Negotiations between Huthis and Saudi Arabia remained stalled despite flurry of diplomatic activity and confidence-building steps, while rival forces jostled for control in southern provinces.

Huthi-Saudi talks remained deadlocked despite steps to ease tensions. In attempt to increase pressure on Huthis, Saudi Arabia 5 June held talks on Yemen with Chinese officials and 7 June with U.S. officials. Other diplomatic efforts continued at high intensity: notably, UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg 4-5 June travelled to Saudi Arabia and Oman, and Presidential Leadership Council leader Rashad al-Alimi 8 June met U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken in Saudi capital Riyadh. Negotiations, however, remained stuck over various Huthi demands, including salary payments and increasing flights from Sanaa airport. In positive steps, national carrier Yemenia Airways 8 June announced doubling flight schedule to six, with first direct flight since 2016 between Yemen and Saudi Arabia 17 June arriving in Saudi Arabian city Jeddah; Huthi media 21 June reported Saudi Arabia and Huthis exchanged bodies of fighters. Huthis officials issued weekly warnings of return to hostilities and Huthi redeployments along front underscored potential of renewed war. Meanwhile, UN 16-18 June convened talks between govt and Huthis in Jordanian capital Amman, where Huthis reportedly agreed to negotiate release of prominent political prisoner and Islah member Mohammed Qahran.

Regional actors manoeuvred their affiliated forces in south. Following Riyadh’s request, Al-Alimi’s Nation Shield Forces 6 June deployed from Saudi border toward Aden province, signalling intent to counteract United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) influence in south; STC next day reportedly sent reinforcements to Aden. In Hadramawt province, after STC took steps to solidify its influence with UAE support in recent months, Saudi Arabia invited several prominent Hadrami leaders to Riyadh for discussions regarding future of region, underscoring tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi; participants of discussions 21 June established Hadramawt National Council.

In other important developments. Huthis continued to economically undermine govt, notably by importing cooking gas through Hodeida port to break govt’s monopoly in Marib. Clashes between suspected al-Qaeda militants and UAE-backed pro-govt Shebwa Defence Forces 10 June reportedly killed three in Shebwa province.

Negotiations between Huthis and Saudi Arabia remained stalled despite flurry of diplomatic activity and confidence-building steps, while rival forces jostled for control in southern provinces.

Huthi-Saudi talks remained deadlocked despite steps to ease tensions. In attempt to increase pressure on Huthis, Saudi Arabia 5 June held talks on Yemen with Chinese officials and 7 June with U.S. officials. Other diplomatic efforts continued at high intensity: notably, UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg 4-5 June travelled to Saudi Arabia and Oman, and Presidential Leadership Council leader Rashad al-Alimi 8 June met U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken in Saudi capital Riyadh. Negotiations, however, remained stuck over various Huthi demands, including salary payments and increasing flights from Sanaa airport. In positive steps, national carrier Yemenia Airways 8 June announced doubling flight schedule to six, with first direct flight since 2016 between Yemen and Saudi Arabia 17 June arriving in Saudi Arabian city Jeddah; Huthi media 21 June reported Saudi Arabia and Huthis exchanged bodies of fighters. Huthis officials issued weekly warnings of return to hostilities and Huthi redeployments along front underscored potential of renewed war. Meanwhile, UN 16-18 June convened talks between govt and Huthis in Jordanian capital Amman, where Huthis reportedly agreed to negotiate release of prominent political prisoner and Islah member Mohammed Qahran.

Regional actors manoeuvred their affiliated forces in south. Following Riyadh’s request, Al-Alimi’s Nation Shield Forces 6 June deployed from Saudi border toward Aden province, signalling intent to counteract United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) influence in south; STC next day reportedly sent reinforcements to Aden. In Hadramawt province, after STC took steps to solidify its influence with UAE support in recent months, Saudi Arabia invited several prominent Hadrami leaders to Riyadh for discussions regarding future of region, underscoring tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi; participants of discussions 21 June established Hadramawt National Council.

In other important developments. Huthis continued to economically undermine govt, notably by importing cooking gas through Hodeida port to break govt’s monopoly in Marib. Clashes between suspected al-Qaeda militants and UAE-backed pro-govt Shebwa Defence Forces 10 June reportedly killed three in Shebwa province.

Hopes of breakthrough deal between Saudi Arabia and Huthis dwindled, while southern separatists demanded independent state and factions jockeyed for control of Hadramawt province.

Huthi-Saudi talks stalled. After Saudi diplomatic visit in April raised expectation of breakthrough, Huthis refused to sign Saudi-proposed roadmap or deal with Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), and refused to provide guarantees to enter intra-Yemen talks; Huthis reportedly demanded Riyadh pay reparations for war. UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 2-3 May visited capital Sanaa and held “constructive” meeting with Huthi leaders; 3 May travelled to Aden for “fruitful” discussion with PLC head al-Alimi. Grundberg 17 May briefed UN Security Council, noting “clear determination on all sides to make progress” toward peace deal despite violence along front lines, particularly in al-Jawf, Marib, Taiz and Saada governorates.

Southern Transitional Council (STC) made bid for leadership in south. In attempt to build consensus among southern groups on secession and position itself as main force in south ahead of anticipated intra-Yemeni talks, STC 4-8 May convened Southern National Consultative Meeting, which 8 May produced “national charter” calling for “restoration of the state of the south”; several important groups, notably Hadramawt Inclusive Conference and National Conference for the People of the South, refused to attend, stating opposition to STC’s expansionist agenda. STC 8 May announced council’s restructuring, including creation of legislative body of 392 members. STC President and PLC Vice President Ayderous al-Zubaidi 9 May appointed three new STC vice presidents.

Tensions persisted in Hadramawt, UN proceeded to salvage FSO Safer. Amid STC threats to take over Wadi Hadramawt – northern valley of Hadramawt controlled by Saudi-aligned Islah forces – Saudi-led delegation 5-6 May met Hadramawt and Shebwa governors as part of Saudi strategy to challenge STC’s power and deploy Nation’s Shield Forces headed by al-Alimi. PLC 22 May met Saudi defence minister in Riyadh, where council members criticised STC’s moves in Hadramawt. UN 4 May fell short of funding target to salvage stranded oil tanker FSO Safer but planned to begin rescue operation.

First Saudi diplomatic visit to Yemen in eight years and prisoner swap injected momentum into peace talks, raising hope for comprehensive agreement in May to halt hostilities.

Peace process picked up speed amid Saudi-Huthi talks and prisoner swap. Saudi Arabia 3 April invited Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) members to Saudi Arabian capital Riyadh to discuss negotiations with Huthis, where it presented draft agreement that reportedly included six-month nationwide ceasefire, end to transport restrictions, release of detainees and payment of salaries to civil and military employees in both Huthi and govt-controlled areas. Saudi-led coalition 6 April announced lifting of most restrictions on commercial ships docking in southern ports, including Aden, for first time in eight years. Saudi and Omani delegations 8 April met Huthi leaders in Sanaa to discuss renewal of ceasefire that lapsed in Oct 2022, in first official Saudi diplomatic mission to Yemeni capital since kingdom launched military campaign in March 2015; draft agreement was reportedly modified to include declaration of cessation of war instead of truce, roadmap for humanitarian aid and economic arrangements, and steps toward comprehensive political solution; parties also discussed departure of foreign forces. Although stumbling block remained over Saudi Arabia’s status as mediator or conflict party, Huthi chief negotiator 14 April said negotiations were “serious and positive”. In key confidence-building measure, Huthis, govt and Saudi Arabia 14-16 April concluded swap of 887 detainees; Saudi Arabia 17 April unilaterally released 104 detainees. UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 17 April described talks as best opportunity for peace in eight years.

Parties clashed in Marib, Shebwa and Lahij governorates. Huthi forces and Saudi-backed Salafi group, Saba Axis, clashed along front lines in Marib governorate. Huthis, Giants Brigade and Southern Transitional Council (STC)-affiliated Shebwa Defence Forces clashed along border between Shebwa and al-Bayda.

Saudi-led coalition sought to ease tensions in south. Coalition continued meetings with pro-govt and Southern Transitional Council (STC)-affiliated officials to ease tensions, particularly over Wadi Hadramawt area where STC forces seek to replace Islah-affiliated troops. STC President and PLC member Aydrous al-Zubaidi 1 April announced plan for STC to integrate new south-ern components, consolidating STC as chief representative on southern issue.

Huthis escalated hostilities in Marib and Shebwa governorates, ending months-long de facto truce and overshadowing prisoner exchange deal with govt as well as Iran-Saudi agreement.

Huthis launched attacks in Marib and Shebwa. Huthis launched assaults on govt-aligned forces 20 March in Marib’s Harib district and 26 March in mountain range connecting to Merkhah Al Ulya district in southern Shebwa, leading to deadly clashes, displacing hundreds and ending de facto truce in last six months as govt warned of possible return to all-out fighting; Huthi offensive seemingly sought to break stalemate in ongoing backchannel talks with Riyadh and dampened hopes for Saudi-Iran détente. Huthis 25 March conducted drone attack on Taiz Governor Nabil Shamsan, killing one. Huthis same day announced restrictions on humanitarian flights arriving in capital Sanaa, citing alleged Saudi prohibition on commercial flights.

