Dabaiba in July changed oil leadership, Central Bank 2 Aug reportedly disbursed 8.5bn dinars to National Oil Corporation as part of 15bn “urgent and temporary financial arrangement” concluded in mid-April. Libya’s envoy to UN, Taher El-Sonni, 15 Aug said Dabaiba’s govt had rejected UN proposal to appoint Senegalese former Minister Abdoulaye Bathily as new head of UNSMIL; move came after UN Security Council late July extended UNSMIL’s mandate for only three months amid Russian insistence that new UN mission head is chosen before it agrees to longer extension.

Wave of protests highlighted popular frustration with political standoff; deadly clashes erupted between rival factions in capital Tripoli; and oil exports resumed after controversial oil leadership change. Series of spontaneous demonstrations – driven by difficult living conditions, including recurring electricity cuts, and political actors’ inability to form consensus on elections – early July rocked several cities across country. Notably, protesters 1 July stormed and set fire to House of Representatives building in eastern city of Tobruk. Under pressure from popular mobilisation and shrinking prospect of any political breakthrough, Sirte-based PM Bashagha 8 July said his govt would in following days attempt to take office in Tripoli with support of loyal armed forces; military commanders of Western region 13 July reiterated Tripoli is “a red line”, vowed to confront any attempts to sow discord among security components in capital. Deadly fighting between rival factions 21-22 July broke out in several Tripoli neighbourhoods, with 16 people reportedly killed; in response, Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba 22 July suspended Interior Minister Khaled Mazen, replacing him on an interim basis with local govt Minister Bader Eddine al-Toumi. Meanwhile, Dabaiba 12 July dismissed National Oil Corporation (NOC) Chairman Mustafa Sanalla, replaced him with former Central Bank Governor Farhat Bengdara. Sanalla next day rejected decision, said Dabaiba’s mandate to govern had expired. Militia loyal to Dabaiba 14 July deployed outside NOC headquarters in Tripoli and installed Bengdara as chairman. NOC’s new leadership 15 July lifted force majeure which was declared in April at several oil facilities, enabling oil production and exports to resume in following days; NOC 31 July said crude production had returned to pre-force majeure levels of 1.2mn barrels per day. Arabic language media outlets Al Jazeera Arabic and Al-Araby Al-Jadeed in July reported growing convergence between Dabaiba and eastern strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Notably, Lt-Gen Abdelrazzak Al-Nadhouri, second in command of Haftar-led forces, 18-19 July reportedly met with Lt-Gen Muhammad Al-Haddad, chief of staff of Libyan army, to discuss unification of military institution. Meanwhile, U.S. judge 29 July found Haftar liable for war crimes over alleged extrajudicial killings and torture in Libya, paving the way for plaintiffs to seek compensation.

Crisis of two govts dragged on as UN-led talks failed to forge consensus on constitutional basis for elections. House of Representatives (HoR) 15 June passed Sirte-based PM Fathi Bashagha’s proposed govt budget. Bashagha unlikely to be able to tap into state funds, however, as Tripoli-based Govt of National Unity (GNU) immediately rejected budget, and Central Bank of Libya Governor Siddiq Elkebir, who is in charge of making disbursements into govt accounts, did not signal he would recognise budget. Bashagha’s efforts to win international support remained unsuccessful. UN Sec-Gen office 23 June said UN would continue to recognise Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba as legitimate PM until elections are held. Delegates of HoR and Tripoli-based High State Council 12-20 June met in Egypt’s capital Cairo for third round of UN-sponsored political talks, failed to find agreement on constitutional basis for elections; new UN-convened talks between rival assemblies’ chairmen 28-29 June took place in Switzerland, failed to make breakthrough. Simultaneously, some politicians in recent weeks tried to forge consensus for “third” govt to replace both Bashagha and Dabaiba-led executives, while eastern strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and Dabaiba aides in June allegedly met outside Libya to negotiate deal aimed at persuading Haftar to drop support for Bashagha in favour of Dabaiba. Politically driven closures of oil sector throughout June persisted, with production fluctuating between 600,000-900,000 barrels/day, equivalent to 50-75% of country’s total oil production before closures; National Oil Corporation 30 June declared force majeure on oil terminals of Sidra and Ras Lanuf in Gulf of Sirte region due to shutdown of oilfields. Meanwhile, security situation in capital Tripoli remained tense. Notably, rival western militias 10 June clashed in Souk el-Tlath neighbourhood, leaving at least one dead; UN Support Mission in Libya next day expressed concerned and urged restraint, also reported mobilisation of armed groups from areas surrounding Tripoli. Heavy fighting between rival GNU-affiliated militias 22 June left three combatants and one civilian dead in Zawiyet Al-Dahmani neighbourhood. Pan-Arab media 23 June reported clashes at military base in Tripoli as 22 June transitional phase deadline set by 2020 roadmap passed.

Political crisis took violent turn as forces loyal to rival govts clashed in capital Tripoli amid lack of substantial progress in UN-led negotiations; oil and gas fields and export terminals remained closed. Tobruk-based PM Fathi Bashagha 17 May entered Tripoli in bid to install his govt in capital city; armed groups loyal to Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba mobilised and opened fire, leaving one person killed; Dabaiba’ camp reportedly granted Bashagha safe passage out of Tripoli following mediation by local actors and members of 5+5 Joint Military Commission – comprising representatives of Libya’s two rival military coalitions. In televised addresses same day, Dabaiba condemned “coup project”, said Bashagha “committed suicide politically”, while Bashagha said his govt would be based in central city of Sirte but claimed Dabaiba had “lost control” of Tripoli. Reports in following days emerged that Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aghela Saleh and head of Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC) Khaled Mishri mid-May met in Egypt, agreed to work together toward “third way” including new govt that would replace Dabaiba and Bashagha’s; latter’s entourage however denied Saleh had dropped his support for Bashagha. UN-led negotiations made little substantial progress in charting way out of political impasse. UN Acting Special Representative for Libya Stephanie Williams 15-20 May convened second round of talks between representatives of rival assemblies in Egypt’s capital Cairo; participants reviewed 2017 draft constitution and found consensus on two thirds of articles, but failed to concretely discuss roadmap to elections and crisis of two rival govts; talks to resume 11 June. Oil and gas fields and export terminals – shut down in mid-April by pro-Libyan National Army head, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, and pro-Bashagha constituencies to weaken Dabaiba’s access to oil revenues – remained closed; crude oil exports down to approximately 700,000 barrels/day, one third less than normal, with estimated $40mn daily loss of foregone oil sales revenues. As part of U.S. efforts to persuade rival authorities to accept “financial mechanism” to oversee disbursement of govt funds, U.S. ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, 26 May met in Tunisia with various state institution representatives.

Political feud engulfed country’s economic and financial institutions as rival authorities sought to secure access to oil revenues; UN efforts to negotiate way out of political impasse remained vain. Five military officers loyal to eastern strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar 9 April withdrew from UN-backed so-called 5+5 Joint Military Commission (comprising representatives of country’s two rival military coalitions), urged Haftar to shut down oil production to prevent Tripoli-based PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba from accessing oil revenues; move came after National Oil Corporation (NOC) transferred oil sales revenues to Tripoli-based Central Bank of Libya (CBL), whose governor has remained loyal to Dabaiba, despite promising in March to abide by Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) order not to do so. NOC mid-April declared force majeure and suspended operations at Al-Feel and Sharara oil fields, Zuwetina and Brega oil terminals, after local protesters allegedly backed by Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) entered sites; all sites remained closed by month’s end. Clashes between two rival militias allied with Dabaiba’s govt 22 April disrupted operations in Zawiya oil facility (west). Meanwhile, delegates from HoR and rival Tripoli-based consultative High State Council (HSC) 13-18 April attended UN-backed political talks on legal framework for elections in Egypt’s capital Cairo; participants failed to make breakthrough but agreed to resume talks in May (after Muslim holy month of Ramadan). HoR-appointed PM Fathi Bashagha 21 April presided over his first cabinet meeting in Sebha city (south); govt renewed commitment to pursuing “peaceful option” to assume duties in Tripoli. Meanwhile, Islamic State (ISIS) 19 April claimed responsibility for previous night car bomb attack targeting LNA camp in Umm al-Aranib town (south); no casualties reported. LNA said it repelled 25 April attack by armed group, reportedly affiliated with ISIS, in Ghadwa area near Sabha city. British daily newspaper Financial Times 28 April reported some 1,000 pro-Moscow Syrian mercenaries and about 200 operatives from Russian private military company Wagner Group, who had been stationed alongside Haftar-led forces, pulled out of Libya in recent weeks; also said some 5,000 pro-Moscow mercenaries allegedly remain in country.

Crisis of two rival govts raised spectre of renewed localised clashes and tug of war over control of state’s resources, putting 2020 ceasefire at risk. Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) 1 March endorsed PM Fathi Bashagha’s 39-member cabinet in controversial vote of confidence marred by procedural shortcomings. Bashagha same day vowed to install his govt in capital Tripoli “peacefully and securely”. Tripoli-based incumbent PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba immediately condemned “fraudulent vote”, refused to cede power and said he will “hold accountable anyone who dares to approach any government building” in Tripoli. Armed groups loyal to Tripoli-based govt 3 March shut down airspace and detained two ministers of Bashagha-led govt to impede them from attending swearing-in ceremony in Tobruk city (east); ministers released next day, domestic flights between east and west resumed 22 March. Pro-Bashagha forces 10 March deployed on eastern edges of Tripoli, raising fears of confrontation with pro-Dabaiba forces. U.S. Ambassador Richard Norland immediately warned against escalation, while UN mission same day called on parties to “refrain from any action that could lead to armed clashes”. Bashagha next day said forces had withdrawn and assured “there will not be a war”. Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar’s forces 15 March stormed Dabaiba’s Government of National Unity (GNU) headquarters in Benghazi city (east) and dismissed all employees; later handed building over to Bashagha’s govt deputy PM Salim Al-Zadma. UN Under Sec-Gen for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo 16 March warned Security Council that “political polarization” in Libya “risks dividing the institutions once again”; also highlighted recent increase in human rights violations, hate speech and political violence. After UN Special Adviser on Libya Stephanie Williams 4 March asked HoR and Tripoli-based consultative High State Council (HSC) to nominate six delegates each to form “joint committee” to resolve political impasse, HSC 15 March nominated representatives, but HoR failed to appoint representatives and did not attend UN-backed HoR-HSC Joint Committee talks in Tunisia 22-24 March. Bashagha 22 March banned implementation of GNU-issued decrees or instructions; next day accused GNU of usurping power and occupying state institutions’ headquarters in Tripoli; 26-28 March repeatedly vowed to enter Tripoli in next few days.

House of Representatives appointed Fathi Bashagha as new PM, increasing polarisation and raising risk of institutional division; vote of confidence in new govt could result in two rival govts vying for power. Unidentified gunmen 10 Feb attacked incumbent PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba’s convoy in capital Tripoli; sources close to Dabaiba denounced “assassination attempt”. Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) hours later appointed former Tripoli-based Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha as PM-designate and tasked him with forming new govt by late Feb. HoR same day postponed elections indefinitely by passing new political roadmap stipulating HoR and rival Tripoli-based assembly, High State Council, will task experts committee with amending never-adopted 2017 draft constitution; amendments to be subjected to referendum prior to elections. Bashagha’s appointment follows 2021 deal with his past foe, Libyan National Army head Khalifa Haftar, providing that in case of failure to hold presidential election in Dec 2021, Haftar would support Bashagha as head of new govt in return for concessions in cabinet line-up and on condition that Bashagha increase funds allocated to Haftar-led military forces. Dabaiba immediately rejected HoR’s move, vowed to remain in post until national elections are held. Hundreds 11 Feb demonstrated in Tripoli and Misrata city against HoR; military brigades loyal to Dabaiba next day converged on Tripoli from other towns to “secure the government headquarters and key sites in the capital”. Dabaiba 21 Feb announced multi-track plan leading to parliamentary elections in June and postponing constitutional review and presidential election to after new parliament is seated; also reiterated elections “sole solution” to political crisis. HoR 28 Feb postponed vote of confidence in Bashagha’s proposed govt citing need for more consultations on cabinet line-up. Foreign powers remained divided on way forward, with several foreign capitals adopting wait-and-see attitude while Egypt and Russia supported Bashagha’s bid to premiership. Dabaiba’s Govt of National Unity 17 Feb criticised UN Special Adviser Stephanie Williams for allegedly making contradictory statements on political crisis.