Diplomatic efforts bore fruit before escalation. Following 10 March Saudi-Iran deal to restore ties (see Saudi Arabia and Iran), Saudi officials reportedly revealed deal included Iranian commitment to halt weapons shipments to Huthis; govt, Huthis and Southern Transitional Council (STC) cautiously welcomed agreement, fuelling hopes of reducing risk of new Huthi offensive; longstanding grievances of local factions, however, remained unaddressed. Meanwhile, Huthi-Saudi talks continued and, in parallel, govt and Huthi delegations 20 March reached deal to exchange 887 detainees in UN-facilitated talks in Switzerland.

Rift between STC and Riyadh continued, govt made overtures to Islah. STC official criticised deployment of Saudi-backed army National Shield Forces in STC-controlled areas, which threatens STC’s grip in south. STC 9 March voiced concern over Saudi-Huthi talks, warning against any deal that goes beyond UN-led process. Separately, Presidential Leadership Council member and leader of Joint Resistance Forces Tareq Saleh 2 March travelled to Islah-stronghold Taiz city and shook hands with rival and Islah military leader Abdo Farhan Mekhlafi, likely signalling attempts to secure pockets of influence in event of Saudi-Huthi settlement.

In other important developments. In first maritime incident in Red Sea this year, unidentified assailants 17 March attacked ship with machine-gun fire. Huthis doubled down on efforts to remove restrictions at Hodeida port, which could jeopardise govt revenues.

Saudi-Huthi backchannel talks displayed signs of progress, Huthis criticised UN’s role in Hodeida and Riyadh announced large deposit in Aden-based Central Bank as govt faced economic troubles.

Tentative signs of breakthrough in Huthi-Saudi negotiations emerged. Contours of deal reportedly became clear as Huthis claimed that Saudi Arabia agreed to their preconditions, including easing movement restrictions around Sanaa airport and Hodeida port and paying state employees’ salaries in Huthi-controlled areas. In positive signals, Riyadh permitted increased movement in Huthi-controlled Hodeida port and both sides toned down negative media rhetoric. Meanwhile, concurrent high-level diplomacy continued. In hope of resurrecting truce ahead of Muslim holy month of Ramadan beginning late March, UN Spe-cial Envoy Hans Grundberg’s military adviser early Feb met govt military commanders, tribal and civil society leaders to discuss possible ceasefire mechanisms. Grundberg 7 Feb met Presidential Leadership Council members al-Alimi and Abu Zara’a al-Muharrami in Aden to discuss inclusive political process; next day met Southern Transitional Council (STC)-aligned Aden governor. Grundberg and Iranian foreign ministry special adviser 9 Feb travelled separately to Oman for talks with Omani officials and Huthi chief negotiator.

Huthis grew critical of UN’s role in Hodeida. Huthis 6 Feb accused UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) of intentionally blocking cargo ships from entering Hodeida port, which UNVIM denied, and called for abolition of mechanism; criticism may reflect Huthis’ desire to diminish UN role ahead of possible lifting of Saudi Arabia’s restrictions on port. Huthis 5 Feb accused UN of delaying mission to salvage rusting oil tanker FSO Safer.

Economic outlook remained bleak, govt forces manoeuvred along front lines. Riyal in govt areas hovered around lowest rate since start of truce, while govt’s oil production remained at near-halt amid Huthi threats; Huthis sought to channel import commodities solely through Huthi-controlled Hodeida rather than govt-controlled Aden. Saudi Arabia 21 Feb announced $1bn deposit intended for Central Bank of Aden. Meanwhile, Nation Shield Forces – commanded by PLC head al-Alimi – deployed across key fault lines in Lahij, Shebwa, al-Dhale and Hadramawt governorates, which have seen friction between STC and Islah forces; move could be aimed at forestalling STC takeover in Hadramawt.

Backchannel talks between Huthis and Saudi Arabia intensified amid steady rise in skirmishes along front lines, while Saudi-Emirati tensions rose over influence in Hadramawt governorate.

Huthis and Saudi Arabia pursued dialogue to reinstate truce. After Omani mediators 10 Jan arrived in capital Sanaa, Huthi chief negotiator 15 Jan called talks with Omanis “serious and positive” but group warned of military escalation if their conditions are not met. Govt remained excluded from talks, raising fears that Riyadh could make unacceptable concessions. UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg 16 Jan visited Sanaa to discuss truce restoration with Huthi officials and same day briefed UN Security Council, reporting “potential step change” in conflict’s trajectory. Meanwhile, low-scale fighting along key front lines in Saada, Marib, Taiz, al-Dhale and Hodeida continued to steadily rise, raising threat of miscalculation and renewed conflict. Head of Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Al-Alimi late Jan established Nation Shield Forces, new military units under his direct command.

Emirati-backed groups sought to shift balance of power in Hadramawt. Southern Transitional Council (STC) – backed by United Arab Emirates (UAE) – 3 Jan mobilised protesters in Seyoun city demanding replacement of Islah-affiliated First Military Region with UAE-aligned Hadrami Elite Forces. Local tribal bloc Hadramawt Tribes Confederation denounced STC moves. In sign of unity with First Military Region, Saudi delegation 10 Jan met Hadramawt governor. STC’s efforts to establish military presence in areas with strong historical ties to Saudi Arabia could mark beginning of UAE-led initiative to uproot Saudi-backed Islah from Hadramawt, threatening localised conflict.

Govt continued active diplomatic engagement amid economic deterioration. U.S. Special Envoy Timothy Lenderking and U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Steven Fagin 6 Jan met al-Alimi and PM Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed to mobilise international support for govt; al-Alimi 10 Jan met U.S., UK, French and European Union ambassadors. PLC members and govt officials 8 Jan met in Saudi capital Riyadh to discuss stabilising economy and govt initiative to lower exchange rates against U.S. dollar. Following Huthi-enforced halt to oil exports, govt 8 Jan approved increase of customs exchange rates from 500 to 750 riyals; STC immediately called for reversal as fuel and other commodity prices spiked.

Back-channel efforts to restore truce showed little sign of breakthrough, as economic conflict escalated amid lingering risks of front-line hostilities and regional escalation.

No signs of progress in renewing truce emerged, despite ongoing efforts. Back-channel talks between Saudi Arabia and Huthis failed to make breakthrough as Huthis maintained demand for Saudi-led coalition to use govt oil revenues for public sector salaries, including of security services, which govt refused, while Saudi Arabia sought reassurance that Huthis would commit to political process. Diplomatic efforts continued nonetheless: notably, UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 6 Dec concluded trip to Saudi Arabia; European Union (EU) ambassadors 8 Dec concluded visit to Aden city where they met Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) head al-Alimi; EU delegation 10 Dec met Taiz governor and military, security and civil society leaders in Taiz city; head of Huthi Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation 6 Dec met EU delegation to Yemen to discuss humanitarian situation. In attempt to ease intra-PLC tensions, al-Alimi, Southern Transitional Council chief and PLC member Ayderous al-Zubaidi, and PLC Islah representative Abdullah al-Alimi 2 Dec met in United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Huthis and govt targeted each other on economic front. Although front-line hostilities did not significantly escalate, parallel economic conflict became increasingly visible. Following Huthi attacks in recent months on govt oil facilities, which paralysed state revenues, economic situation in govt-held areas deteriorated markedly; notably, Aden city witnessed repeated power outages, heightening risk of civil unrest. Huthis intensified threats to target facilities with drones to prevent exports without Huthis receiving share. In response, Central Bank of Aden 6 Dec ordered money exchange companies to freeze accounts of, and stop transactions with, 12 Huthi-affiliated entities; tit-for-tat measures heighten risk of miscalculation that could trigger return to hostilities.

In other important developments. PLC member and leader of National Resistance Force Tareq Saleh 7 Dec oversaw opening of UAE-financed airport in Mokha port city, Taiz governorate, easing movement restrictions for besieged Taiz residents. Defence minister 8 Dec signed military and security cooperation agreement with UAE; Huthi Deputy FM same day called agreement illegal and threatened to target Abu Dhabi.

Back-channel talks between Huthis and Saudi Arabia signalled deal could be reached outside stalled UN process, while Huthis attacked energy infrastructure, raising risks of front-line and regional escalation.

Huthis and Riyadh intensified back-channel negotiations away from UN process. As UN efforts to resurrect truce remained deadlocked, Huthis and Saudi Arabia intensified Oman-facilitated secret talks that excludes Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and UN Special Envoy. Huthis demanded govt use oil and gas revenues to pay civilian and military state employees; while PLC rejected demand, Riyadh reportedly showed willingness to accommodate request provided Huthis enter political process first. Talks raise prospect of bilateral agreement that excludes PLC, which could incentivise anti-Huthi factions to act as spoilers.

Huthis attacked oil and gas infrastructure and redeployed troops on front lines. Huthis 9 Nov launched “warning shot” drone attack on Qana port in Shebwa governorate and ramped up media campaign threatening to target domestic and regional oil and gas facilities; attack disrupted crude oil exports, which is govt’s only source of revenue, and raised spectre of high-profile attack on Saudi Arabia or United Arab Emirates during World Cup. Huthis 21 Nov attacked al-Dhabba oil terminal for second time. While violence remained below pre-truce levels, tempo of skirmishes along front lines rose steadily, as Huthis sent reinforcements to Marib governorate. Unknown gunmen 8 Nov killed adviser to defence minister and his driver near Marib city. Meanwhile, UN human rights chief 4 Nov said Huthis had committed war crimes since truce’s expiry. U.S. Navy 8 Nov reported-ly intercepted shipment of missile fuel from Iran to Huthis in Gulf of Oman.

Diplomatic efforts continued to reinstate UN-brokered truce. U.S. Envoy for Yemen Timothy Lenderking 2-8 Nov visited Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to meet Saudi, Emirati and govt officials. UN Special Envoy to Yemen Hans Grundberg 7 Nov concluded visit to Saudi capital Riyadh, where he met Saudi ambassador to Yemen who is reportedly prominently involved in back-channel talks. Meanwhile, PLC leader al-Alimi 2 Nov attended Arab summit in Algerian capital Algiers and urged member states to designate Huthis as terrorist organisation, as PLC had done in Oct.

April truce remained stuck in limbo after parties failed to agree extension, raising risk of Huthi regional attacks and new cycle of escalation.

Truce remained stuck between outright collapse and extension. Ahead of 2 Oct expiry, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg 1 Oct proposed reopening roads in Taiz governorate, expanding flights from Sanaa airport, lifting restrictions on Hodeida port, and paying public sector salaries and pensions; however, Huthis at eleventh hour demanded govt pay salaries of defence and interior ministries in Huthi-controlled areas using oil and gas revenues, which govt rejected. Main sticking point during month remained source of revenue that ought to cover salary payments, with reports suggesting possible regional player could foot bill; unconfirmed reports late month suggested backchannel talks between Huthis and Saudi Arabia to revive truce were ongoing.

In absence of extension, risk of return to frontline and cross-border hostilities grew. Huthis 2 Oct threatened to target international energy companies operating in Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, ahead of influx of visits to region for World Cup in Qatar in Nov. In first announced military action since truce expiry, Huthi drone 21 Oct targeted cargo ship docking at oil terminal in al-Shihr port, Hadramawt governorate, as Huthis accused companies of looting country’s resources. In response, govt’s National Defence Council designated Huthis as terrorist organisation. Elsewhere, clashes between Huthis and Saudi-led coalition-aligned Southern Transitional Council (STC) 6 Oct reportedly killed at least eight in Yafa, Lahij governorate. UN 13 Oct reported skirmishes along frontlines in Taiz, Marib, Hodeida and Dhale governorates during month.

In south, tensions continued within anti-Huthi bloc. STC mobilised protestors demanding withdrawal of Islah-aligned forces, in effort to extend its rule in Hadramawt governorate; thousands of pro-STC demonstrators 14 Oct reportedly protested in Seiyun, Hadramawt governorate.

In other important developments. Saudi delegation 12 Oct travelled to Sanaa, and Huthi delegation visited kingdom, to finalise prisoner exchange talks for first time since 2014; both parties reiterated agenda did not include truce. Yemeni riyal’s value 4 Oct plummeted to 1,174 to dollar, lowest since April.

Efforts to extend UN-brokered truce stalled ahead of Oct deadline amid govt disunity and Huthi military build-up, raising spectre of return to full-scale fighting.

Govt and Huthis failed to overcome key sticking points to renew truce. Ahead of expiry of UN-brokered truce on 2 Oct, efforts to secure third extension remained deadlocked amid fear of return to front-line hostilities; main sticking points included Huthi demand for disbursement of salary payments to areas under their control and govt demand for Huthis to first reopen roads in and around Taiz city. Flurry of diplomacy continued: notably, head of Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Rashad al-Alimi during month met UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg, U.S. Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking, U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Grundberg 3-5 Sept met Iranian FM Hossein Amir Abdollahian who reiterated Huthis’ call for lifting “blockade” and disbursing salary payments; Huthis 28 Sept reiterated threats to not extend while Grunberg warned “real risk” of return to war.

Anti-Huthi bloc faced fragmentation amid simmering tensions in south. Following deadly clashes in Aug between PLC factions that saw United Arab Emirates-aligned forces consolidate control of Shebwa and Southern Transition Council (STC) late Aug advance into Lawdar, capital of Abyan governorate, situation in south calmed during month; however, STC signalled intent to push further east into oil-rich Hadramawt and Mahra governorates. Protests supported by STC occurred throughout month in Hadramawt and Mahrah governorates demanding replacement of Islah forces from security positions.

Huthis continued military build-up in Hodeida, al-Qaeda struck in south. Huthis 1 Sept held military parade in Hodeida city; UN mission in Hodeida same day condemned parade as violation of 2018 Hodeida agreement. Huthis 21 Sept held another military parade in capital Sanaa as govt same day held military parades in Marib and Taiz; Huthis may believe resumption of hostilities favours them after weeks of PLC infighting. Meanwhile, suspected al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 6 Sept launched deadly attack on security post in Ahwar, Abyan province, sparking clashes that killed 21 troops and eight militants.

Warring parties agreed two-month truce extension, while deadly clashes in Shebwa among rival anti-Huthi factions widened cracks within Political Leadership Council. Govt and Huthis 2 Aug for second time agreed to extend UN-mediated April truce for another two months; UN’s failure to secure six-month extension may signal warring parties’ reluctance both to return to frontline fighting and to transform truce into permanent ceasefire. Huthis same day demanded disbursement of salaries to public sector employees in Huthi-controlled areas, which they said was precondition for further truce extension, and opening of ports and airports. Govt refused salary payments before Huthis reopen roads in Taiz city; Taiz issue remained deadlocked despite rounds of talks in recent months in Jordanian capital Amman. Govt 29 Aug claimed Huthi attack killed 10 soldiers near Taiz city in “dangerous escalation”. On diplomatic front, UN Military Advisor Antony Hayward 4 Aug travelled to Ibb and Taiz governorates and met Huthi and govt representatives to discuss reopening roads in Taiz; UN envoy’s representative in Aden 10 Aug visited Mokha city in Taiz governorate to discuss opening roads local authorities. Meanwhile, tensions escalated within Political Leadership Council established in April. In Shebwa governorate, United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed groups and Islah-aligned factions came to blows after Shebwa Governor and General People’s Congress Party member Muhammad bin al-Wazir al-Awlaki 6 Aug removed local commander of paramilitary Special Security Forces (SSF) and Islah party loyalist Abdi Rabbi Lakaab. Fighting between UAE-aligned Giants Brigades and Shebwa Defence Forces (SDF) on one side and SSF on other 7 Aug erupted in provincial capital Ataq; Giants Brigades and SDF 10 Aug reportedly took over city with dozens killed in fighting. Islah forces said Giants Brigades 20 Aug took over parts of oil field in Shebwa’s Ayaz. In neighbouring Abyan governorate, Political Leadership Council leader Rashid al-Alimi 22 Aug ordered Southern Transition Council (STC, backed by UAE and aligned with SDF) to cease its military operations, which STC next day described as “anti-terror” operation. Earlier, Al-Alimi 1 Aug appointed STC leader as governor of Socotra island and General People’s Congress official with purported STC ties as governor of Hadramawt.

Amid deadlocked talks to reopen roads to Taiz city, international actors scrambled to extend UN-mediated truce ahead of August expiry; failure to extend could see return to front-line and cross-border fighting. Ahead of 2 Aug expiry of UN-mediated truce between warring parties, international efforts to secure six-month extension intensified. Huthi Supreme Presidential Council member Mohammed al-Huthi 17 July called UN-mediated truce “shocking and disappointing experience”, suggesting Huthis may not agree to further truce extension; failure to extend could see conflict parties return to front-line fighting and cross-border attacks between Huthis and Saudi Arabia. Talks over reopening roads to Taiz, key pillar of truce agreement, remained stalled, further eroding hope of extension. Parties opted for unilateral announcements that did not translate into action on ground: Huthis 6 July announced unilaterally opening 50th/60th road, north west of Taiz city; Presidential Leadership Council member Tareq Saleh next day ordered reopening of road between Mokha city and Taiz areas under Huthi control, while Southern Transitional Council leader Ayderous al-Zubaidi announced reopening of road in al-Dhale governorate. UN special envoy’s office 21 July said Huthis rejected latest UN proposal focused on opening four secondary routes in Taiz in first phase. At talks in Jordanian capital Amman, Huthi and govt military committee representatives 5 July agreed to create joint operation room to coordinate military efforts and to reduce inflammatory media rhetoric. On security front, explosion at arms depot 5 July killed at least six and wounded 32 in Lawdar town, Abyan province. Suspected Huthi shelling 23 July killed at least one child and injured ten in Taiz city. Intense military redeployments by conflict parties on key front lines, including in Taiz and Marib, signalled preparation for potential resumption of violence. Anti-Huthi factions conducted recruitment campaigns; notably, Saudi-funded Happy Yemen Brigades commenced recruitment in Abyan province and deployed to presidential palace in Aden, seat of govt and leadership council; in parallel, Southern Transitional Council continued recruitment, mostly in Aden. UN Security Council 13 July extended mandate of UN mission (UNMHA) implementing Dec 2018 ceasefire in Hodeida ports. Presidential Leadership Council 29 July announced partial cabinet reshuffle.