Following failure to hold presidential election in late Dec, parliament and others manoeuvred to postpone polls indefinitely. Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aguila Saleh 17 Jan called for replacing interim Govt of National Unity (GNU) with new govt, contending PM Dabaiba’s mandate expired 24 Dec, and proposed new constitutional drafting process. High National Election Commission (HNEC) same day said six to eight months needed to resume electoral process (constitutional drafting process notwithstanding), 20 Jan set up committee to review presidential candidacies submitted in Nov. Dabaiba 23 Jan also called for adoption of new constitution before elections, but denied his mandate expired on 24 Dec, insisting new govt can only be appointed following elections. UN Special Adviser Stephanie Williams 24 Jan insisted “Libya does not need another prolonged transitional period”; comment came after Williams 16 Jan said holding elections by June, in line with UN-brokered 2020 roadmap, was “very reasonable and possible”. Dabaiba 31 Jan announced applications for interim PM would open next day and said HoR would meet 8 Feb to vote on new PM; several politicians throughout month appeared to campaign for PM position, including former Tripoli-based Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha and Tripoli-based High State Council Chair Khaled Mishri, both of whom recently made important overtures to eastern strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Islamic State (ISIS)-affiliated combatants 24 Jan claimed having killed two security personnel near southern town of Sabha one week earlier; new attack in same area 26 Jan reportedly killed another three. Meanwhile, French govt 4 Jan said around 300 mercenaries had left eastern Libya, hailing start of phased withdrawal of thousands of foreign forces in line with 2020 ceasefire. Central Bank Governor Saddek Omar Elkaber 20 Jan announced launch of bank’s reunification process. Brussels Prosecutor’s Office 21 Jan said it had issued international arrest warrant against Libyan Investment Authority Chairman Ali Mahmoud Hassan on corruption and embezzlement charges as part of investigation into management of Libyan assets frozen in Belgium after fall of Muammar Qadhafi in 2011.

Authorities postponed presidential election in last-minute move as tensions ran high around capital Tripoli. Amid disputes over eligibility of candidates, electoral timetable and scope of future president’s powers, High National Electoral Commission (HNEC) 20-22 Dec postponed first round of presidential election, initially scheduled for 24 Dec, for one month, as House of Representatives (HoR) committee tasked with monitoring election process 22 Dec said it was “impossible” to hold polls as planned. U.S. Ambassador Richard Norland immediately expressed “disappointment”. After British embassy 24 Dec expressed continued support for Govt of National Unity (GNU), said it would “not endorse the establishment of parallel governments or institutions”, HoR Foreign Affairs Committee next day accused UK of “interference”, said only HoR could decide on formation of new govt or continuation of GNU. Elections unlikely to take place in Jan as HoR election committee 27 Dec recommended laying out “new, realistic and applicable roadmap … rather than fixing new dates and repeating the same errors”; HoR next day suspended session on political roadmap. Earlier in month, several controversial presidential candidates cleared to run: Tripoli Appeals Court 1 Dec upheld PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba’s presidential bid; Sebha Appeals Court next day reinstated Saif al-Islam Qadhafi as candidate; Tripoli Appeals Court 6 Dec overturned Zawiya court ruling barring Khalifa Haftar from running. Run-up to tentative polls marred by tensions. HNEC 2 Dec said electoral centres subjected to armed robbery and voter cards theft; militiamen 8 Dec entered HNEC’s Zawiya premises to demand postponement of elections until adoption of new constitution. Forces affiliated with different armed groups 16-21 Dec took up positions in and around Tripoli in possible protest at Presidential Council’s 15 Dec decision to replace Tripoli Military Zone Commander Gen Abdelbasit Marwan with Gen Abdelkader Mansour; Council 21 Dec suspended appointment, while UN mission (UNSMIL) same day said mobilisation “creates tensions and increases the risk of clashes that could spiral into conflict”. Following Nov resignation of UN Envoy Ján Kubiš, UN Sec-Gen António Guterres 6 Dec appointed Stephanie Williams – who served as Acting Special Representative in March 2020-Jan 2021 – as new Special Adviser on Libya.

Registration of polarising presidential hopefuls amid heated controversy over electoral framework could presage mobilisation of rival forces around 24 Dec polls. Several controversial figures submitted presidential candidacies to electoral commission throughout Nov: son of late dictator Muammar Qadhafi, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, who is wanted by International Criminal Court, 14 Nov; eastern strongman Khalifa Haftar 16 Nov; and PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba 21 Nov. Election commission 24 Nov disqualified 25 out of 98 registered candidates, including Qhadafi. Qhadafi’s lawyer late-Nov tried to appeal decision, but Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) forces impeded access to Sebha courthouse where appeal should be filed; LNA 30 Nov reportedly withdrew. Tripoli court 28 Nov accepted appeal submitted by presidential hopefuls against Dabaiba’s candidacy, while Benghazi court same day rejected appeal against Haftar’s candidacy. Electoral Commission expected to release final list of presidential candidates in early Dec. Meanwhile, several Tripoli-based anti-Haftar and anti-Qadhafi constituencies voiced opposition to presidential and parliamentary election laws unilaterally adopted by House of Representatives (HoR) in Sept-Oct. Notably, some 25 mayors 9 Nov signed petition against electoral framework; in following days, some 40 HoR members, and separately military coalition of anti-Haftar forces, endorsed petition. French President Emmanuel Macron 12 Nov hosted international conference for Libya; world powers reaffirmed need to hold elections on time and vowed to push for sanctions against anyone who disrupts electoral process, but some cracks appeared among foreign stakeholders and within UN over current electoral framework. Both UK and Italy’s representatives stressed need for consensus on election legislation, while Egypt and France did not express any concern on current electoral framework. UN Sec-Gen António Guterres same day urged Libyans “to come together in a spirit of national unity” and “forge a consensus on the legal framework for the elections”; statement departed from line of UN Envoy Ján Kubiš, who in recent weeks rubberstamped HoR’s electoral laws; Kubiš 23 Nov offered his resignation which Guterres accepted. UN Security Council next day threatened sanctions against those “obstructing or undermining the elections”.

Uncertainty persisted over whether elections will take place in Dec, while tensions within PM Dabaiba’s govt resurfaced. Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) 6 Oct issued long-awaited parliamentary election law despite lack of proper qualified majority and without consulting political rivals; text envisages parliamentary elections taking place several months after presidential election set for 24 Dec. Critics, especially among Tripoli-based constituencies, immediately denounced procedural flaws and said sequencing violates political component of UN-backed peace plan that envisages simultaneous presidential and legislative elections. Participants in Libya Stabilization Conference in capital Tripoli, 21 Oct reiterated their support for 24 Dec date (set during UN-backed forum in Nov 2020), as did embassies of France, Germany, Italy, UK and U.S. in joint statement 25 Oct. So-called 5+5 Joint Military Commission, comprising representatives of Libya’s two rival military coalitions, 6-8 Oct met in Switzerland’s Geneva city in presence of UN Envoy Ján Kubiš, agreed on Action Plan envisaging “phased, balanced and synchronized withdrawal” of mercenaries, foreign fighters and forces. Tensions still brewing between Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar-led Arab Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF) and Tripoli-based Govt of National Accord (GNU) over salary disputes, with GNU refusing to pay ALAF salaries to Haftar’s central command and instead demanding to make direct payment to individual bank accounts. Political tensions between easterners within GNU and PM Dabaiba resurfaced. Notably, deputy PM Hussein al-Qatrani and others 10 Oct accused Dabaiba of sidelining ministers from east. Amid stalled unification of Central Bank, Dabaiba’s govt took controversial measures against heads of some top income-generating institutions, notably sacking head of state-owned Telecommunications holding company Faisal Gergab mid-Oct, allegedly after latter’s refusal to authorise transfer of profits into govt accounts; oil ministry 19 Oct also announced suspension of National Oil Corporation head Mustafa Sanalla, officially to allow investigations into alleged administrative offences. UN human rights investigators 4 Oct said war crimes and crimes against humanity likely committed by all conflict parties, including external actors, since 2016.

Prospects of holding elections by year’s end fading as parliament unilaterally issued presidential election law and voted no-confidence motion against unity govt, escalating political tensions. Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aghila Saleh 8 Sept ratified presidential election law without putting it to vote or consulting rival political factions; law establishes strong presidential system of governance. Unilateral move sparked ire of western-based authorities. Rival assembly, Tripoli-based consultative High State Council (HSC), next day decried law as “flawed” due to lack of consultations, vowed to oppose it in court. Other Tripoli-based political opponents claimed it was designed to impose presidential election alone, without parliamentary ones, despite UN-backed roadmap requiring to hold both by year’s end. While briefing UN Security Council, UN Special Envoy for Libya Ján Kubiš 10 Sept did not express reservations on HoR’s presidential election law. HSC 19 Sept passed its own proposal for constitutional framework, envisaging bicameral legislative model, but also directly elected president. HoR 27 Sept postponed same-day session on parliamentary elections law to early Oct. Following weeks of mounting tensions between parliament and govt, HoR 21 Sept approved motion of no-confidence against govt, citing concerns over budgetary disbursements; PM Dabaiba and his cabinet to stay in power as “caretakers” with curbed access to country’s finances. Dabaiba same day rejected no-confidence vote, called on Libyans to rise up against HoR; in response, hundreds 24 Sept gathered in capital Tripoli. Meanwhile, fighting 3 Sept broke out between rival Tripoli-based armed forces in worst fighting this year. Dabaiba 7 Sept said govt forces arrested senior Islamic State (ISIS) figure Embarak al-Khazimi in operation south of Tripoli. Forces loyal to eastern strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar 14 Sept launched air and ground operation against formerly allied Chadian rebel group Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) in Tarbu area along Chadian border; Chadian and French forces reportedly involved in operation. Presidency Council Chair Mohamed al-Menfi 6 Sept announced release of political prisoners as part of national reconciliation effort; Saadi Qadhafi, son of former leader Muammar Qadhafi, released previous day. U.S. House of Representatives 28 Sept passed bill enabling sanctions against foreign actors in Libya.

Implementation of UN-backed peace process stalled amid tensions between rival armed coalitions and rising blockages between parliament and govt. Leader of Arab Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF) Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar 9 Aug ordered raft of appointments and promotions of senior military officials under his command; move came two days after Presidency Council (supreme armed forces commander as per UN-brokered political transition roadmap) cautioned against unilateral decisions to nominate or promote military officials. 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) – comprising military officers loyal to now dissolved UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA) and others affiliated with ALAF – 14 Aug called on Govt of National Unity (GNU) to suspend military agreements with all countries, said it had agreed on measures for “urgent removal of foreign forces and mercenaries”; GNA-aligned political and military figures accused JMC of overstepping its authority. UN 26 Aug welcomed creation of joint security force comprising members of rival coalitions to secure key water pipeline; joint force 29 Aug reportedly prevented sabotage attempt by gunmen affiliated with former Qadhafi-era official. Meanwhile, delegates of UN-backed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum 11 Aug failed to reach consensus on legal framework to hold elections in Dec, and House of Representatives (HoR) mid-Aug said it is drafting bill for direct presidential election. Amid repeated govt failure to obtain HoR approval of 2021 state budget, Oil and Gas Minister Mohamed Oun 16 Aug warned budget stalemate put oil production at risk. After HoR speaker 25 Aug demanded that PM Dabaiba appear before chamber to be questioned about govt’s performance or face no-confidence vote, Dabaiba 27 Aug accused HoR of obstructing govt and hindering elections, said body’s reasons for delaying budget approval were “unrealistic and flimsy”. Military prosecutor’s office 5 Aug issued arrest warrant for Qadhafi’s son, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, over alleged ties to Russian security personnel suspected of war crimes in Libya in 2019; move came days after Saif Qadhafi revealed ambitions for political comeback in interview with U.S. newspaper The New York Times. Islamic State (ISIS) 23 Aug claimed responsibility for previous day car bomb attack against ALAF checkpoint in Zella area (south).

Transition remained at standstill with all political and economic tracks of peace process deadlocked; authorities reopened strategic road linking west and east. In Geneva city (Switzerland), delegates of UN-backed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum 28 June-2 July failed to forge agreement on legal framework to hold presidential and parliamentary elections in Dec; political factions remained at loggerheads over electoral roadmap and which type of ballot to hold. Renewed attempts by House of Representatives (HoR) to approve 2021 state budget proposed by govt of national unity 6 and 13 July failed; main stumbling block related to funding for Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar-aligned forces; Economic Working Group comprising UN, U.S., EU and Egyptian representatives 26 July urged Libyan govt and parliament to “find realistic compromise solutions” on budget. Appointment of new Central Bank governor remained in stalemate, with HoR and rival Tripoli-based High Council of State disagreeing on appointment process. UN Special Envoy for Libya Ján Kubiš 8 July submitted final report of international audit of Central Bank’s rival branches, launched in 2018, to Presidency Council and heads of Central Bank’s branches; auditors reportedly said Central Bank’s division complicates access to foreign exchange, impedes monetary reform, and undermines integrity and oversight of commercial banks, and recommended steps toward its reunification. Kubiš 15 July told UN Security Council Libya’s banking system “will likely collapse” if country’s two central bank branches do not unify, also said stalled political talks could unravel Oct 2020 ceasefire agreement. HoR Speaker Aghela Saleh 27 July warned Libya would return to “square one” and new rival govt could emerge in east if polls were delayed. PM Dabaiba 30 July said strategic Misrata-Sirte road linking west and east had reopened in line with Oct 2020 ceasefire provisions. Rival militias 22-23 July reportedly clashed in capital Tripoli, leaving seven dead including three civilians; Mohamed Kani, leader of Haftar-aligned al-Kani militia accused of having killed over 100 people in and around Tarhuna city in 2020, killed 27 July in Benghazi city reportedly while resisting arrest by another Haftar-aligned unit.

Tensions between rival armed coalitions rose and Islamic State staged first attack in a year; at Berlin conference, Libyan govt and foreign states renewed calls for elections in Dec and foreign forces withdrawal. Forces loyal to now dissolved UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA) 5 June held military ceremony in Misrata city (west) to mark first anniversary of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s defeat in capital Tripoli; Haftar’s Arab Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF) held their own military parade in Benghazi city (east) late May to mark seventh anniversary of launch of their “Dignity Operation”. High-level Turkish delegation 12 June visited Tripoli and condemned parade by “putschist Haftar”, prompting pro-ALAF MPs to denounce violation of Libyan sovereignty and triggering brawl in House of Representatives 14 June. Following months-long delay, PM Dabaiba 20 June said strategic road linking Misrata to Sirte city (centre) had reopened in line with Oct 2020 ceasefire provisions, which ALAF same day denied; 5+5 Joint Military Commission – comprising military officers loyal to GNA and others affiliated with ALAF – next day postponed reopening. In first Islamic State (ISIS) attack since May 2020, suicide bombing 6 June and explosive device 14 June killed six ALAF-aligned fighters in Sebha area (south). ALAF 17 June said it had launched counter-terrorism operation in south west and 19 June closed Essen border crossing with Algeria, prompting Presidency Council to same day ban military movements unless approved. Unidentified gunmen 3 June abducted NGO Libyan Red Crescent official Mansour al-Maghrabi in Ajdabiya city (east). At international conference co-sponsored by UN in Germany’s capital Berlin, new interim national unity govt and foreign stakeholders 23 June renewed calls to hold presidential and parliamentary elections in Dec in line with UN roadmap, and for “all foreign forces and mercenaries” to withdraw “without delay” despite reservations from Turkey, whose forces are deployed in Libya. Ahead of 1 July deadline set by UN to clarify electoral roadmap and enact necessary legislation for Dec elections, delegates of UN-backed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum 28 June-1 July met in Switzerland in bid to break deadlock in negotiations.

Implementation of Oct 2020 ceasefire provisions and discussions on electoral roadmap and budget remained largely stalled. UN Sec-Gen Guterres 14 April said there had been “no reduction of foreign fighters” since Oct 2020 ceasefire, reiterated calls for their withdrawal and for all parties to stop violating arms embargo, also said defensive positions reportedly being set up in centre along ceasefire line between forces loyal to now dissolved UN-backed Govt of National Accord and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Arab Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF). UN Special Envoy for Libya Ján Kubiš 21 May said efforts to reopen strategic road linking Misrata city (west) to Sirte city (centre), gateway to Libya’s main oil terminals, had stalled. Amid continued disagreement over electoral roadmap, France, Germany, Italy, UK and U.S. 6 May jointly called on Libyan authorities to facilitate 24 Dec elections and agree on constitutional and legal basis for elections by July. Delegates of UN-backed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum 26-27 May failed to reach consensus on which elections should be held; Kubiš referred matter back to House of Representatives (HoR) and High Council of State. HoR 24 May discussed amended state’s budget proposed by Govt of National Unity (GNU), approved salaries and subsidies sections, but rejected operational and development expenditures. Meanwhile, Presidency Council 7 May appointed Hussein al-Aeb as new intelligence chief, prompting Tripoli-based armed groups allied to former intelligence chief Imad Tarabulsi to reportedly storm Council’s headquarters in capital Tripoli. HoR members 24 May also protested Aeb’s appointment, which they had not been consulted over in violation of UN roadmap. Haftar 29 May organised military parade in Benghazi city (east), which High Council of State same day condemned. UK 13 May imposed asset freezes and travel bans on ALAF-aligned al-Kani militia and its two leaders over alleged abuses. International Criminal Court 17 May said it had collected evidence of “serious crimes” in detention facilities, including torture and sexual violence, and urged GNU to investigate. Following sudden surge in migrant departures for Europe early May, GNU late May said EU, Italy and Malta had agreed to help secure Libya’s southern border.

Discussions on roadmap for elections planned late this year and budget stalled amid disagreement between different constituencies. Legal Committee of UN-backed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum 7-9 April failed to reach consensus on legal roadmap for general elections scheduled for Dec; disagreements persisted over whether Libya should hold referendum on draft constitution first, or opt directly for parliamentary election or both parliamentary and presidential elections. Budget discussions turned into tug of war between institutions. Eastern-based House of Representatives 19 April rejected PM Dabaiba’s govt budget, reportedly making its approval conditional on Central Bank’s governor’s replacement, which eastern constituencies have long requested; National Oil Corporation same day said it was forced to declare force majeure – lifted 26 April – at key export terminal due to Central Bank’s reported refusal to release budget funds, accused latter of politicising oil sector. Dabaiba 25 April cancelled next day’s cabinet meeting in Benghazi city (east) after security officers aligned with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Arab Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF) barred Dabaiba’s security escort from entering city over presence of Tripoli-based militias in its ranks; ALAF 27 April clarified it had no issue with Dabaiba visiting if coordinated with local security forces. New mass graves in and around Tarhuna city (west), former stronghold of ALAF-aligned militia, continued to be uncovered throughout month; Dabaiba early April pledged to deliver justice. NGO Amnesty International 26 April said east-based military courts had convicted hundreds of civilians perceived to be ALAF critics or opponents – including 22 sentenced to death – in “sham, torture-tainted trials” between 2018 and 2021. UN Security Council 16 April unanimously approved deployment, “when conditions allow”, of UN team to Sirte city to monitor Oct 2020 ceasefire. Presidency Council Chairperson Mohamed al-Menfi 21 April ordered armed forces to secure southern border with Chad immediately after Haftar-aligned Chadian rebel group Front for Change and Concord based in southern Libya 11 April crossed border into Chad in bid to depose Chadian President Déby (see Chad). 

Unified govt, first in over seven years, received vote of confidence and assumed power in major step forward for peace process. PM-designate Dabaiba 4 March submitted cabinet line-up proposal to House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aghela Saleh notably featuring two deputy PM positions for eastern and southern Libya. Following two-day parliamentary debate in strategic city of Sirte (centre) and closed-door negotiations which led Dabaiba to replace ten cabinet picks, HoR 10 March approved his Govt of National Unity (GNU) with close to all of 132 lawmakers present voting in favour, drawing international commendation; GNU tasked with leading country to general elections scheduled for Dec. GNU 15 March took oath before HoR in Tobruk city (east). UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA) PM Serraj in Tripoli 16 March and east-based PM Abdullah al-Thani in Benghazi city 23 March officially handed over power to GNU. Meanwhile, UN 3 March deployed advance team to assess possible UN support to Oct 2020 ceasefire. UN Security Council 12 March urged all parties to fully implement ceasefire agreement, called for withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries. UN expert panel report 16 March said arms embargo imposed in 2011 remained “totally ineffective”. Amid rumours that Turkish-backed Syrian mercenaries had begun withdrawing, FM Najla al-Mangoush 25 March called for “immediate departure” of all foreign mercenaries following meeting with French, German and Italian counterparts in Tripoli. Unidentified gunmen 24 March killed Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Arab Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF) senior commander Mahmoud al-Werfalli – wanted by International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2016-2018 – in Benghazi. PM Dabaiba 19 March ordered investigation after over a dozen bodies found in mass grave in Benghazi previous day. Authorities throughout month also discovered new mass graves in and around Tarhuna city (west), former stronghold of ALAF-aligned al-Kani militia, on whose leaders EU 22 March imposed sanctions for alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in Tarhuna between 2015 and 2020. ALAF 14 March announced arrest of prominent Islamic State figure Mohamed Miloud Mohamed, aka Abu Omar in Ubari city (south).

In unexpected breakthrough, participants to UN-led political talks elected new political leadership; implementation of Oct 2020 ceasefire however still on hold. UN-backed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum 5 Feb elected heads of unified transitional govt to lead country to general elections scheduled for Dec 2021; winning ticket secured 39 votes of 74, with Abdelhamid Dabaiba, a businessman with ties to former Qadhafi regime, elected PM-designate, Mohamed al-Menfi (representing east) chosen as Presidency Council president-designate, and Musa al-Koni (south) and Abdullah al-Lafi (west) elected Presidency Council VP-designates; vote of confidence in House of Representatives (HoR), currently scheduled on 8 March, needed for new leadership and upcoming cabinet to officially replace Libya’s two rival govts. Tripoli-based Govt of National Accord (GNA) immediately welcomed breakthrough and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, leader of east-based Arab-Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF), 6 Feb said he was ready to work with new leadership. UN Security Council 9 Feb welcomed “important milestone in Libyan political process”. In east, in bid to foster unity ahead of vote of confidence, al-Menfi 11 Feb met dozens of tribal elders, academics and activists in Benghazi city, next day met mayor of Tobruk city and pledged to unify all state institutions. Dabaiba 25 Feb delayed submitting list of cabinet members to HoR for approval. AFP 28 Feb leaked UN report alleging at least three delegates had received bribes to vote for Dabaiba in 5 Feb election. Meanwhile, UN Security Council 4 Feb called on Sec-Gen Guterres to deploy advance team to monitor implementation of Oct 2020 ceasefire, and UN Special Envoy for Libya Ján Kubiš 19 Feb met with Haftar in Benghazi city to discuss ceasefire implementation. Unclaimed mortar attack during tenth anniversary celebrations of Libyan uprising 17 Feb killed one child in Sabha city in south. GNA Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha 21 Feb claimed he was target of assassination attempt after gunmen same day opened fire on his motorcade outside capital Tripoli; one person killed and two arrested.

Participants to UN-led political talks agreed on mechanism for choosing transitional govt, while implementation of Oct 2020 ceasefire continued to falter. In apparent breakthrough, UN-backed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) 19 Jan agreed on hybrid mechanism to choose transitional three-member Presidency Council and PM to lead country to elections scheduled for Dec 2021; LPDF members to elect PM with 70% of votes, and simultaneously to be divided into three regions to elect with 70% of votes their representative on Presidency Council; votes scheduled for Feb; back-up list-based system to kick in if abovementioned voting procedure fails. Meanwhile, Tripoli-based Govt of National Accord (GNA) and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar-led Arab-Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF) continued to accuse each other of pursuing military build-up in violation of ceasefire signed in Oct, and missed 23 Jan deadline to ensure departure from Libya of all foreign fighters. ALAF 13 Jan accused Turkey of continuing to send military equipment to GNA, and media including U.S.-based TV channel CNN 22 Jan alleged ALAF-allied Russian military contractors had recently dug 70km trench fortification from Sirte city to Jufra airbase to prevent possible GNA military offensive in central and eastern Libya. New U.S. administration 28 Jan called on all external parties, including Turkey and Russia, to immediately cease military operations in Libya and withdraw their forces; United Arab Emirates next day said it was ready to cooperate with UN and U.S. to find “diplomatic and political solutions” to conflict. Central Bank of Libya early Jan introduced new unified exchange rate, devaluing Libyan dinar by 300% in attempt to alleviate faltering economy; move prompted major spike in price of basic food commodities, with bread and oil prices rising by 30% by mid-Jan. Rival finance ministers 12 Jan met to discuss unification of 2021 national budgets. UN Sec Gen Antonio Guterres 18 Jan appointed former Slovakian FM Ján Kubiš as new UN envoy to Libya; Kubiš due to take office in early Feb. UN Security Council mid-Jan also extended sine die mandate of UN Acting Special Representative for Libya Stephanie Williams to allow her to continue political dialogue efforts.

Implementation of Oct ceasefire agreement continued to falter, while political dialogue aimed at unifying country’s divided institutions stalled. Tripoli-based Govt of National Accord (GNA) 7 Dec accused Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar-led Arab-Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF) of mobilising in south in attempt to take over military base in desert town of Obari; ALAF same day denied claim and instead accused Tripoli of having dispatched “militias, weapons and military equipment toward front lines west of Sirte and Jufra” towns in centre; GNA in following weeks continued to alert foreign partners to suspected ALAF military build-up in south. Meanwhile, ALAF naval forces 7 Dec intercepted Turkish cargo vessel near port city of Derna in east, prompting Turkey’s FM to warn that “targeting Turkish interests in Libya will have grave consequences”; ALAF 9 Dec accused Turkey of “undermining Libyan sovereignty and its resources” by “dispatching military equipment” and “transporting mercenaries and foreign fighters to fight” alongside GNA forces. Turkish parliament 22 Dec extended Ankara’s direct military support to GNA, including deployment of Turkish troops, for another 18 months. In letter to UN Security Council, UN Sec-Gen Guterres 29 Dec proposed to set up international monitoring group to support ceasefire. Meanwhile, political talks stalled. UN Acting Special Representative for Libya Stephanie Williams 15 Dec said Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) failed to agree on mechanism to choose transitional govt to lead country to elections in Dec 2021 despite six online meetings since face-to-face talks in Tunisia in Nov. UN however moved forward with election preparations and 21 Dec established Legal Committee, consisting of 18 LPDF members, tasked with drafting proposals on legal framework for elections. UN Security Council 15 Dec approved Guterres’s proposal to appoint Bulgarian diplomat Nickolay Mladenov as UN special envoy for Libya; UN 22 Dec however said Mladenov had declined position due to “personal and family reasons”. Meeting of Central Bank of Libya’s board of directors  held 16 Dec for first time in five years; participants agreed to devaluate Libyan dinar and fixed official exchange rate of 4.48lyd/$, with aim to unify Libya’s exchange rate system. 