Conflict parties extended April truce for two months, while negotiations over access to Taiz city remained central sticking point and divisions surfaced within govt. Warring parties 2 June renewed UN-mediated April truce for two months; truce – which is longest in effect since start of war in 2015 – has halted entirely cross-border attacks between Saudi-led coalition and Huthis and significantly slowed ground fighting. Low-scale fighting, however, continued during month across front lines, while conflict parties reportedly continued redeployment of military reinforcements and use of drones was reported in Marib, Hajjah, Saada, Hodeida, Taiz and al-Dhale governorates. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 3 June said 19 civilians had been killed in first two months of truce. In effort to fulfil truce’s third confidence-building measure, govt and Huthis 5 June began second round of negotiations in Jordanian capital Amman over reopening road access to Taiz city; UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg’s office 6 June presented proposal for phased reopening of roads. Huthis 24 June rejected UN proposal. After Huthis lifted ban on Grundberg’s entry to capital Sanaa, envoy 8 June visited city to meet Huthi Supreme Political Council President Mahdi al-Mashat and other Huthi officials, urging them to accept UN proposal. Separately, govt, Huthi and Saudi-led coalition representatives 6 June agreed to set up joint operation room to facilitate ceasefire. News 13 June surfaced that Oman facilitated talks in May on border security between Saudi Arabia and Huthis. Domestically, tensions within recently-formed Presidential Leadership Council surfaced, raising uncertainty over whether anti-Huthi bloc will remain united; notably, head of Southern Transitional Council (STC) Ayderous al-Zubaidi pushed for STC military wing, Security Belt Forces, to remain independent following govt’s decision in May to unify all anti-Huthi factions; STC reportedly has embarked on rampant recruitment across south. Meanwhile, security incidents in south rose, notably targeting STC-aligned individuals; IED 15 June killed journalist in Aden city. On economic front, food prices rose causing aid organisations to reduce food rations. With Yemeni riyal reaching 1,050 to U.S. dollar early month, state oil company in Aden 4 June increased fuel prices. Amid increasing power-cuts, as summer months approach, protests 5 June erupted in Mukalla city, Hadramawt governorate.

April truce largely held as UN scrambled to extend deal ahead of June expiration to avoid potential return to hostilities; Sanaa airport opened for first commercial flight in six years. Hostilities remained largely paused between govt and Huthis, notwithstanding slight increase in reported violations on ground, notably in Jabal Balaq mountains in Marib governorate, Taiz and Hajjah governorates. Huthis 23 May downed alleged Saudi-led coalition spy drone, killing three and injuring three in capital Sanaa. In positive development, first commercial flight in six years 16 May left Sanaa international airport after it had been temporarily postponed in April; reopening of airport was part of UN-brokered truce along with ending restrictions on fuel shipments into Hodeida port and lifting Huthi siege on Taiz city. Regarding latter, Huthis 17 May announced new demands, including halting fighting in Taiz governorate and removing military equipment from main roads; first round of talks between Huthis and govt to reopen Taiz roads 29 May ended with no tangible results. On diplomatic front, as expiration of truce on 2 June approached, UN envoy Hans Grundberg worked to secure extension. Grundberg 12 May spoke with head of Presidential Council Rashad al-Alimi, PM Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed and VP of Council Tareq Saleh about truce. Yemeni FM Ahmed Awak bin Mubarak 17 May met U.S Sec State Anthony Blinken in U.S. capital Washington and said govt was “very hopeful to extend” truce. Head of Huthi Supreme Political Council 22 May said Huthis “are not against” extending truce. Grundberg 30 May returned to Aden city and met with Rashad al-Alimi to discuss reopening Taiz roads, and 31 May met with Huthi’s chief negotiator Mohammed Abdul-Salam, where he discussed renewing truce and reopening roads in Taiz governorate. In gesture to support truce, Saudi-led coalition 6 May returned over 100 prisoners to Yemen. Clashes between suspected al-Qaeda militants and Southern Transitional Council-aligned militia Security Belt 6 May reportedly killed dozen in Dhale governorate. Saudi Arabia 16 May agreed to transfer $174mn deposit to Yemeni central bank. Yemeni riyal was volatile after relative stability during Ramadan: 8 May deteriorated to 1040 riyal to U.S. dollar before 18 May appreciating to 980.

In major breakthrough, fighting slowed and cross-border attacks halted after warring parties agreed two-month truce, while President Hadi handed over power to new presidential council. In first coordinated cessation of hostilities since 2016, UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 1 April announced two-month nationwide truce starting next day between Hadi govt and Huthis, which includes cessation of military operations and cross-border attacks, opening of Sanaa airport for biweekly commercial flights to Jordan and Egypt, permission for around 18 fuel ships to enter Huthi-controlled Hodeida port, and negotiations over opening road access to besieged Taiz city. Fighting slowed significantly following announcement of truce: Saudi-led coalition airstrikes and Huthi cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia halted, while fighting around Marib city persisted at low level. Grundberg 6 April expressed concern over “some hostile military activities”, especially around Marib, while absence of mechanism to monitor violations leaves truce fragile; collapse of deal could see swift return to front-line fighting and cross-border attacks. In first visit since taking office, Grundberg 11 April travelled to capital Sanaa and met senior Huthi officials. First commercial flight from Sanaa International Airport in six years was postponed 24 April after disputes over passports being used by travellers. Amid Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-led consultations in Saudi capital Riyadh and reportedly under pressure from Saudi Arabia, President Hadi 7 April announced removal of VP Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and transferred executive authority to new Presidential Leadership Council led by veteran politician and security official Rashad al-Alimi; Council includes diverse anti-Huthi factions and equal number of northern and southern leaders. Al-Alimi 8 April promised to “end the war and achieve peace”. Al-Alimi and other council members arrived in southern Aden city from Saudi Arabia and were sworn in 19 April with UN envoy and EU and GCC ambassadors in attendance. Following formation of presidential council, Saudi Arabia 7 April announced $3bn financial aid to govt, $1bn of which United Arab Emirates will supply, and $300mn for UN aid response; subsequently, Yemeni riyal nearly doubled in value from around 1,000 to about 650 YR to dollar, but subsequently declined.

Fighting slowed on front lines, UN envoy initiated political talks, and rising fuel prices and food shortages exacerbated humanitarian crisis. Fighting remained largely stalemated throughout month with clashes concentrated in Hajjah and Marib governorates. In Hajjah, Huthis retook areas in Harad city they lost in Feb. In Marib, fighting took place in Harib district near al-Balaq mountains encircling Marib city. Elsewhere, govt-aligned forces launched attacks on Huthis in Mukayras district, al-Bayda governorate, and Lawdar district, Abyan governorate; relative calm on front lines could signal Huthis re-grouping for counteroffensive around Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Huthis continued cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia that provoked retaliatory airstrikes (see Saudi Arabia). On diplomatic front, UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 7 March initiated consultations with political parties (excluding Huthis) in Jordanian capital Amman; no tangible results. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 15 March proposed multiparty talks in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh with Huthis, who next day said they would welcome talks only in neutral country; GCC states elected instead to hold political consultations in Riyadh with anti-Huthi parties, in apparent effort at forming united front, and potentially restructuring govt. Grundberg 19 March met Huthi chief negotiator to discuss possible truce during Ramadan. Head of Huthi-led Supreme Political Council 26 March proposed initiative via mediators to halt Huthi cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia and ceasefire for three days in exchange for coalition reopening Sanaa International airport, and bring Hodeida port back up to full capacity; Saudi-led coalition 29 March announced it would halt military operations from next day. Russian invasion of Ukraine compounded already dire humanitarian situation. With 30%-40% of country’s wheat imported from Ukraine and Russia, outbreak of war (see Ukraine) led to skyrocketing prices as country has four months of reserves. Rising costs and depreciating currency raise risk of social unrest, not least during Ramadan when average household consumption rises; Integrated Food Security Phase Classification 14 March predicted 60% of population likely to experience acute food insecurity June-Dec 2022. High-level donor conference 16 March only raised $1.3bn of estimated $4.3bn budget, forcing UN to scale down humanitarian programs in 2022.

Anti-Huthi forces maintained multi-front offensive to regain lost territories as fighting in Marib stalemated, while tensions in south and economic hardship across country persisted. Govt-affiliated forces throughout month launched multi-front offensive, restoring degree of military equilibrium after two years of Huthi gains, but suffered series of reversals on ground. Govt forces advanced on Haradh city, Hajjah governorate, and reportedly gained parts of al-Safra district, Saada governorate. In Taiz governorate, United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed National Resistance Forces advanced along Red Sea-Taiz city road between Jabal Habashi and Maqabana districts. However, Huthis launched counteroffensives in each area, claiming to have retaken most territory. In Marib governorate, fighting largely stalemated. Saudi-led coalition early month reportedly deployed newly-formed “Happy Yemen Brigades” near Marib. While UAE-backed Giants Brigades late Jan withdrew from Shebwa and southern Marib governorates, two brigades remained in northern Shebwa and Harib governorates where fighting continued. In southern Marib governorate, govt forces encircled Huthis from strategic al-Ain and Harib road. Huthis continued cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia throughout month (see Saudi Arabia). Saudi-led coalition responded with airstrikes; notably, strike 14 Feb hit telecommunications infrastructure in capital Sanaa. In Hadramawt governorate in south, tensions between govt and tribal Hiba movement rose as Hiba blocked oil exports, demanding greater share of oil revenues from Shihr port. Southern Transitional Council official 17 Feb called for “escalation” of protests demanding withdrawal of govt troops from governorate. Fuel shortages remained widespread, particularly in Huthi-controlled territories, with govt and Huthis accusing each other of blocking passage of oil. Yemeni riyal 15 Feb fell to 1,180 to U.S. dollar, further increasing pressure on fuel price. Internationally, U.S. govt – under pressure from UAE, Saudi Arabia and Israel – 4 Feb held internal meeting about possible designation of Huthis as Foreign Terrorist Organisation; Treasury Dept 23 Feb sanctioned members of international network funding Huthis. UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 3 Feb met Huthi spokesperson in Oman’s capital Muscat; Huthis still refused Grundberg’s entry into Sanaa. In UN Security Council briefing, Grundberg 15 Feb announced new framework for inclusive process. UN Security Council 28 Feb imposed arms embargo on Huthis.