Ceasefire agreement faced implementation obstacles, while political talks made slow progress. 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) – comprising military officers loyal to UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA) and others affiliated with Field Marshal Haftar’s Arab-Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF) – 2-4 Nov met in western Ghadames city, for first time inside Libya, to establish subcommittees to follow-up on Oct ceasefire agreement; 10 Nov met again in central city of Sirte, agreed that JMC’s headquarters would be based there. In following days, subcommittees started to discuss reform of Petroleum Facilities Guards, military unit tasked with protecting oil facilities that both GNA and Haftar’s forces have rival chains of command over. Military forces from both sides, however, remained positioned on front lines and foreign military equipment continued to arrive to rival factions, in defiance of ceasefire. Acting UN Special Representative for Libya Stephanie Williams 19 Nov said GNA forces remained stationed at Abu Grein and al-Washkah localities, with patrolling activities reportedly taking place there, while ALAF continued to set up fortifications and military outposts between Sirte and al-Jufra towns, and around al-Jufra airbase; Williams same day said military cargo flights were recently  monitored at al-Watiya and Misrata airports, under GNA control, while intense cargo aircraft activity was monitored between Benina airport, al-Jufra and al-Gardabiya airbases under ALAF control. In Tunisia, UN-backed political negotiations 9-15 Nov produced noncommittal roadmap to presidential and parliamentary elections to be held 24 Dec 2021; document sets general principles guiding transition period and states that Libyan institutions have 60 days to agree on legal framework for elections. Delegates late Nov resumed consultations online, no substantial progress reported. Feud late Nov erupted between Central Bank of Libya (CBL) on one hand, and GNA and National Oil Corporation (NOC) on the other, over latters’ 22 Nov decision to withhold oil revenues in transit account and stop them from accruing to CBL; move is backed by U.S. and UN, but CBL argues it is illegal and could hinder public sector payments. 

Warring parties signed countrywide ceasefire agreement and resumed political talks under UN auspices, while oil production continued to increase. Representatives of UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA) and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar-led Arab-Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF) 23 Oct signed countrywide “permanent ceasefire” agreement, following UN-led talks in Geneva. Both sides agreed to stop hostilities across country, withdraw respective forces from front lines, expel foreign mercenaries and freeze foreign military training programs in Libya until new govt is formed. UN late Oct relaunched Libyan Political Dialogue; talks between 75 delegates representing rival camps, Tripoli-based High Council of State (HCS) and Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HOR), and other delegates handpicked by UN took place virtually 26 Oct; in-person meetings scheduled to start 9 Nov in Tunisia; discussions focus on formation of unified cabinet with view to reaching comprehensive political settlement. GNA 30 Oct announced PM Serraj, who last month said he would hand over duties by end of Oct, will stay in office until new govt is formed “to avoid a political vacuum”. Earlier in month, foreign actors hosted meetings between rival camps. Morocco 2-6 Oct convened delegations from rival assemblies to discuss appointment of heads of national institutions including Central Bank of Libya; delegations agreed to appoint either institutions’ chairman or deputy on basis of regional quotas. Egypt 11-13 Oct hosted HCS-HOR talks on constitutional roadmap. Meanwhile, tensions around central city of Sirte early to mid-Oct remained high as both sides reportedly continued to amass equipment and forces in spite of Aug local ceasefire; GNA early month accused Haftar’s camp of violating ceasefire by allegedly launching rockets against GNA positions, which Haftar denied. In attempt to pressure Russian military to withdraw from Libya, EU 15 Oct imposed travel ban and economic sanctions on Kremlin insider Yevgeny Prigozhin. Following Sept deal to lift months-long oil sector blockade, National Oil Corporation progressively lifted force majeure on export terminals and major oil fields, and oil production late-Oct reached 500,000 barrels per day. IMF data in Oct showed Libya’s GDP is expected to shrink by 66% this year and prices to increase by 22%.

Oil exports resumed after rival camps brokered deal to lift months-long oil sector blockade, and rival PMs pledged to step down amid protests. East-based strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar 18 Sept agreed to lift eight-month oil sector blockade and allow resumption of oil sales; move followed weeks of intense diplomatic efforts and meeting between Haftar’s camp and west-based UN-backed PM Serraj’s Deputy Ahmed Meitig in Russia mid-Sept. Central Bank and officials in Tripoli late Sept distanced themselves from deal on grounds that Meitig made too many financial concessions to Haftar camp, but oil exports resumed 26 Sept. Ceasefires declared by rival east-based House of Representatives’ head Aguila Saleh and Serraj in Aug mostly held, despite Haftar’s Arab-Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF) shelling UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA) forces’ headquarters west of strategic city of Sirte 1 Sept. Heads of rival assemblies, Saleh and Tripoli-based High State Council’s Khaled Mishri 6-10 Sept met in Morocco and agreed to start consultations on appointment of five top institutional posts, including Central Bank governor; leaders also agreed to appoint members of their institutions to participate in UN-mediated talks scheduled to restart in Oct, with aim to reach agreement on new unified govt to guide country toward general elections within 18 months. Protests against corruption and worsening living conditions subsided in west but continued in east. Protesters 13 Sept set fire to govt headquarters in Benghazi city and attacked police station in al-Marj town, prompting police to fire live ammunition, leaving one dead and several wounded. Amid unrest and in alleged attempt to pressure representatives of various factions to agree on new unity govt, rival PMs announced their intention to step down. East-based PM Abdullah al-Thani 14 Sept tendered his resignation to Saleh, who left him in caretaker capacity until lawmakers review his resignation. Serraj 16 Sept said UN-brokered talks have led to “new preparatory phase” to unify institutions and announced his intention to resign by end of Oct. Two militias loyal to GNA 24 Sept clashed in Tripoli suburb of Tajoura, leaving at least three killed and several wounded.

Head of Tripoli-based UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA) PM Serraj announced unilateral ceasefire amid intensifying diplomatic efforts to revive political negotiations, while rival authorities faced series of protests. Germany and U.S. intensified their efforts to find way out of stalemate in oil-rich central Libya, which GNA-allied forces backed by Turkey have been seeking to take back from Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Arab-Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF) in recent months. U.S. President Trump 13 Aug discussed with Turkish President Erdoğan creation of demilitarised zone around Sirte city and nearby Jufra airbase and reopening of Haftar-controlled oil sites. During visit to Libya, German FM Heiko Maas 17 Aug met with Serraj and reiterated calls for demilitarisation of central Libya. Haftar’s spokesperson 19 Aug said ALAF won’t retreat from Sirte and leave city to “invaders”. Serraj 21 Aug announced unilateral ceasefire, called for resumption of oil production and export through Libya’s National Oil Corporation and for presidential and parliamentary elections in March 2021. Haftar’s ally, Tobruk-based House of Representatives Speaker Aghela Saleh, same day expressed support for truce and elections, and proposed Sirte as new capital for Libya. Haftar’s spokesperson 23 Aug dismissed ceasefire, said GNA is planning Turkish-backed offensive on Sirte. Oil and gas export blockade imposed by ALAF remained in force, but Haftar-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard 19 Aug announced partial lifting of blockade in Marsa al-Brega oil export terminal solely for export of locally stored oil barrels, citing shortage of gas in local power stations. Protests 23 Aug erupted in capital Tripoli and other western cities over deteriorating living conditions and bad governance, and continued in following days; armed men fired live ammunition to disperse protesters in Tripoli wounding several, and abducted at least six. Serraj 29 Aug dismissed Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha allegedly over his handling of protests and subsequently announced plan to reshuffle cabinet. In Sirte, protests late-Aug erupted against Haftar forces and in support of former Qadhafi regime; ALAF forces cracked down on protestors reportedly killing one and arresting over 50.

Turkish-backed forces loyal to UN-recognised Govt of National Accord (GNA) prepared offensive in Libya’s centre, while Egypt took preparatory steps toward direct military intervention, raising risk of conflict escalation in Aug. In west, unknown aircraft 5 July launched airstrikes on Wutiya airbase, reportedly destroying air defence systems following Turkish deployment of military equipment there. In centre, GNA-allied forces continued to prepare for offensive to capture Sirte city, gateway to Libya’s main oil terminals, and nearby Jufra airbase from Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Arab-Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF); column of about 200 vehicles reportedly moved eastward from Misrata city 18 July. Citing threat to national security, Egypt army 9 July held major exercise near Libyan border and Egyptian parliament 20 July authorised troop deployment abroad “in defence of national security” against “criminal armed militias and foreign terrorist elements”. UN Security Council special session on Libya 9 July highlighted international schisms: France fulminated against Turkey’s “aggressive” posture as destabilising factor; Turkey called for international community to end support for ALAF; Germany and U.S. supported demilitarisation of central Libya, but Russia did not; U.S. slammed Russia for deployment of mercenaries, which Russia denied. UN acting envoy to Libya Stephanie Williams late July warned of “huge risk” of miscalculation around Sirte triggering direct confrontation between rival foreign powers. Diplomatic efforts redoubled to secure agreement on reopening of oil fields and export terminals that Haftar-led forces and allied local tribesmen shut down in Jan. U.S., UN and Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) early July proposed draft agreement holding guarantees that oil revenue would not accrue in contested Tripoli Central Bank but in NOC-controlled bank account for 120 days, to allow for concrete steps to address Haftar’s demands to replace Central Bank top management. NOC 10 July lifted force majeure on oil sites and ordered resumption of oil exports, but agreement unravelled within 24 hours with Haftar rejecting NOC’s temporary holding of oil revenues and reiterating call for audit of Central Bank under UN supervision. UN 27 July announced launch of Central Bank audit.

Tides turned in battle for capital Tripoli and front line shifted eastward around strategic city of Sirte, raising risk of escalation there in coming weeks, while political negotiations remained stalled. Forces loyal to UN-recognised Govt of National Accord (GNA) 5 June reclaimed control of capital Tripoli and took Tarhuna, last outpost of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Arab-Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF) in west, reportedly after ALAF and Russian military aides pulled out without fighting. GNA 11 June reported discovery of several mass graves in Tarhuna. GNA Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha 7 June signalled intention to continue military offensive eastward to capture strategic city of Sirte and nearby Jufra airbase, which serves as ALAF’s operations base. ALAF and its foreign backers 12-13 June repelled GNA offensive on Sirte; airstrikes killed over 40 GNA fighters and 19 civilians. Egypt President Sisi 20 June threatened military intervention in Libya over “red line” of Sirte. Turkey tried to strike deal with Russia over Sirte, but Russia’s foreign and defence ministers 14 June postponed visit to Turkey in last-minute move. Meanwhile, attempts at restarting negotiations failed. UN mission, which remains weakened by absence of special representative, held separate consultations on ceasefire with GNA and ALAF delegations throughout month. Sisi 6 June proposed roadmap for political negotiations, which was welcomed by allied states but rejected by GNA and Turkey. After National Oil Corporation and local guards 6-7 June agreed to restart oil production at Sharara and El-Feel oil fields in south, armed Haftar-allied military commanders 8 June ordered employees to halt production. UN Human Rights Council 22 June ordered fact-finding mission in Libya to investigate alleged violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law since early 2016.

Tripoli-aligned forces claimed significant military victories as urban areas in capital Tripoli faced unprecedented shelling and civilian casualties, while socio-economic conditions continued to deteriorate amid COVID-19 lockdown and oil blockade; external military support on both sides could fuel an escalation in June. UN mission 19 May said fighting between UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) and General Haftar’s Arab Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF) killed at least 58 civilians since 1 April; almost double the number of civilian casualties in first quarter of 2020. ALAF forces throughout month launched repeated artillery strikes on Tripoli’s Meitiga airport and residential neighbourhoods; ALAF forces 7 May killed two police and one civilian in attack on Zawiyat al-Dahmani suburb in Tripoli near foreign ministry, Turkish embassy and Italian ambassador’s residence. GNA forces 5 May launched new offensive and 18 May seized control of ALAF-stronghold Wutiya airbase; dozens killed in offensive. ALAF 20 May announced tactical withdrawal from southern Tripoli neighbourhoods, under its control since April 2019 but fighting in city continued. Turkey continued sea and air deliveries of military aid to Libyan forces allied to Ankara; Russia delivered at least 14 MIG-29 and SU-24s fighter jets to Haftar-controlled bases throughout May, prompting U.S. 26 May to voice concern over Moscow’s increased military footprint in Libya and possible escalation. ALAF air force chief 21 May announced plan for “largest air campaign in Libyan history in coming hours” and said “all Turkish positions and interests in all cities are legitimate targets”. U.S., Russia, Turkey, UN and Algeria late May voiced support for ceasefire and resumption of political talks. Central Bank 1 May projected 2020 budget deficit of more than $18bn, in addition to loss of over $4.5bn due to ongoing ALAF-backed tribes blockade of oil production and export sites in place since mid-Jan. Austerity measures, including limits on foreign exchange, led to loss of income, food shortages, price spikes and supply chain disruptions; measures worsened impact of businesses closed due to COVID-19 public health measures and absence of govt financial plan to assist business owners.

Despite renewed international calls for ceasefire amid COVID-19 pandemic, fighting around capital Tripoli and in western Libya reached unprecedented levels of violence, with a strong likelihood of continued escalation in May; meanwhile financial pressures mounted. The battle for Tripoli reached one-year anniversary in early April as fighting intensified between Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Arab-Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF) and forces allied to Tripoli-based Govt of National Accord (GNA). ALAF forces early April continued missile strikes on southern Tripoli residential areas, causing civilian casualties, including 6 April targeted al-Hadba hospital equipped for COVID-19 patients. Tripoli residents week of 6 April suffered electricity shortages and cuts in water supply as pro-Haftar tribesmen in central Libya shut down water pumping station linked to Tripoli’s reservoirs. Turkey throughout month increased military support to GNA, partly enabling it to score significant victories across western Libya: GNA forces 14 April captured central coastal towns Sabratha and Sorman, under control of pro-Haftar tribesmen since 2018; GNA forces 18 April surrounded Tarhuna, ALAF stronghold in western Libya and base of operations for war on Tripoli. Meanwhile, GNA and ALAF forces throughout month continued confrontation near Sirte, central Libya, with heavy casualties reported on both sides, and GNA 12 April downed ALAF-operated, Russian-made attack helicopter. Turkish fighter jets 18 April conducted first ever military exercises over Misrata. Haftar 27 April declared that he accepted the people’s “mandate” to scrap 2015 UN-mediated Libyan Political Agreement and empower ALAF General Command to take control of country’s governing institutions; proposal divided supporters, adversaries called it a coup. Financial pressures increased in absence of oil revenues; ALAF-backed tribes continued blockade of oil production and export sites in place since mid-Jan, causing $4.5bn revenue shortfall. Increased dependence on foreign currency reserves led to tension between PM Serraj and Central Bank Governor Sadiq Al-Kabir; Central Bank 8 April adopted stringent measures on credit letters that paralysed food imports, increased both prices and black market requests for hard currency.

Fighting intensified around Tripoli and elsewhere as UN mediation efforts floundered. New round of fighting began mid-March between Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Arab-Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF) and forces allied to Tripoli-based Govt of National Accord (GNA). ALAF 19 March fired missiles on Ain Zara neighbourhood killing four civilians. GNA 20 March reportedly killed 25 ALAF fighters. GNA fighters from Misrata attempting to recapture Sirte, under ALAF control since early Jan, clashed occasionally with ALAF. UN Security Council-recognised National Oil Corporation (NOC) in Tripoli 16 March reported illegal shipments of jet fuel arriving in ALAF-held Benghazi from United Arab Emirates (UAE). ALAF-backed tribes maintained closure of oil production and export sites causing $3bn shortfall since blockade began mid-Jan. UN Sec-Gen’s Special Representative Ghassan Salamé resigned 2 March, dealing blow to peace talks. Salamé’s political deputy, U.S. diplomat Stephanie Williams, named acting head of UN mission 11 March. Embassies of Algeria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, UK, U.S., EU delegation, and govts of Tunisia and UAE 17 March called on conflict parties to declare humanitarian ceasefire, halt transfers of military equipment and personnel, and allow local authorities to respond to COVID-19 challenge. GNA and ALAF issued responses 18 and 21 March respectively, but fighting escalated thereafter dashing hopes of ceasefire. GNA 25 March launched offensive to capture ALAF-controlled Wutiya airbase south west of Tripoli, but failed and retreated with ALAF prisoners; ALAF forces moved west taking control of small towns of Jmeil and Ragdalin. Fighting escalated around Abu Ghrein, near Sirte from 28 March: dozens killed on both sides, reportedly including at least six high-level ALAF commanders.

Despite intense diplomacy aimed at brokering ceasefire in Jan, fighting and arms imports continued throughout month and UN-led talks faltered. Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Arab Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF, previously Libyan National Army) kept up assault on capital Tripoli held by forces loyal to UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA). Rockets hit Tripoli’s Meitiga airport and 6 Feb Tripoli University causing no casualties. Strike on residential neighbourhood of Nauwfiliyin 12 Feb killed one. Missile hit Tripoli’s functioning port 18 Feb; Turkish President Erdoğan 22 Feb said Turkish military had suffered losses in Libya, possibly reference to two Turkish soldiers presumed killed in port strike. Haftar 23 Feb claimed his forces had killed sixteen Turkish soldiers, figure believed to be exaggerated. Both sides continued to receive shipments of arms and military equipment from external backers. Cargo flights landed in Benghazi city from Haftar allies Jordan and United Arab Emirates early Feb; Turkey reportedly continued shipments of military equipment to Tripoli for GNA forces and pro-Turkey Syrian fighters continued to arrive, now estimated at over 2,000. Talks between five ALAF and five GNA military representatives in Geneva early Feb failed to produce ceasefire agreement; GNA initially called off second meeting due 18 Feb following ALAF strike on Tripoli port but subsequently talks resumed without producing agreement. Negotiations on new governing framework and new govt of national unity kicked off 26 Feb but GNA and House of Representatives pulled their delegates citing lack of progress in military talks. UN hosted talks on financial/economic track in Cairo 16-17 Feb with no breakthrough. Oil sector closures supported by pro-Haftar tribes continued, reportedly causing revenue shortfall of over $2bn. UN Security Council 12 Feb adopted first conflict-related resolution since April 2019 outbreak of hostilities, calling on parties to commit to ceasefire and on UN member states to comply with arms embargo, Russia abstained. EU foreign affairs ministers 17 Feb agreed to launch new operation in Mediterranean Sea to enforce UN arms embargo, expected to launch in March.

Diplomatic efforts intensified to de-escalate conflict between forces loyal to UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA) and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Arab Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF, previously known as Libyan National Army), but fell short of ceasefire deal. Turkish parliament 2 Jan approved deployment of troops and naval assets to Libya in support of PM Serraj’s GNA. In subsequent weeks, Ankara reportedly sent 2,000 allied Syrian fighters and dozens of Turkish military experts to capital Tripoli. Airstrike on military academy in Tripoli 4 Jan reportedly killed at least 30, most of them students; GNA blamed ALAF, who denied involvement. ALAF 6 Jan seized control of coastal city of Sirte. Russia, Haftar’s ally, and Turkey 8 Jan called for ceasefire starting 12 Jan and return to negotiating table; for a week starting 12 Jan, both sides refrained from aerial strikes and only exchanged minor artillery fire. Russia and Turkey 13 Jan brought Haftar and Serraj to Moscow in attempt to seal seven-point ceasefire agreement; Serraj signed it, but Haftar rejected it. Pro-Haftar local tribes 17 Jan shut down oil production and exports, prompting production to plummet from 1.2mn barrels per day to 300,000 overnight; blockade was ongoing as of 31 Jan. Leaders from twelve countries including Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Germany, France, Italy and UK, as well as representatives of UN, EU, African Union and League of Arab States, attended much-delayed international peace conference in Berlin 19 Jan, called on warring parties and their foreign backers to “redouble efforts” for sustained suspension of hostilities; commit to implement UN arms embargo; and support UN-backed political process. In Berlin, Serraj and Haftar did not attend conference, but reportedly agreed to appoint representatives to military committee scheduled to meet in Geneva under UN auspices by end of Jan to discuss details of ceasefire; military talks were later postponed. Fighting resumed late Jan in Tripoli: ALAF airstrikes 29 Jan killed four civilians in southern Hadba neighbourhood.

Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) made some advances in offensive to take capital Tripoli from UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA) as UN-led efforts to promote ceasefire remained stalled, and Turkey’s potential deployment of troops to support GNA could escalate fighting in coming weeks. LNA raided Al-Swani neighbourhood south of Tripoli 1 Dec, reportedly killing five children. Haftar 12 Dec urged his forces to advance toward centre of Tripoli in what he said would be “final battle” for capital. In following days, LNA forces intensified shelling and published footage of reinforcements coming from eastern Libya to Tripoli, and Russian-provided attack helicopters flying over capital. GNA 19 Dec approved implementation of military deal signed with Turkey in Nov, paving way for reinforced Turkish military and logistical support. Turkish parliament 30 Dec debated bill that, if passed in 2 Jan session, could empower govt to send troops to Libya to reinforce GNA. LNA 20 Dec gave GNA-affiliated militias from Misrata 72 hours to leave Tripoli and coastal city of Sirte, threatening to further target Misrata with airstrikes. Berlin 10 Dec hosted fifth UN-backed meeting to prepare ground for peace process, but parties remained at odds over ceasefire conditions.

Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) kept up its offensive to take capital Tripoli from UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA) as UN-led efforts to promote ceasefire faltered. LNA deployed more military personnel, reportedly including Russian military aides, to Tripoli front lines from rear bases in east. LNA airstrike 3 Nov hit Tripoli’s Mitiga airport, closed since Sept; LNA early Nov upped airstrikes in southern Salaheddin neighbourhood, forcing GNA to retreat toward city centre; LNA 19 Nov shelled areas in city centre near oil and gas storage tanks; LNA 18 Nov hit factory in southern Wadi Rabia neighbourhood, killing at least ten including foreign workers. LNA also targeted GNA bases and ammunition depots in other regions: LNA hit Misrata airport and weapons storage depot in residential area in Misrata 19 Nov; 14 Nov hit Sirte airport; 28 Nov LNA struck Tebu armed groups loyal to GNA after latter previous day tried to take over al-Feel oil site in south. GNA tried to drum up international support: following interior and foreign ministers’ visit to Washington DC mid-Nov, U.S. State Department issued its strongest statement yet against LNA offensive, also condemning “Russia’s attempts to exploit the conflict”. GNA and Turkey 26 Nov signed security deal and agreement on reciprocal jurisdiction over Mediterranean waters that inflamed tensions with Greece and Egypt. As a result, UN-backed initiative aimed at pushing two sides’ foreign backers to support ceasefire and commit to stop funnelling weapons to Libyan allies faltered. Libyan parties continued to disagree on ceasefire conditions.

Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) intensified airstrikes on forces allied to UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA) and civilian targets as it pursued campaign to take capital Tripoli; UN kept up diplomatic efforts to push two sides’ international backers to support ceasefire. LNA stepped up air-strikes against GNA’s strategic sites, notably hitting Misrata airport 5 Oct and large weapons depot in Misrata 16 Oct. LNA denied targeting civilians after suspected LNA airstrike on horse-riding club in Janzur west of Tripoli 6 Oct wounded six; and strike near military intelligence camp in Tripoli’s Fornaj neighbourhood killed three girls 14 Oct. Unidentified gunmen 16 Oct killed two women and three children on road from Aziziya to capital Tripoli; LNA accused GNA-allied militias. GNA-backed offensive against LNA stronghold in Tarhunah, 60km south east of capital reportedly killed eleven LNA supporters 16 Oct. GNA 27 Oct launched attack on Haftar’s forces in southern Tripoli to regain positions lost mid-Oct, said it took eight LNA fighters prisoner. Germany hosted third UN-backed meeting of international stakeholders 21 Oct with view to holding international conference on Libya by end of year, but parties continued to disagree on right approach; UN pushed for minimum agreement on cessation of hostilities while some regional capitals demanded comprehensive political, military and financial plan. LNA 19 Oct expressed support for ongoing UN-backed talks, but said no political process would be possible without first eradicating militias in Tripoli.

Fighting continued in capital Tripoli and airstrikes hit elsewhere, as UN led preparations for international conference to take place late Oct or Nov aimed at aligning foreign stakeholders behind de-escalation efforts. In Tripoli, balance of power remained about equal between armed groups affiliated to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and those aligned with UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA). Forces clashed sporadically in several neighbourhoods. LNA and GNA continued to launch drone strikes on locations further afield including Misrata and Sirte on Mediterranean coast and Jufra in centre. In first significant blow against LNA stronghold in Tarhunah, 60km south east of capital, GNA strike 13 Sept reportedly killed eleven, including three senior military figures aligned with LNA. Authorities shut down Tripoli’s GNA-held Mitiga airport after rocket 1 Sept narrowly missed plane carrying pilgrims, LNA denied responsibility. GNA drone strike allegedly carried out by Turkish operators hit LNA-base in Jufra area around 9-10 Sept, reportedly killing United Arab Emirates officers. In apparent retaliation, LNA stepped up air attacks, with strikes on Tripoli’s Mitiga and Misrata airports 17-18 Sept; LNA 16 Sept struck GNA affiliates in Sirte area, killing two combatants. Four U.S. airstrikes killed 43 suspected Islamic State (ISIS) combatants near town of Murzuq in south 19, 25, 27 and 29 Sept. UN envoy Ghassan Salamé held high-level meetings in Ankara, Cairo and Abu Dhabi in late Aug and early Sept, intensifying outreach to main foreign stakeholders to obtain commitments to stop providing weapons to local proxies and participate in conference in Berlin in late Oct or Nov. Ministerial-level representatives attended preliminary technical meeting in Berlin 17 Sept and foreign ministers 26 Sept attended event on Libya on margins of UN General Assembly in New York. During speech at UN in New York, UN-backed PM Serraj 25 Sept called Haftar “war criminal” and ruled out peace talks, hours later Haftar said he was open to dialogue with GNA.