Battlefield hostilities escalated as anti-Huthi forces regained Shebwa governorate and Saudi-led coalition intensified bombing after Huthis launched deadly attacks on United Arab Emirates. United Arab Emirates (UAE)-aligned Giants Brigades early month recaptured al-Ain, Bayhan and Usaylan districts in north-western Shebwa governorate, al-Saadi junction connecting Marib and Shebwa governorates, and Harib district in southern Marib governorate; Giants Brigades later gained control of strategic road leading to al-Abdiya district and advanced toward Umm Rish camp in al-Juba district in Marib, although local and regional media late month reported that Giants’ military push was being halted; gains represented Huthis’ first visible territorial losses since their push toward Marib city in Jan 2020. In response to losses, Huthis carried out series of missile and drone attacks on UAE (see United Arab Emirates); Saudi-led coalition reacted by launching air strikes on capital Sanaa; notably, coalition 18 Jan carried out air raids on Sanaa killing at least 20; 21 Jan struck telecoms facility in Hodeida city killing three children and causing four-day nationwide internet outage. Attack 21 Jan targeting prison in Huthi-held Saada city reportedly killed at least 91 and injured over 200; coalition denied responsibility. U.S. President Biden 19 Jan said administration was considering re-designating Huthis as international terrorist organisation. Elsewhere, clashes continued without major shifts in front lines. In south, Taiz city witnessed increased levels of fighting, with govt forces making small advances around Jabal Habashi and Maqbana districts’ border. On political front, tensions between local authorities and tribal movements resurfaced in Hadramawt governorate as tribal conglomeration Hadramawt Inclusive Committee in Wadi Hadramawt area vied for establishment of locally-led military unit outside of ministry of defence chain of command as governor rejected idea. On economic front, currency volatility persisted as Yemeni riyal 30 Jan fell to 1,030 to U.S. dollar, following its appreciation last month, amid fuel shortages and price hikes, notably in Sanaa. Internationally, Iranian FM 10 Jan met Huthi top negotiator and Omani officials; UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 12 Jan briefed UN Security Council, notably highlighted military escalation and concern over militarisation of Hodeida port; 19 Jan met Saudi Vice Minister of Defense and Yemeni FM in Saudi capital Riyadh.

Govt forces regained some positions from Huthis in southern Hodeida amid ongoing fighting around Marib city, tit-for-tat violence at Saudi border escalated, and protests erupted in south. On Red Sea coast, govt-aligned Joint Resistance Forces reclaimed some areas in southern Hodeida province lost during Nov withdrawal, including most of Hays district and al-Udayn junction, temporarily cutting off Huthi supply lines from Taiz province. Joint Resistance Forces then focused operations on northern Maqbana axis in western Taiz, notably to gain economically strategic Saqim custom point. In Marib governorate, fighting remained focused around al-Balaq mountain range encircling Marib city. In blow to govt forces, clashes with Huthis 13 Dec reportedly killed senior govt military commander. Elsewhere, govt forces achieved minor gains in western Shebwa while fighting in al-Dhale and al-Bayda governorates slowed. Huthis continued cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia (see Saudi Arabia). Saudi-led coalition responded with airstrikes in Sanaa, Saada, Taiz, Marib and Hodeida governorates; notably, airstrike 3 Dec struck vehicle in Maqbana, Taiz province, killing five civilians and five Huthi fighters; coalition 20 Dec struck targets at Sanaa International Airport. Huthis 21-27 Dec halted humanitarian flights entering capital Sanaa. In south, protests over currency collapse and high food prices early Dec erupted in Aden, Hadramawt, Abyan and Taiz governorates; notably, hundreds 5 Dec protested in Taiz city calling for removal of Taiz governor and PM Abdulmalik Saeed. On political front, tribal members 6 Dec launched sit-in in Nisab district, Shebwa province, calling for removal of govt-aligned governor and protesting economic deterioration; President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi 26 Dec replaced governor with member of parliament aligned with former ruling General People’s Congress party. Economic situation im-proved with Riyal dropping to below 1,000 to U.S. dollar after govt 6 Dec replaced governor and deputy governor of govt-controlled Central Bank. Internationally, UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 13 Dec concluded visit to Oman’s capital Muscat where he met Yemeni and Omani officials, including Huthi chief negotiator Mohammed Ab-dul Salem, while Huthis continued to deny Grundberg entry into Sanaa. Grundberg 14 Dec briefed UN Security Council emphasising dire economic situation and need for negotiations even without ceasefire.

Withdrawal of Saudi-led coalition-aligned troops from Hodeida prompted Huthis to seize territory on Red Sea coast and close in on Marib city, raising prospect of imminent offensive or siege. Saudi-led coalition-aligned Joint Resistance Forces 12 Nov withdrew from Hodeida city to military bases in southern Hodeida and northern Taiz governorates, citing UN-brokered 2018 Stockholm Agreement; UN Mission on Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) denied knowledge of redeployment, 15 Nov called withdrawal “major shift” in front lines. Huthis immediately seized vacated areas, reopened road connecting Hodeida and capital Sanaa, and clashed with rival forces in al-Fazih, al-Tuhayta, al-Haima and Hays districts; local medical workers reported highest casualties on Red Sea coast since 2018. Saudi-led coalition 14 Nov launched airstrikes in Hodeida to protect aligned forces, which later initiated renewed offensive in southern Hodeida. In Marib governorate, Huthis 2 Nov announced capture of al-Jubah and Jabal Murad districts; by end of Nov, Huthis surrounded Marib city from al-Jodeida in south east, al-Jubah in south, Sirwah in west and Meghdal in north west with forces 20km from city, raising prospect of imminent offensive or siege. Elsewhere, anti-Huthi forces stepped up military campaign in western Taiz governorate, seizing territory in northern Maqabana district; Huthis 10 Nov fired missiles on Mokha city. In north, Huthis continued cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia (see Saudi Arabia); Saudi-led coalition launched airstrikes, notably announcing strikes on Sanaa, Saada and Marib governorates 20 Nov. In south, security situation worsened; notably car bomb 9 Nov killed pregnant Yemeni journalist in Aden city. Protesters rallied in Lahij, Taiz, Abyan and Shebwa governorates over deteriorating economy and fuel prices. Tensions between Southern Transitional Council (STC) and govt continued, notably in Shebwa governorate. Amid stalled implementation of 2019 Riyadh Agreement, STC leadership 9 Nov stated “our patience has reached its limits”; most Saudi-led coalition forces 11 Nov vacated Aden – further Saudi withdrawal risks collapse of Riyadh Agreement. On diplomatic front, UN Envoy Hans Grundberg continued regional listening tour in Aden, Taiz governorate and Iranian capital Tehran. Economic situation worsened with Riyal falling to record-low, passing YR1,500 to U.S. dollar, and fuel prices reaching all-time high in south.

Huthis launched multi-pronged assault in central Yemen, increasing risk of battle for Marib city, while tensions between govt and Southern Transition Council (STC) escalated in south. On military front, after consolidating control in al-Bayda governorate in Sept, Huthi forces made major breakthroughs in last contiguous bloc of territory under govt control in central Yemen’s Abyan, Shebwa and Marib governorates, substantially raising likelihood of battle for Marib city. Huthis early month encircled Abidya district and gained control of Rahaba and Harib districts in Marib governorate as well as Usaylan, Bayhan and al-Ain districts in Shebwa governorate; gains enabled push into Jebel Murad and al-Jubah districts in Marib governorate in attempt to surround Marib city; fall of Marib city would deal heavy blow to govt credibility and UN mediation efforts. Meanwhile, Huthis continued cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia (see Saudi Arabia). In Hodeida governorate, Saudi-led coalition 6, 23, 24 Oct destroyed eight explosive-laden boats amid reports of build-up of Huthi forces. In south, tensions between govt and separatist STC rose; notably, gun battles between rival forces in Aden 2 Oct killed four militants. Car bomb targeting Aden Governor Ahmed Lamlas and Govt Minister Salem al-Socotri 10 Oct killed six and injured seven others; Lamlas and al-Socotri survived. Car bomb at Aden Airport 30 Oct killed several civilians. PM Maen Saeed Abdulmalek 12 Oct returned to Aden for first time in over six months. Insecurity and protests persisted in Aden as well as Lahij, Mukalla, Abyan governorates and Socotra island; notably, gunmen 4 Oct killed humanitarian worker in Tur al-Baha district, Lahij. On diplomatic front, UN Envoy Hans Grundberg continued regional listening tour, including in Saudi capital Riyadh and Aden in first Yemen visit since taking up position. In UN Security Council briefing, Grundberg 14 Oct confirmed meeting Huthi representatives in Omani capital Muscat and highlighted “growing gap” between Huthi’s and govt’s visions of ceasefire and political settlement. Economic situation worsened with ongoing fuel and electricity shortages. Yemeni riyal 17 Oct fell to record low YR1,385 to dollar, prompting govt to close exchange shops and implement measures to curb demand for foreign currency.