Deadly stalemate persisted in and around capital Tripoli between Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and forces nominally loyal to UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA), and fighting escalated in south between militias allied to GNA and LNA. Fighting in and around Tripoli led to no substantial change in territorial control amid humanitarian crisis with over 100,000 displaced, many sheltering in schools. LNA airstrike 2 Aug reportedly killed three GNA fighters in al-Saddadah south east of Tripoli. LNA 15 Aug reportedly shelled Tripoli’s Mitiga airport, killing one guard, and 15-16 Aug bombed Zuwara airport west of Tripoli which it said housed Turkish drones. LNA drone mid-Aug reportedly struck field hospital in al-Aziziya south of Tripoli, drawing UN’s condemnation. After brief lull in fighting 11-12 Aug during Muslim holiday Eid al-Adha, LNA resumed attacks 13 Aug. GNA 21 Aug reportedly retook Sebea district south of Tripoli. Seventeen LNA fighters 23 Aug reportedly surrendered to GNA south of Tripoli. In south, clashes escalated in Murzuq, by late Aug leaving at least 100 people dead and 3,000 displaced. After clashes between unidentified armed groups 4 Aug left four dead, suspected LNA airstrike same day killed at least 43 in Murzuq; locals claim that LNA denied killing civilians and said airstrike targeted “Chadian opposition fighters”. GNA-allied militia known as South Protection Force 18 Aug said it had expelled LNA forces from Murzuq. LNA next day reportedly sent reinforcements to maintain control of nearby Sharara oilfield. In Misrata, about 200km east of Tripoli, LNA 6 Aug hit cargo plane landing at air college and 17 Aug bombed GNA air base; GNA next day said it had downed LNA drone. In Benghazi in east, car bomb 10 Aug killed five, including three UN staffers, prompting UN Sec-Gen Guterres to call for internal investigation.

Hostilities spread to new areas: fighting between Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and forces nominally loyal to UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA) continued in and around capital Tripoli, GNA carried out airstrikes in Jufra and Waddan in centre, and LNA in Misrata east of Tripoli. Parties continued to receive military support from allies (GNA from Turkey, LNA from United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt), while diplomacy to stop war remained paralysed. Fighting in and around Tripoli led to no substantial change in territorial control. Suspected LNA airstrikes on Tajura migrant detention centre near Tripoli 2 July killed at least 50 migrants, prompting international outrage; LNA denied responsibility, claimed it targeted weapons depot. GNA 20-21 July carried out airstrikes on LNA-held Tripoli airport and Wadi Rabea, reportedly killing thirteen LNA. LNA 22 July launched large-scale assault on several fronts to capture Tripoli, which GNA forces repelled, capturing eleven LNA. Suspected LNA airstrikes 27 July targeted Zawiya hospital killing five medics. For first time since April outbreak, GNA drones 25 July attacked LNA in Jufra and Waddan in centre, destroying LNA assets. LNA 26 July struck Misrata airport some 200km east of Tripoli, from where GNA drones took off, no damage reported. Instability increased in east. In Benghazi, unclaimed car bombs 11 July killed two soldiers and two civilians; LNA blamed GNA supporters. Five bodies recovered in Benghazi 18 July. Cairo 14-16 July hosted some 70 members of Tobruk-based parliament House of Representatives (HoR) in bid to revive body’s legitimacy; Tripoli-based parliamentarians boycotted meeting, but participants reaffirmed HoR authority to appoint unity govt. U.S., UK, France, UAE, Egypt and Italy 16 July called for halt to conflict. UN envoy 29 July called for truce on Eid al-Adha holiday around 10 Aug accompanied by confidence-building measures, followed by summit of “concerned countries” to cement arms embargo, and then by national conference.

Fighting continued in and around capital Tripoli between Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and forces nominally loyal to UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA) pushing death toll to over 700 since early April. Both sides relied heavily on airpower and continued to receive military support from regional allies. In offensive launched late May to capture city centre, LNA forces advanced only 2-3km into southern Salaheddin neighbourhood; LNA airstrikes hit GNA depots on airport road and eastern suburb Tajoura. GNA forces 19 June claimed they had retaken former international airport, but control over airport still contested. GNA forces 26 June reconquered and expelled LNA from Gharyan, key logistic base 80km south of capital under LNA control since April. Turkish engineers in Tripoli trained GNA forces to use anti-aircraft technology and armoured vehicles, reportedly provided by Turkey but paid for by Qatar. Turkey 30 June said if militias loyal to Haftar did not release six Turkish nationals they were holding, Haftar’s “illegal militia forces” would be “legitimate targets”. Forces loyal to Haftar 30 June said they had destroyed Turkish drone parked at Tripoli’s only working airport, halting civilian flights. United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Russia reportedly continued to deliver military supplies to LNA, and Egypt manpower. Both sides rejected calls for ceasefire and political talks. In speech 16 June, PM Serraj refused talks with Haftar and excluded him from his proposed political roadmap, including National Conference under UN aegis to appoint judicial committee to draft legislation for parliamentary and presidential elections to be held before end of 2019. In 19 June interview, Haftar said LNA would continue military operations until it controlled capital; he would then abolish bodies created by 2015 Skhirat agreement, including Tripoli-based Presidency Council, form constitutional committee, hold referendum, disband militias and hold elections. Islamic State (ISIS) claimed two bomb blasts in Derna in east 2 June.

Fighting intensified in and around capital Tripoli between Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and forces nominally loyal to UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA). Stalemate persisted with pro-GNA forces preventing LNA advance on centre, but unable to launch counteroffensive against LNA strongholds in Tarhunah and Gharyan, 60km south east and 80km south of capital respectively. Both sides stepped up airstrikes: LNA carried out several air and drone strikes against bases of armed groups in Tripoli and nearby towns and on front lines, causing significant damage to equipment. GNA air force also struck LNA-held areas. LNA shot down GNA fighter jet 70km south of Tripoli 7 May and captured pilot, who claimed to be Portuguese. Both sides intensified fighting 24-25 May, but achieved no major victory. Dozens of Turkish-made armoured vehicles arrived in Tripoli port 19 May, reportedly intended for pro-GNA forces. UN Security Council 10 May called on parties to “return to UN political mediation, and to commit to a ceasefire and de-escalation to help mediation succeed”. UN envoy Ghassan Salamé 21 May urged UN to stop other countries fuelling conflict by supplying weapons. EU Foreign Affairs Council 13 May called LNA’s offensive “a serious threat to international peace and security”, called on “all parties to implement a ceasefire” and return to political negotiations. Both sides rejected calls for ceasefire. Haftar 16 May told Italian PM Conte in Rome he was about to take Tripoli and in talks with French President Macron in Paris 22 May Haftar ruled out ceasefire. During visits to Rome, Paris, Berlin and London, UN-backed PM Serraj mid-May conditioned resumption of talks on LNA forces’ complete withdrawal from west. In south, Islamic State (ISIS) claimed attacks against LNA in Sebha 4 May, Ghadwa 9 May and Zilla 18 May that reportedly killed at least three LNA fighters. LNA 29 May handed over to Egypt authorities prominent Egyptian militant Hisham al-Ashmawi, arrested in eastern Libya in Oct 2018.

War broke out as Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) advanced on capital Tripoli intent on taking city from UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA), but pro-GNA forces held LNA at bay; fighting could escalate if both sides continue to mobilise and external actors strengthen Libyan allies. LNA 3 April launched advance on Tripoli from east with apparent backing of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, France and Russia taking control of surrounding countryside. By making deals with local commanders, LNA took Garyan, 80km south of Tripoli, 3-5 April and set up base there; in same period LNA took Tarhunah and ‘Aziziya south east of Tripoli, Sabratah and Sorman east of Tripoli, and reached city’s outskirts. GNA’s PM Serraj mobilised loyalist militias under banner of Tripoli Protection Force (TPF) and armed groups from Misrata. TPF by 14 April had pushed LNA out of Zahra and Suwani on Tripoli’s western outskirts; same day shot down LNA warplane; 19 April expelled LNA from ‘Aziziya and Ain Zara in south-eastern outskirts, prompting LNA to withdraw to Qasr bin Gashir and Wadi al-Rabia south of city. Artillery fire killed six civilians in Tripoli residential area 16 April, LNA and GNA blamed each other. In southern Libya, pro-GNA Southern Protection Force 18 April attacked LNA air base at Tamanhint near Sebha and withdrew. Same day, LNA crushed uprising in Garyan. World Health Organization 23 April said 264 people killed around Tripoli since start of offensive, including 21 civilians. LNA reportedly used armed drones, provided and possibly controlled by foreign backer, for precision strikes on GNA military installations in Tripoli. GNA also received some military assistance. U.S. shifted from opposition to apparent support for Haftar: Sec State Pompeo 7 April condemned LNA offensive; U.S. 18 April objected to draft UNSC resolution calling for ceasefire; President Trump reportedly had phone conversation with Haftar 15 April, reportedly praising his efforts in counter-terrorism and to protect oil fields.

Fighting eased in south and UN renewed efforts to mediate agreement between head of eastern military coalition Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar and PM of Tripoli-based internationally-recognised Govt of National Accord (GNA) Faiez Serraj to form new unity govt and unify state institutions, including military. Following Haftar-Serraj meeting 27 Feb in United Arab Emirates under UN auspices, UN Envoy Ghassan Salamé early March shuttled between them or their advisors in Libya. To show support for potential Haftar-Serraj deal, French FM Le Drian visited Tripoli and Benghazi 18-19 March, and commander of U.S. Africa Command Thomas Waldhauser visited Tripoli 19 March. After months of delay, Salamé 20 March said National Conference, part of UN Action Plan, would take place mid-April in desert city of Ghaddames in west near borders with Algeria and Tunisia, but did not disclose agenda nor list of invitees. At meeting of Libya Quartet (League of Arab States, African Union (AU), EU and UN) in Tunis 30 March, AU President Moussa Faki announced national reconciliation conference would be held in Addis Ababa in July. Local elections took place in nine municipalities in country’s first voting for five years; turnout low at 38%, electoral commission said local elections would take place in about 60 other municipalities in coming weeks. Fighting eased in south as Haftar’s Libyan National Army consolidated control, following offensive launched in Jan, and oil production resumed in Sharara oil field, closed since Dec.

Following its mid-Jan advance into south west, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s east-based Libyan National Army (LNA) continued to consolidate control in area, securing Sebha peacefully but triggering fighting in Murzuq region, 100km south west of Sebha; local armed groups or forces in north allied to Tripoli-based Govt of National Accord (GNA) could retaliate against LNA in coming weeks. Murzuq region saw heavy fighting: clashes between LNA-allied local Arab forces and local Tebu non-Arab armed groups near Ghadduwah from 1 Feb left at least fourteen dead, LNA said at least four LNA soldiers killed. LNA airstrike in outskirts of Murzuq 4 Feb reportedly killed seven Tebu, including civilians. LNA 8 Feb bombed Murzuq residential area, no casualties reported. Fighting inside Murzuq 20-23 Feb between LNA-allied Arab forces and Tebu armed groups left dozens of tribesmen and three LNA soldiers dead, including Murzuq’s GNA-affiliated security chief. Tebu accused pro-Haftar forces of attacking them and ransacking houses, LNA accused Tebu of harbouring Chadian armed groups. LNA 6-7 Feb announced it had taken control of Sharara oil field, 200km west of Sebha, reportedly after local Tuareg guards previously aligned with GNA switched sides; LNA 22 Feb said it had taken over al-Feel oil field near Murzuq. GNA made several military appointments 6 Feb allegedly in response to LNA advance: Tuareg general Ali Kanna appointed commander of southern region; Mohammed al-Sharif of Jufra region appointed chief of staff and Salem Joha of Misrata as his deputy. GNA said it and U.S. forces conducted airstrikes on al-Qaeda camp in Ubari in south west 13 Feb, killing four militants; U.S. denied involvement. In eastern city of Derna, clashes between LNA and coalition of Islamist militants Derna Protection Force intensified early Feb, seven civilians reportedly killed 11 Feb. LNA mid-Feb claimed final victory in Derna. Libyan Red Crescent 21 Feb said it had recovered over 30 bodies in Derna in Feb. UN envoy Ghassan Salamé hosted meeting between PM Serraj and Haftar in Abu Dhabi 27 Feb; leaders reiterated need to hold elections.