Huthis intensified assault in north and consolidated control in central al-Bayda governorate, raising prospect that fighting could increase further in coming month; protests escalated in south. On military front, hostilities escalated sharply throughout month. In north, Huthis made gains in western Marib governorate and 8 Sept captured Rahabah district in Marib’s south. In strategic and central al-Bayda governorate, Huthis consolidated control, enabling offensives into Bayhan district in Shebwa governorate and Lawdar district in Abyan governorate, threatening key road interchanges and transport lines between govt-held areas; Huthis could further intensify assaults in Marib, Shebwa and Abyan in coming weeks. In Hodeida governorate, fighting took place in southern al-Tuhayta, al-Hayma and Hays districts; Huthis reportedly deployed multiple brigades to al-Tuhayta in preparation for what local forces speculate is major offensive to restore control of Red Sea coast taken by United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed forces in 2018. Huthis also continued cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia (see Saudi Arabia). In south, Huthis 11 Sept fired five drones, three missiles at Red Sea port Mocha, Taiz governorate, reportedly injuring six soldiers. Fighting in al-Dhale governorate continued at same levels in Qataba, al-Husha and al-Masharih districts. Separately, protests escalated in Aden, Taiz, Shebwa, Hadramawt, Socotra and al-Mahra governorates throughout month; violent clashes between demonstrators and security forces, who fired live ammunition, 15 Sept left three dead during protests in Aden and Mukalla cities. Demonstrators in Aden and Hadramawt protested collapse of public services, electricity outages and currency collapse, while in Shebwa, Socotra and al-Mahra, protesters demanded withdrawal of Saudi and UAE troops. Southern Transition Council leader Aydrous al-Zubaidi 15 Sept declared state of emergency in southern governorates in response to Huthis’ inroads. Hundreds 27 Sept protested in Taiz city, blocking streets in protest at currency crash and inflation. On diplomatic front, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg 10 Sept briefed UN Security Council, stressing need for more inclusive, Yemeni-led peace process. Grundberg 15-17 Sept visited Saudi capital Riyadh, met with Yemeni President Hadi and govt and Saudi officials. Meanwhile, Yemeni Riyal fell below YR1,100 to dollar in govt-controlled areas, driving up fuel and commodity prices.

Fighting lulled in north but violence persisted in south amid tensions between govt and southern separatists; UN Sec-Gen appointed new special envoy, and UN sounded alarm over risk of famine. In north, fighting quietened with post-Eid al-Adha reduction in fighting largely continuing throughout month. Huthis continued cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia (see Saudi Arabia). In south, Huthis made advances towards Shebwa governorate and other territories controlled by Yafa tribal confederation; Huthi pressure increased fragile security situation amid wave of tit-for-tat assassinations targeting govt and Southern Transitional Council (STC) officials. Alleged Huthi attack targeting Saudi-led coalition’s al-Anad military base in Lahj governorate 29 Aug killed at least 30 soldiers and wounded at least 50 others. Saudi mediation attempts to broker power-sharing accord between Hadi govt and STC remained stalled. After govt-aligned speaker of House of Representatives 28 July decided to hold parliamentary meeting in eastern Hadramawt governorate, part of pre-1990 independent south, protesters 1 Aug in response to STC call for civil disobedience reportedly burnt tyres, blocked roads and closed shops in Seiyun and Mukalla cities in Hadramawt governorate. STC during month made series of unilateral security appointments; mid-month threatened to enforce independent local exchange rate in areas under STC control as Yemeni riyal early Aug fell below record YR1,060 to $1 in govt-controlled areas. On diplomatic front, UN Sec-Gen Antonio Guterres 6 Aug announced selection of Swedish diplomat and current EU Ambassador to Yemen Hans Grundberg as new UN special envoy for Yemen; govt officials, Saudi Arabia and Oman 7 Aug welcomed appointment while Huthi chief negotiator next day said talks with Grundberg would be futile without progress toward reopening ports and airports. UN Assistant Sec-Gen for the Middle East Khaled Khairi 23 Aug raised alarm over fuel shortages, called on govt to allow entry of essential supplies into Hodeida port and urged all parties to stop “weaponizing the economy” amid Huthi-govt standoff over tax and customs payments at Hodeida port. UN humanitarian chief Martin Griffiths same day warned two thirds of population dependent on humanitarian aid and 5mn people in immediate danger of famine.

While violence eased in Marib, heavy clashes between tribal forces and Huthis erupted in southern al-Bayda governorate; tensions heightened between Southern Transition Council and govt. Following last month’s heavy clashes, fighting eased in Marib governorate as Huthis redirected their forces from northern front lines to southern al-Bayda governorate; local forces from al-Humaiqan tribe – supported by southern separatists and Salafist fighters, many from Yafa tribe – 2-4 July made territorial gains, reportedly including in az-Zahir and as-Sawmah districts, in most intense fighting in area in 18 months. By 11 July, Huthis had largely regained territories and began to push into al-Humaiqan tribal territory. Elsewhere, Huthis 4 July reportedly carried out attack on military base in Abyan in rare missile strike on southern region, while cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia continued (see Saudi Arabia). Meanwhile, on diplomatic front, UN efforts at kickstarting ceasefire negotiations effectively halted as approval by UN Security Council’s permanent members of leading candidate Hans Grundberg for new UN special envoy position stalled; outgoing envoy Martin Griffiths 19 July took up new position as UN’s humanitarian chief, leaving Yemen position vacant. Omani officials reportedly continued pushing for ceasefire between Riyadh and Huthis without any progress. In south, tensions rose between the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and internationally-recognised govt. Talks in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh between two sides to discuss implementation of Nov 2019 Riyadh Agreement 1 July ended inconclusively; STC accused govt of arresting and attacking its supporters in Shebwa governorate, while govt alleged STC was fostering violent protests and unrest in Shebwa; both accused other of building up forces in Abyan governorate. Tensions stemming from STC President Aydrous al-Zubaidi’s late June reshuffle of STC-aligned security forces continued; move seen as attempt to consolidate control in southern Aden city’s state and parallel institutions. STC leader and Aden Governor Ahmed al-Lamlas 14 July announced formation of “popular security committees”, which govt viewed as attempt to reinforce STC’s position in city. Yemeni Riyal hit historic low, plunging to YR1,000 to U.S. dollar on 12 July, marking 72% depreciation of pre-war value.

Huthis reinvigorated offensive in Marib governorate, raising prospect of all-out summer offensive in coming month, while nationwide ceasefire talks remained stalled. In north, after brief lull in fighting in first half of June between Huthis and govt-aligned forces, hostilities 19 June escalated in Marib governorate, with Huthis stepping up drone and missile attacks in Marib and across border in Saudi Arabia; fighting fuelled fears that Huthis may launch long-anticipated offensive to coincide with summer dust storms that limit Saudi-led coalition's airstrike capacity. Huthis’ seizure of Marib city and surrounding oil and gas facilities could trigger mass displacement and cut off 90% of country’s petroleum gas supply. Huthis claimed Saudi-led coalition 5, 18, 21 June carried out airstrikes in Marib and Saada governorates while Saudi air defences 19 June intercepted 17 Huthi drones launched toward kingdom (see Saudi Arabia). Meanwhile, ceasefire negotiations remain deadlocked. Omani mediation delegation 5-11 June travelled to capital Sanaa to meet Huthi leaders to discuss UN-backed ceasefire initiative. Huthis maintained position on unilateral reopening of Hodeida port and Sanaa air-port as pre-condition for ceasefire talks and demanded withdrawal of foreign forces from Yemen. Saudi and Hadi govts insisted issues be treated as package, as discussed in 2020. Outgoing UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths in his last UN Security Council briefing 15 June painted “bleak picture” of conflict and expressed hope Omani mediation process will “bear fruit”. In sign of growing U.S. frustration with lack of progress, U.S. Envoy for Yemen Timothy Lenderking 17 June blamed Huthis for failed ceasefire talks. Meetings between govt and Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Saudi capital Riyadh on implementation of 2019 Riyadh Agreement stalled. STC 18 June suspended participation, citing govt intransigence; STC 21 June denied rejecting Riyadh Agreement and said it agreed to Hadi govt’s return to southern city Aden as soon as possible. STC 26 June said it would end all communication with parties to Riyadh Agreement. Protests in south occurred throughout month, including in Aden and Taiz city, amid water and electricity shortages and ongoing depreciation of Yemeni riyal.

Huthis continued assault in north as ceasefire talks remained stalled; meanwhile, tensions between govt and southern separatists persisted in southern city Aden. In north, intense fighting continued throughout month. Huthi offensive in Marib governorate halted as its forces met stiff resistance from govt-aligned forces and Saudi-led coalition airstrikes along mountainous ground west of Marib city; while Huthis appeared to remain intent on seizing Marib, ongoing Saudi-Iran security talks (see Saudi Arabia) could offer opportunity to prevent destructive battle of Marib city. On diplomatic front, UN Sec-Gen António Guterres 12 May confirmed Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths due to be next UN humanitarian coordinator, raising speculation over his successor as Yemen envoy. Griffiths and U.S. Envoy Timothy Lenderking throughout month expressed frustration over lack of progress in ceasefire talks with Huthis; Griffiths 12 May described Huthi assault on Marib as “relentless” and 26 May concluded three-day visit in Saudi Arabia where he met senior Saudi and Yemeni govt officials; Huthis reportedly maintained their support for nationwide ceasefire contingent upon unilaterally reopening Hodeida port and Sanaa airport. In south, ongoing tensions between Yemeni govt and pro-independence Southern Transitional Council (STC) risked imperilling Saudi-brokered Nov 2019 Riyadh agreement. Widespread electricity shortages in Aden city continued while prices of local goods rose due to ongoing depreciation of Yemeni riyal. Following his return to Yemen after two years on 1 May, STC President Aydrous al-Zubaid criticised govt for failing to implement Riyadh agreement and starving Aden of resources; dispute with govt also persisted over appointment of senior officials to political posts. Political tensions between govt and STC raised prospect of renewed clashes in Abyan governorate, where govt- and STC-aligned forces are positioned.

Hostilities in Taiz and Marib governorates continued between Huthis and govt-backed forces while tensions between separatists and govt persisted in south. Fighting continued throughout month between Huthis and govt-aligned forces in Taiz governorate as latter sought to open road access to Aden city and Red Sea coast in attempt to break Huthi siege of Taiz city and relieve pressure on Marib governorate. Fears rose that Huthis may be planning more attacks in Marib governorate in May aimed at securing tactical positions ahead of new offensive in summer months when dust storms will likely limit Saudi-led coalition’s ability to provide defensive air support. Huthis late April intensified offensive and advanced deeper into Marib, seizing control of territory to west of Marib city; fighting reportedly killed dozens of Huthi and govt fighters, including senior military official Major General Abdullah al-Hadhiri on 24 April. On diplomatic front, as UN Security Council Resolution 2216 marked its sixth anniversary on 14 April, efforts to broker ceasefire remained stalemated as Huthis continued to reject Riyadh’s unveiling in March of “an initiative to end the Yemeni crisis”, largely reiteration of Riyadh’s position in year-long UN-led negotiations. In south, tensions continued between govt and pro-independence Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Aden amid electricity shortages and protests as STC accused govt of purposely withholding services in city; discord also centred on series of military, judicial and local appointments made by President Hadi, with STC claiming they were not consulted despite formation of unity govt in Dec 2020; popular anger could rise further in summer months if increased demand for electricity is not met. Meanwhile, Huthis continued cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia (see Saudi Arabia). 

Huthis continued offensive in Marib and cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia, while govt and Huthi forces clashed along Red Sea Coast and in Taiz and Hajja regions; anti-govt protests erupted in south. In north, Huthis and govt-aligned forces throughout month fought heavily in western and southern Marib governorate; Huthis claimed limited gains around Marib dam south west of Marib city while govt and Saudi-backed forced made repeated attempts to seize control of highway connecting Marib city with Huthi-held Sanaa and al-Jawf in west; threat of Huthi assault to take Marib city remained distinct possibility. Huthis continued drone and missile attacks on targets inside Saudi Arabia (see Saudi Arabia); Riyadh 7, 21 March launched airstrikes on targets inside capital Sanaa for first time since beginning of year. Fighting also broke out in Hodeida, Taiz and Hajja governorates as govt-aligned forces early March launched new offensives on Huthi positions in attempt to relieve pressure on Marib; govt-aligned forces 9 March reportedly seized mountaintop positions west of Taiz city. On diplomatic front, U.S. Yemen Envoy Timothy Lenderking throughout month stepped up outreach to Huthis, reportedly proposing plan that calls for nationwide ceasefire in exchange for lifting restrictions on Sanaa airport and Hodeida’s ports as well as national salary payment mechanism. Riyadh 22 March announced “an initiative to end the Yemeni crisis”, largely reiteration of existing peace proposal that Huthis called “nothing new”. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken and UK, France and German FMs 24 March met to discuss peace efforts; Blinken 25 March held call with Yemeni PM Saeed, stressing need for ceasefire and inclusive peace agreement. In south, protests erupted mid-month in Aden city over deteriorating economic conditions, including repeated blackouts, fuel shortages and food price hikes, with Yemeni riyal sliding to YR900 to dollar; protesters 16 March stormed presidential Ma’shiq palace, where PM Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed has been based since late Dec. Riyadh 25 March allowed fuel shipments to enter Huthi-held Hodeida port for first time in almost two months. UN Sec-Gen Antonio Guterres 2 March expressed disappointment after donors pledged only $1.7bn for UN’s humanitarian efforts, $1bn less than 2019 pledges. 

Huthis intensified military offensive in Marib governorate, threatening further escalation in area, while U.S. changed course to address conflict with renewed focus on mediation. In some of heaviest fighting since 2018, Huthis mid-month significantly stepped up their year-long offensive in Marib governorate where they advanced in north west, west and south of province, making particular progress in western district of Sirwah some 20km from Marib city. Looming battle for Marib city and nearby oil and gas production facilities could trigger more mass displacement, deepen country’s humanitarian and economic crisis, and spark renewed armed conflict in south and along Red Sea coast in March. Govt-aligned forces late Feb announced imminent counter-offensive to expel Huthi forces from Marib governorate, but Huthis held recent gains by end of Feb. Rebels also intensified cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia (see Saudi Arabia). In major policy shifts, U.S. President Biden 4 Feb announced that U.S. will halt “offensive support” for Saudi-led coalition’s war effort in Yemen, including transfer of precision-guided munitions, while “stepping up” diplomatic support for UN-led mediation; appointed veteran diplomat Timothy Lenderking as new U.S. special envoy to Yemen; and, lastly, revoked Trump administration’s designation of Huthi movement and its three top leaders as “foreign terrorists”. In renewed diplomatic push, Lenderking 22 Feb-3 March travelled to several Gulf countries to meet govt officials and UN special envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths. Meanwhile, UN humanitarian chief Mark Lowcock 18 Feb briefed UN Security Council on Yemen, warning of “worst famine the world has seen in decades”. UN 21 Feb announced that talks proceeding since 24 Jan between Huthis and govt on potential prisoner swap failed to reach agreement.

Outgoing U.S. administration designated Huthi group and leaders as terrorists, potentially imperilling aid and diplomatic efforts and risking Huthi retaliation. In one of its final acts in office, outgoing U.S. Trump administration 11 Jan designated Huthi movement as Foreign Terrorist Organisation and Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity, and three top leaders as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, all of which came into force on 19 Jan. Move comes after Huthis early Jan warned of “reciprocal responses” to designation; possible retaliation in Feb could include ban on contact with U.S. citizens, freezing communication channels with UN, and cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia and maritime traffic in Red Sea. UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Mark Lowcock 14 Jan warned designation would precipitate “a large-scale famine on a scale that we have not seen for nearly 40 years” while UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths same day warned it would have “chilling effect” on his efforts to mediate end to conflict. Speaking at his 19 Jan Senate confirmation hearing, incoming U.S. Sec State Anthony Blinken promised to immediately review designation and launch review of Yemen policy; new U.S. Biden administration 25 Jan approved all transactions involving Huthis for one month while designation faces review, and next day announced temporary pause on arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, fighting continued along Yemen’s major front lines in Hodeida, al-Dhale and Marib governorates; intense clashes were reported along Red Sea coast in first two weeks of month, prompting UN mission 7 Jan to issue statement of concern after wedding hall 1 Jan was hit during fighting, reportedly killing five. Huthis 17 Jan reportedly launched projectile into Saudi Arabia that hitvillage in southern Jazan region, injuring three civilians; Huthis denied responsibility of 23 Jan missile attack on Riyadh (see Saudi Arabia). In south, tensions rose between Southern Transitional Council (STC) and govt after President Hadi 15 Jan appointed former PM Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr as head of Shura Council without consulting STC, which accused govt of breaching Nov 2019 Riyadh Agreement. 

Deadly bombing in Aden city overshadowed long-awaited progress toward implementing Riyadh Agreement, while fighting in north continued. In positive step, govt and pro-independence Southern Transitional Council (STC) moved toward implementation of Nov 2019 Riyadh Agreement after Saudi officials 17 Dec announced both sides’ military and security forces had redeployed from Aden and key front lines in Abyan governorate, east of Aden, where new security cordon had been formed by non-aligned Salafist fighters previously based along Yemen’s Red Sea coast; Yemeni state media 18 Dec also announced formation of long-awaited 24-minister cabinet led by returning PM Maen Saeed Abdulmalek to be based in temporary capital Aden. Multiple explosions 30 Dec however rocked Aden airport as new cabinet arrived and disembarked plane, killing at least 26 people and injuring more than 100; second attack reportedly struck Aden’s Mashiq Palace, where cabinet due to be based. In north, after seizing key military base west of Marib city in Nov, Huthi fighters intensified attacks throughout month in southern and north-western Marib; STC-linked forces in al-Dhale governorate in early Dec reported wave of Huthi attacks on front lines between their governorate and Huthi-held Ibb governorate. In south, tensions mounted between govt-affiliated forces and STC over United Arab Emirates (UAE)’s control of two military bases in Shebwa governorate; local media 14 Dec reported exchange of artillery fire around major gas export facility overseen by French oil company Total at Balhaf town in Shebwa governorate; French parliamentarians 12 Dec demanded review of UAE control of terminal, citing concerns over allegations of torture at base. Meanwhile, fears persisted throughout month of potentially imminent U.S. decision to designate Huthis as foreign terrorist organisation that could further dent prospects for stalled UN peace process; Washington 10 Dec sanctioned three Huthi security officials for alleged human rights abuses. Saudi and U.S. officials mid-month blamed Huthis for 13 Dec attack on oil tanker off the port of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, although Huthis denied responsibility. Saudi and Yemeni govt officials blamed Huthis for what they termed “terrorist” attack on Aden airport on 30 Dec, strengthening case for U.S. designation.