Fighting erupted between rival armed groups in capital Tripoli, while in south west tensions heightened after forces from east-based Libyan National Army (LNA) moved into region’s capital, Sebha, raising risk of new fighting there in Feb. Breaking Sept 2018 UN-brokered ceasefire, rival armed groups clashed in Tripoli 16 Jan reportedly over implementation of new UN-backed Tripoli security plan; at least sixteen killed 16-20 Jan, including civilians. Armed groups 21 Jan agreed to new ceasefire following local mediation. LNA troops in about 100 vehicles arrived in Sebha, main city in south west, 16 Jan saying they intended to “rid the south of terrorists and foreign armed groups” and secure oil installations. Local armed groups from Tebu, Tuareg and Arab tribes nominally allied to Tripoli-based Presidency Council (PC) vacated military bases in Sebha, but tensions remained high as many of them declared opposition to LNA’s arrival. LNA 18 Jan said it had killed three suspected Islamist militants including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) commander in Brak Shati, north of Sebha. UN Envoy Ghassan Salamé 20 Jan expressed “deep concern” about LNA’s deployment in south; LNA 23 Jan referred to Salamé as “opponent”. UN-backed National Conference planned for early Jan was postponed sine die. International efforts to broker agreement between Tripoli-based UN-backed PM Serraj and LNA commander Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar continued; they allegedly met in Jordanian capital Amman early Jan but reached no compromise. Political feuds within Tripoli-based govt continued. In open letter 12 Jan, three vice presidents in Serraj’s UN-backed PC representing west, south and east accused him of making unilateral decisions and cabinet appointments, including of new health and local governance ministers in Jan, without consulting them. LNA said it killed two suspected Islamic State (ISIS) militants in eastern city of Derna 21 Jan. Local official 31 Jan said security forces arrested leading ISIS member Khalifa al-Barq in Sirte 30 Jan.

Tensions rose in capital Tripoli following 25 Dec Islamic State (ISIS) attack on foreign affairs ministry that killed at least six people including three assailants and injured 21. Infighting between Tripoli-based militias also continued: Tripoli militia leaders known as al-Aweinat and Salah al-Marghani killed in Tripoli 26 Nov and 15 Dec respectively. Wrangling among west and east-based politicians continued to stall political process. Referendum law and two constitutional amendments, passed by Tobruk-based parliament House of Representatives (HoR) in east late Nov, supposed to pave way for referendum on draft constitution and selection of new Presidency Council, angered politicians in Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC) in west and provoked criticism regarding alleged substantive and procedural flaws. Police and security officers from rival west and east-based govts 29 Dec met in eastern city of Benghazi in effort to unite security forces. Fezzan Rage, youth protest movement demanding better services in impoverished Fezzan region in south, backed by Petroleum Facilities Guards militia nominally loyal to PM Serraj’s govt, forced closure of country’s largest oil field Sharara 8 Dec. Internationally recognised Tripoli-based National Oil Corporation (NOC) 16 Dec declared force majeure on Sharara’s operations. PM Serraj 19 Dec visited oil field to negotiate with protesters, but NOC said oil field would remain closed until new security arrangements are set up. Chadian armed group 27 Dec attacked camp of forces loyal to Field Marshal Haftar, de facto commander in east, near town of Traghen in south west, reportedly killing one and injuring thirteen others.

UN unveiled revised political roadmap and participants in international conference in Palermo, Italy, endorsed it, but deep divisions between rival Libyan leaders and competing agendas emerged. At UN Security Council 8 Nov, UN envoy Ghassan Salamé said elections would take place in 2019, acknowledging for first time that they will not be held in Dec as planned. Salamé presented revised action plan consisting of National Conference in Jan 2019 and establishment of “electoral framework” by spring 2019. At international conference in Palermo, Italy 12-13 Nov, stakeholders expressed support for revised action plan but heads of delegations representing Tripoli-based UN-backed Presidency Council, Tripoli-based High State Council, Tobruk-based parliament House of Representatives (HoR) and Field Marshal Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) did not sit side-by-side. While nominally supporting UN efforts, delegations disagreed on which elections should be held and what powers, if any, National Conference should wield. Haftar refused to attend any conference event, instead took part in unscheduled and inconclusive meeting with Tripoli-based PM Serraj 13 Nov, alongside leaders from Russia, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, France, Italy, UN and EU. Disregarding new UN action plan, Tobruk-based HoR 27 Nov claimed that previous day it passed constitutional referendum law and constitutional amendment that recognises modified version of 2015 Libyan Political Agreement (which HoR never recognised) and requires appointment of new three-member Presidency Council and separate PM. Some HoR members and their political opponents in Tripoli contest legality of HoR vote and substance of approved legislation. Islamic State (ISIS) claimed 23 Nov attack in southern town of Tazerbo that killed nine police. Score-settling between militias in Tripoli continued: former head of Tripoli Revolutionary Brigades Haythem Tajouri allegedly killed three of group’s leaders. U.S. 30 Nov said its airstrike previous day near al-Uwaynat in south killed eleven al-Qaeda militants.

PM Serraj pursued cabinet reshuffle and began to implement new economic reforms and security measures in capital Tripoli, as violence flared in south. UN-backed PM Serraj 7 Oct appointed four new ministers (interior, economy, finance and sports) without consulting fellow members of Presidency Council (PC) or seeking approval from Tobruk-based parliament House of Representatives (HoR); spokesperson 22 Oct said cabinet reshuffle still ongoing. Serraj’s appointment of former militia leader and politician from Misrata, Fathi Bash Aga, as interior minister and Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Ali Issawi, suspected of involvement in 2011 killing of prominent eastern military commander, as economy minister triggered outrage in east. Consultations between Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC) and HoR to remove Serraj and change composition of PC he heads continued.  Unidentified gunmen 16 Oct killed leader of so-called Tripoli Brigade, Khairi al-Kikli, dubbed Hankoura, while other gunmen cut off supply of city’s drinking water. Serraj 23 Oct approved plan for new security arrangements in Tripoli, Greater Tripoli Security Plan, which is supposed to create joint police and army forces to secure city; UN political mission (UNSMIL) same day welcomed plan. Haftar’s east-based Libyan National Army (LNA) 7 Oct arrested former Egyptian army officer turned al-Qaeda affiliate and founder of al-Murabitun militant group Hisham al-Ashmawy in eastern city of Derna. Fighting flared in south near Chadian border mid-Oct reportedly between LNA and its auxiliaries on one side and gunmen whom LNA claimed were Chadian armed groups on other. LNA 13 Oct reportedly carried out airstrikes on alleged Chadian rebels near Tamassah oasis. Clashes between LNA-allied and Chadian militia 13-14 Oct reportedly left four Libyans and eleven Chadians dead. Haftar discussed insecurity in border area with Chadian President Déby in Chadian capital Ndjamena 16 Oct (see Chad). Islamic State (ISIS) militants attacked town of Fuqaha’ in Jufra region (centre) 28 Oct killing at least five people, kidnapping ten and setting fire to public buildings. (Updated 1 Nov)

After eruption of violence in capital Tripoli late Aug, fighting escalated despite UN-mediated ceasefires; end-month security situation in capital was calm but precarious. Armed groups from towns surrounding Tripoli maintained offensives early Sept in bid to oust Tripoli-based militias and pressure Prime Minister Faiez Serraj to step down. UN 3 Sept mediated ceasefire and in follow-up meeting 9 Sept most parties agreed to lay down arms and support formation of ceasefire monitoring mechanism. Long-range artillery fire struck Tripoli’s Maitiga airport 11 Sept and fighting broke out in capital’s south 18-19 Sept. Tripoli-based UN-backed Govt of National Accord 26 Sept announced new ceasefire, which took effect previous day, and two main armed groups reportedly retreated from city. But security in capital remained precarious end-month as most Tripoli armed groups refused to withdraw from state institutions they guard. At least 115 people killed since fighting erupted late Aug, at least half were civilians in residential areas. Attack by gunmen on National Oil Corporation headquarters in Tripoli 10 Sept killed two; govt said Islamic State (ISIS) behind attack. U.S. govt 12 Sept placed sanctions on militia leader Ibrahim Jedran for overseeing June attempt to seize control of Gulf of Sirte oil facilities. Govt and Central Bank 12 Sept announced economic reform package aimed at reducing black market speculation on foreign currency transactions that benefitted some Tripoli armed groups.

Violence erupted in capital Tripoli between armed groups linked to UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA) over control of territory and institutions, and could escalate further in Sept. Clashes broke out 26 Aug between fighters of Seventh Brigade, militia established by GNA’s defence ministry in 2017, and coalition of armed groups operating under GNA’s interior ministry. Clashes 26-31 Aug left at least 39 people dead, including at least eighteen civilians, and continued end month. Other armed groups, including some opposed to GNA from city of Misrata, threatened to join fight in Tripoli. UNSMIL 19 Aug said members of brigades nominally loyal to GNA’s interior ministry had in recent weeks attacked state institutions and prevented them from working, and called on GNA to prosecute those responsible; targeted institutions reportedly include internationally recognised Tripoli-based National Oil Corporation and GNA-managed sovereign wealth fund Libyan Investment Authority. 80 members of eastern Tobruk-based parliament House of Representatives (HoR) 28 Aug called on UN political mission (UNSMIL) to restart political dialogue to change composition of Presidency Council; western Tripoli-based High State Council and Misratan politicians issued similar statements. Progress along election roadmap remained stalled after HoR 27 Aug again failed to pass constitution referendum law. Suspected Islamic State (ISIS) militants 23 Aug attacked GNA checkpoint in Wadi Kaam area, east of Tripoli, killing at least six security personnel. U.S. airstrike in Bani Walid, about 150km south east of Tripoli, killed ISIS commander 28 Aug. Tripoli court of appeal 15 Aug sentenced 45 people to death for allegedly killing demonstrators in Tripoli during 2011 uprising against Colonel Qadhafi; 54 other defendants sentenced to five years in prison.

Under international pressure, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s east-based Libyan National Army (LNA) 11 July reversed decision made late June and returned oversight of oil sales from area under its control to internationally recognised Tripoli-based National Oil Corporation (NOC). Reversal came after Tripoli-based Govt of National Accord (GNA) said audit would be conducted of Central Bank of Libya branches in both east and west. GNA also sacked anti-Haftar Minister of Defence al-Mahdi al-Barghati 29 July, addressing one of LNA’s grievances. Eastern Tobruk-based House of Representatives held session 3o-31 July to vote on draft new constitution that would go to referendum, amid protests in city and divisions on new constitution’s current draft and referendum procedure; vote postponed by two weeks. Islamic State (ISIS) and other armed groups continued attacks on civilians, especially in south. Notably, in south east, suspected Islamist militants 7 July killed two workers and kidnapped two others at Tazirbu water plant. ISIS’s weekly newspaper al-Naba 6 July said ISIS had captured two air force officers from forces loyal to Haftar in Fezzan region in centre. ISIS-linked militants 24 July killed two policemen in eastern town of Agheila.

New fighting over oil export terminals in Gulf of Sirte and subsequent announcement by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s east-based Libyan National Army (LNA) that oil sales from area under its control would go through un-recognised east-based National Oil Corporation (NOC) escalated tensions and risks deepening economic crisis. Forces led by former Petroleum Facilities Guards militia commander Ibrahim Jedran 14 June took control of oil export terminals of Sidra and Ras Lanuf in east, forcing LNA to withdraw, at least 28 killed in fighting that also destroyed crude oil storage tanks. LNA 21 June retook control of terminals and 25 June said it would not surrender control of oil facilities to internationally-recognised NOC in Tripoli, claiming oil revenues accrued in Tripoli helped fund Jedran’s assault, but it would redirect sales via east-based NOC. LNA’s decision condemned by U.S., UK, France, Italy, EU, Arab League and UN sec-gen. Fighting also intensified in eastern city of Derna as LNA came closer to taking city from Islamist militants. Leaders of opposed political and military factions – despite verbally committing at Paris summit 29 May to hold parliamentary and presidential elections 10 Dec and reach agreement on legal framework for elections by mid-September – made no steps toward forming framework.

At summit in Paris hosted by French President Macron 29 May, rival leaders committed to holding parliamentary and presidential elections 10 Dec; meanwhile violence continued in capital Tripoli in west, Derna and Benghazi in east and Sebha in south. In Tripoli, two Islamic State (ISIS) militants 2 May attacked electoral commission, killing thirteen staff and three security officers; some Tripoli militias pushed govt-aligned Presidential Guard out of two bases 26 May. Head of Tripoli-based UN-backed Presidency Council (PC) Faiez Serraj 9 May passed decree giving more autonomy and legal authority to Special Deterrence Force, Salafi-dominated Tripoli-based armed group loyal to him. Eastern commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar 7 May oversaw large military parade in Benghazi in east; 8 May announced Libyan National Army (LNA) would launch new operation to wrest control of eastern city of Derna from coalition of Islamist militants recently renamed Derna Protection Force (DPF); LNA airstrikes 15 May reportedly killed five DPF members; LNA commander killed and two fighters wounded 22 May; UN 31 May said indiscriminate shelling on city had killed at least five civilians, including two children, since 22 May, described violence there as “unprecedented”. Also in east, ISIS claimed car bombing at checkpoint in Ajdabiya that killed at least two LNA troops and kidnapping of police officer in Awjila, both 22 May. Car bombing in Benghazi 25 May killed at least seven civilians. Fighting restarted in early May in southern city of Sebha between militias composed of Awlad Suleiman Arabs and affiliated with Haftar’s LNA, and Tebu ethnic minority militias affiliated with Tripoli-based Govt of National Accord (GNA), at least 30 killed by late-May including civilians. PC 13 May called for immediate ceasefire and deployment of neutral force in Sebha. Human traffickers trying to prevent some 200 captive Eritreans, Ethiopians and Somalis from escaping reportedly killed at least twelve in Bani Walid, about 180km south east of Tripoli 23 May.

Hospitalisation of eastern commander Khalifa Haftar prompted fears of fragmentation in his military coalition and possible mobilisation of his enemies in both western and eastern Libya seeking to reverse status quo in Benghazi in east; election of Khaled Mishri, member of party linked to Muslim Brotherhood, as president of Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC) strengthened opposition to dialogue among eastern constituencies. Field Marshal Haftar, commander of Libyan National Army (LNA), hospitalised in Paris 9-24 April, allegedly after suffering stroke. His opponents in west launched misinformation campaign claiming he was incapacitated or even dead. Haftar returned to Benghazi in east 26 April and addressed supporters, dispelling false rumours. Khaled Mishri, member of Justice and Construction Party (JCP), linked to Muslim Brotherhood, 8 April elected president of HSC, body loyal to UN-backed Presidency Council and rival to Tobruk-based parliament House of Representatives (HoR). Mishri and HoR President Aghela Saleh met in Morocco 23 April, but eastern constituencies remained opposed to overtures to HSC and Muslim Brotherhood, which they see as terrorist organisation. In east, LNA commander Salah Bulgheib 8 April survived assassination attempt and LNA chief of staff 18 April survived car-bomb attack in Benghazi, one civilian killed. LNA 21 April said it had killed and injured dozens of “terrorists” in Sdada area near Misrata, 200km east of Tripoli. In south, inter-tribal clashes fuelled by national rivalries continued, albeit more sporadically; mortar attack on Sebha airport set civilian aircraft on fire 24 April. Pipeline carrying crude oil from Waha oil field into country’s biggest export terminal Es Sider shut down for several days after it was set on fire 21 April. Unidentified militants fired rockets at Mitiga airport in capital Tripoli 19 April, damaging arrivals hall and passenger aircraft belonging to state-run Libyan Airlines. Two armed groups aligned with Presidency Council’s Interior Ministry, Central Security Brigade (Ghaniwa Brigade) and Eighth Force (al-Nawasi Brigade), clashed in Tripoli 30 April, several reportedly wounded. UN political mission 5 April launched series of preparatory meetings for national conference, one pillar of UN Action Plan for Libya.

Inter-tribal fighting fuelled by national rivalries continued in south, while security and humanitarian situation worsened in Derna in east. Fighting resumed early March in southern city of Sabha between militias composed of Awlad Suleiman Arabs and affiliated to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and Tebu ethnic minority militias affiliated with Tripoli-based Govt of National Accord (GNA); clashes 6 March left three dead. Delegation from south, including members from Sabha, 12 March met UN envoy Ghassan Salamé in Tripoli to try to end violence and protect civilians. LNA’s 21-month siege on Derna in east to wrest control of city from coalition of Islamist militants known as Derna Mujahideen Shura Council (DMSC) sparked further violence. LNA 4 March shelled Sayeda Khadija neighbourhood, wounding four civilians. DMSC 19 March attacked LNA’s Kersa checkpoint in western Derna, killing two. Suicide car bombings claimed by Islamic State (ISIS) on LNA checkpoints near Ajdabiya in east reportedly wounded one LNA and two civilians 9 March and killed at least eight, including civilians, 29 March. U.S. airstrike in coordination with GNA in outskirts of Ubari city in south west 24 March killed two, including Musa Abu Dawud, described by U.S. Africa Command as high-ranking figure in jihadist group al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb. Al-Feel oil field in south east remained shut after National Oil Corporation imposed force majeure 23 Feb because guards had withdrawn from site to demand better pay and other benefits. Gunmen 29 March briefly detained Tripoli Mayor Abdelraouf Beitelmal in what general prosecutor’s office said was legal arrest but others described as militia abduction.

UN envoy Ghassan Salamé 8 Feb said many requirements, including developing “constitutional framework”, still to be met before legislative and presidential elections can be held. Supreme Court 14 Feb blocked legal challenges from lower courts to draft constitution voted by Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) in July 2017, paving way for possible referendum on draft and move toward elections. Members of eastern Tobruk-based parliament House of Representatives 19 Feb rejected CDA, calling instead for creation of expert committee to amend 1951 constitution. Forces allied with Libyan National Army (LNA) of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, de facto ruler in east, clashed with suspected Islamic State (ISIS) militants near Dhahra oil field in south east 2-3 Feb, two LNA-allied fighters and three suspected militants killed. LNA commander Mahmoud Warfalli, under International Criminal Court arrest warrant for alleged summary execution of dozens of people, handed himself in to Haftar’s military police 7 Feb. LNA fighters in Benghazi in east protested against his detention 8 Feb; Warfalli released same day. Twin bomb blasts struck mosque in Benghazi 9 Feb, killing at least two. Suicide bombing targeted LNA checkpoint 22km west of Waddan city in centre 21 Feb, three soldiers killed; ISIS claimed responsibility 22 Feb. Heavy clashes took place in Sabha 27-28 Feb after month of tensions between LNA-affiliated militia composed of members of Arab tribe Awlad Suleiman and militias, composed of Tebu ethnic minority, affiliated with Tripoli-based Govt of National Accord – reversal of both groups’ previous loyalties. Tensions mounted after Awlad Suleiman fighter shot dead Tebu in café 1 Feb. Mediation attempts by western and eastern govts have stalled, and fighting could endanger fledgling Tebu-Tuareg peace agreement, amid allegations that Chadian mercenaries have joined Tebu in fighting.

Armed groups aligned with UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA) clashed in Tripoli around Maitiga airport 15 Jan, at least twenty people killed and flights cancelled for five days; GNA subsequently said it would dissolve armed group known as 33rd Infantry Brigade, which attacked Maitiga. Unidentified attackers carried out double car bombing outside mosque in Benghazi in east 23 Jan killing at least 35. Next day video footage released appearing to show Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Mahmoud Warfalli (under International Criminal Court arrest warrant since Aug 2017) outside same mosque executing ten people dressed in blue prisoner uniforms. Unidentified attackers 3 Jan killed local education official who had declared interest in running in parliamentary elections in eastern town of al-Abiyar. Member of influential Awaghir tribe in eastern town of Suluq escaped targeted car bomb 6 Jan. Election commission 10 Jan said over 1.9mn people had registered to vote in elections planned for 2018. Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, LNA head and de facto ruler in east, 7 Jan said Libya was not ready for democracy, and that he would “take action” if elections failed and if wider UN process did not deliver.

Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, de facto ruler in east, 17 Dec publicly rejected 2015 Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), raising risk of new fighting between his allies in west and forces aligned with UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA). In response to claims by Haftar supporters that LPA’s two-year validity would expire 17 Dec, UN Security Council 14 Dec emphasised continuity of LPA, rejecting what it said were incorrect deadlines and declaring unacceptable any attempt to undermine UN-facilitated political process. Haftar 17 Dec in televised speech declared LPA and all institutions emanating from it (including GNA) obsolete. Tensions rose in Tripoli and around Sirte between GNA-aligned militias and those supporting Haftar; GNA-affiliated Nawasi armed group in Tripoli rejected Haftar’s remarks. Unidentified gunmen 17 Dec killed mayor of Misrata Mohammed Eshtewi. French FM 21 Dec met UN-backed PM Serraj in Tripoli and Haftar in Benghazi in bid to revive stalled UN-led talks. Unidentified assailants blew up crude oil pipeline about 130km south of Es Sider terminal in east 26 Dec. In east, Haftar’s forces 28 Dec retook last district of Benghazi under control of Islamist fighters. UN 19 Dec said it plans to move up to 10,000 illegal migrants from Libya to African countries and possibly European countries and Canada in 2018.

UN Envoy Ghassan Salamé continued negotiations to amend parts of 2015 Libyan Political Agreement, 16 Nov told UN Security Council he was confident consensus was close on remaining issues and preparations were underway for National Conference in Feb 2018 as per his action plan. Osama Juwaili, head of Military Council in western city of Zintan and Govt of National Accord (GNA)-appointed commander of western region military zone, formed coalition of militias, early Nov launched “anti-crime” military operation and after six-day operation 8 Nov took control of Aziziya, 41km south west of capital Tripoli, stronghold of Warshefana tribe. Faraj Ghaim, GNA deputy interior minister, after surviving car bombing 5 Nov in Benghazi in east, 10 Nov gave armed groups loyal to east-based strongman General Haftar 48 hours to leave Benghazi. Armed groups led by Haftar’s sons, and Sahawat fighters, reacted by pre-emptively seizing Ghaim’s camps in Benghazi. UN Secretary-General Guterres 20 Nov said he was “horrified” after CNN 15 Nov reported African migrants were being auctioned as slaves in Libya and said he had asked relevant UN actors to investigate. East-based parliament House of Representatives 21 Nov approved Salamé-proposed action plan, but Tripoli-based advisory body State Council demanded further changes.

Talks led by UN envoy Ghassan Salamé aimed at renegotiating parts of 2015 Libyan Political Agreement faltered, as violence escalated in west and risked erupting again in Nov. Delegation from east-based House of Representatives pulled out of second round of talks mid-Oct, demanding west-based State Council put its position in writing; Salamé 21 Oct ended talks without setting date for new round. Anti-ISIS Operations Room, militia nominally under Tripoli govt authority, 5 Oct said it had taken full control of western city of Sabratha from Dabashi Brigade and allied militias also nominally allied to Tripoli; at least 39 killed in weeks of fighting. Fighting risks erupting in Zwara and Zawiya, west and east of Sabratha respectively. Military advances suggested growing influence of east-based strongman General Haftar in west. Several units aligned with Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) moved to re-establish themselves near Sabratha after fighting ended. Forces with sympathies for LNA 9 Oct also took control of Ras Jdir on border with Tunisia and area near Mellitah, where Italian oil and gas company ENI has natural gas facility. Islamic State (ISIS) suicide bombing at court in Misrata 4 Oct killed at least four people and wounded nearly 40; undetonated car bomb found nearby. ISIS 25 Oct claimed attack on checkpoint south of LNA-controlled Ajdabiya in east that left two soldiers dead. UN 10 Oct said LNA’s siege of Derna in east continued to restrict entry of medical supplies and at least three health workers detained at checkpoints near city remained incommunicado. Airstrikes on Derna by unidentified warplanes 30 Oct killed at least fifteen civilians.

Ghassan Salamé, UN envoy for Libya, 20 Sept unveiled three-step plan to break political stalemate including renegotiation of parts of 2015 peace deal, conference aimed at appointing new Presidency Council reducing nine members to three and preparation of elections; international actors voiced unanimous support. Negotiations between rival parliamentary bodies House of Representatives and State Council began 25 Sept in Tunis as first step in UN plan. Representatives of Libyan National Army (LNA) loyal to eastern-based strongman General Haftar visited Moscow early Sept and French and Italian ministers made separate visits to his headquarters; Haftar also visited Rome and Paris 27-28 Sept in ongoing consultations. Members of State Council representing city of Derna 14 Sept called on UN Human Rights Council to take action to end LNA’s siege on city and avoid humanitarian disaster. Rival armed groups Dabashi Brigade and Anti-ISIS Operations Room clashed in Sabratha area, 80km west of Tripoli mid to late Sept, at least seventeen killed, clashes lessened end-Sept. Migrant departures to Europe resumed after lull in July and Aug; at least 100 left Sabratha 15 Sept, over half feared drowned after boat ran out of fuel. U.S. airstrikes 22 Sept killed seventeen alleged Islamic State (ISIS) fighters in camp some 200km south east of Sirte.

International Criminal Court (ICC) 15 Aug issued arrest warrant for war crimes for controversial Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Mahmoud Warfalli, loyal to eastern-based strongman Gen Haftar. LNA early Aug intensified military campaign and cut supplies to wrest control of Derna city in east from coalition of Islamist militants known as Derna Mujahideen Shura Council (DMSC). At least eleven people – nine soldiers and two civilians – beheaded 23 Aug in attack on checkpoint controlled by Haftar forces in Al-Jufra region south of Sirte; LNA accused Islamic State (ISIS) but no group claimed responsibility. Suicide bomber drove car into LNA checkpoint near town of Nufliya, 130km east of Sirte 31 Aug, killing four members of security forces; ISIS claimed responsibility. Tripoli-based UN-backed Presidency Council 7 Aug condemned LNA siege on Derna for worsening humanitarian situation there. Members of armed group affiliated to govt of PM Serraj 13 Aug kidnapped former PM Ali Zeidan in Tripoli, released him 22 Aug. For first time in months in July number of migrants crossing from Libya to Europe decreased – down to 11,000, 50% less than in July 2016. Militia in Reyaina, north west of Tripoli, late Aug closed pipeline valve, blocking transit of crude oil from oil fields in south west and Hamada region to Zawiya terminal; state-owned National Oil Corporation (NOC) subsequently declared force majeure at several oil fields and export sites. Uncertainty continued to surround constitution drafting process after court in al-Bayda in east 17 Aug annulled July’s vote by Constitution Drafting Assembly in favour of draft constitution.