Clashes continued on northern and southern front lines; U.S.’s likely designation of Huthis as terrorist organisation in Dec could prompt retaliatory attacks and hamper humanitarian operations. U.S. reportedly continued to consider designating Huthi rebel group as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO); move would have detrimental impact on UN-led mediation efforts, economy and humanitarian situation, and could prompt rebels to launch major retaliatory strikes into Saudi Arabia. UN reportedly confirmed mid-Nov withdrawal of all U.S. staff from capital Sanaa in anticipation of designation. UN Sec-Gen António Guterres 20 Nov warned that Yemen was “in imminent danger of the worst famine the world has seen for decades”, likely in response to designation rumours. In north, military situation remained largely stalemated with neither govt forces nor Huthis making progress along most active front lines in Marib and al-Jawf governorates, while military activity also decreased in Hodeida and al-Dhale governorates. However, following two weeks of intense clashes, Huthi- and govt-linked media 20 Nov reported Huthis had seized strategically important Mas military camp west of Marib city; if confirmed, group became close to seizing high ground around main highway leading to last major urban govt stronghold. In south, sudden escalation of violence 18 Nov erupted between separatist Southern Transition Council forces and President Hadi loyalists in Abyan governorate; fighting in south and Saudi objections to Hadi cabinet nominees again delayed formation of new unity govt under Riyadh Agreement. Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts remained largely stalled as UN attempts to pave way to talks between govt and Huthis through Joint Declaration initiative remained dependent on formation of new unity govt. 

Huthis continued their military campaign in north, raising prospect of escalating offensives toward Marib and Hodeida in Nov, while Hadi govt and Huthis implemented major prisoner swap agreement. In north, fighting continued along key front lines throughout month and could further worsen around Marib and Hodeida in Nov. Notably, Huthis reportedly pushed into Marib’s al-Abdiyah and Harib districts. Both pro- and anti-Huthi forces also claimed progress in strategically important Rahabah and Jebel Murad districts; govt-aligned forces in turn claimed progress in their push across northern desert in al-Jawf governorate towards key Huthi-held military base. Skirmishes around Red Sea port city of Hodeida further strained Dec 2018 Stockholm Agreement: Huthis early Oct made concerted push into Durayhimi district, south of Hodeida, and reportedly regained full control of Durayhimi town and its environs; heavy fighting followed on “Kilo 16” front line, stretch of territory along main highway linking Hodeida with northern highlands; Huthi’s capture of Kilo 16 could lead to end of partial siege of city as well as collapse of Dec 2018 ceasefire. In south, violent clashes between United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed forces and local govt-affiliated military forces continued throughout month in and around Taiz city. Hadi govt and pro-independence Southern Transitional Council (STC) 1 Oct swapped total of 58 detainees; reports of clashes between STC and govt reduced during month amid speculation of imminent force redeployments on both sides from Aden city and Abyan governorate and formation of new unity govt. Study by London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 28 Oct found Aden suffered 2,100 excess deaths between April and Sept 2020, likely due to COVID-19 outbreak. International Committee of Red Cross and UN 15-16 Oct oversaw largest prisoner swap since war began in March 2015: Huthis and govt transferred 1,081 detainees; deal first agreed as part of Dec 2018 Stockholm Agreement but faced persistent delays. More than 240 people 14 Oct arrived in Huthi-held Sanaa from Oman’s capital, Muscat, as part of parallel deal involving Huthis, Saudi Arabia and U.S., facilitated by Oman, that saw release of two U.S. nationals detained by Huthis in past two years.

Huthi military campaign continued in north amid renewed clashes around Hodeida port; in south, govt and separatists resumed talks.  In north, Huthis throughout month made new gains in oil-rich Marib governorate and consolidated control over territory in neighbouring al-Bayda governorate. Huthis mid-Sept negotiated truce with elements of Murad tribe in al-Mahaliya, thereafter claiming to control the territory. Huthis also continued to launch cross-border missile attacks on Saudi Arabia in apparent attempt to force Riyadh into renewing direct talks that they hoped would allow them to side-step Hadi govt in peace process; Huthis early Sept claimed communications channels with Saudis had become more active. In Taiz in north, clashes early Sept broke out between United Arab Emirates (UAE)-affiliated and govt forces on one hand and Islah-backed military and security forces on other; UAE-backed forces also clashed with Huthi fighters around Red Sea port city of Hodeida throughout month, raising prospect that govt may withdraw from Dec 2018 Stockholm agreement that prevented govt assault on Hodeida. Hadi govt continued to halt fuel imports to Hodeida port amid ongoing spat with Huthis over collection of revenues. In south, govt and separatist Southern Transition Council (STC) mid-Sept resumed power-sharing talks after STC withdrew from talks late Aug citing govt attacks on its forces; both sides, however, continued tit-for-tat attacks in Abyan governorate. Meanwhile, on diplomatic front, UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths mid-Sept presented latest draft of his “Joint Declaration” initiative to Huthis and Hadi govt; initiative calls for nationwide ceasefire, economic and humanitarian confidence-building measures and national political talks. Hadi govt and Huthis 27 Sept agreed on prisoner exchange deal first outlined in Stockholm agreement following talks in Geneva, Switzerland; Huthis to release 400 prisoners while govt will release 681 prisoners in deal Griffiths hailed as “very important milestone”; exchanges to take place mid-Oct.

Huthis escalated their military offensive in Marib governorate while UN peace efforts remained deadlocked. In north, following end of Eid al-Adha holiday, Huthis 2 Aug ramped up their multi-front military campaign to take control of oil-rich Marib governorate – Hadi govt’s last major urban stronghold in north Yemen – and surrounding governorates with sustained attacks on tribal and govt positions in al-Jawf, Marib and al-Bayda governorates. Huthis and govt both claimed to have inflicted significant losses on rival forces in al-Jawf throughout month. Saudi-led coalition 20 Aug said it intercepted drone launched by Huthis from capital Sanaa, reflecting recent trend of intensifying cross-border attacks. In south, Riyadh 2 Aug helped broker agreement between Hadi govt and separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) over reappointment of current PM Maen Abdulmalik Saeed as well as appointment of pro-STC governor and neutral security chief in Aden city, but within days clashes between two sides broke out again in southern governorate of Abyan. STC 25 Aug announced it had withdrawn from Nov 2019 Riyadh agreement, citing “irresponsible behaviour by parties”. Tensions among anti-Huthi groups intensified after clashes erupted in Taiz city between pro-govt forces allied with Islah, Yemen’s main Sunni Islamist party, and rival groups with ties to United Arab Emirates, in early August. Huthis and Hadi govt intensified their criticisms of UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths for alleged bias: Huthis accused UN of lack of balance following UN report on violations of children rights officially published 23 Aug, while Hadi govt rejected UN’s July peace proposal on grounds it “undermines the govt’s sovereignty”. Meanwhile, Huthis 15 Aug reportedly agreed to issue visas to team of UN technical experts to inspect floating oil storage facility, FSO Safer, off coast of Huthi-held Hodeida port; facility reportedly holds around 1mn barrels of oil at risk of leaking, threatening closure of port. Huthis 20 Aug announced that security operation in al-Baydah province consolidated territorial control, and killed Islamic State (ISIS) leader Abu Al-Walid Al-Adani.

Amid rising COVID-19 cases, fighting between govt forces and Huthis in north and cross-border attacks between Huthis and Saudi Arabia intensified, while tensions in south de-escalated. In north, fighting between govt forces and Huthis escalated: Huthis 4 and 18 July fired ballistic missiles into Marib governorate, leaving four civilians injured. Saudi-led coalition 12 July launched airstrike targeting Hajja governorate in north west, killing at least nine, including seven children. Saudi airstrike near al-Hazm, capital of al-Jawf, 15 July killed at least eleven, including several children; UN special envoy next day called for investigation. Meanwhile, Huthis mid-month stepped up campaign against tribes in south of Marib governorate in effort to pressure them into breaking with govt. Cross-border war mid-July intensified after Saudi-led coalition 2 July launched series of airstrikes targeting area around Huthi-held capital Sanaa; in retaliation, Huthis 13 July reportedly launched drone and missile attacks targeting oil facility in Saudi city Jizan, Abha airport and military sites in Jizan and Najran cities; no casualties reported. Saudi-led coalition same day said it had intercepted four Huthi missiles and six bomb-laden drones targeting civilians in Saudi Arabia. In south, after Saudi Arabia in June presented new proposal to govt and Southern Transitional Council (STC) on stalled implementation of Nov 2019 Riyadh Agreement, STC 29 July rescinded its April declaration of self-administration and agreed to implement provisions of Riyadh deal, marking progress toward ending months-long power struggle between STC and UN-recognised govt; President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi 29 tasked PM Maeen Saeed with forming new govt in accordance with deal. Meanwhile, UN special envoy Martin Griffiths early July shared latest draft agreement to end conflict with govt; President Hadi 14 July publicly rejected draft on grounds that it “undermines the govt’s sovereignty”; govt reportedly criticised concessions around reopening of Sanaa airport and easing restrictions on Hodeida port. Local health authorities as of 17 July recorded more than 1,500 COVID-19 cases and 439 deaths; 50% increase in both figures from previous month. UN 15 July warned of risk of oil spill from FSO Safer oil tanker in Red Sea, which risks closure of Hodeida port that could cut off 11 million Yemenis from access to basic goods.

Amid rapid spread of COVID-19, Huthis stepped up attacks in north as well as cross-border strikes into Saudi-Arabia, while govt forces and southern separatists forged ceasefire after renewed fighting. In north, Huthi forces mid-June pursued offensive in west of Marib, pushing toward Marib city while consolidating control over territory in north despite Saudi airstrikes; Saudi-led coalition 26 June carried out series of airstrikes targeting al-Bayda and Marib. Govt forces 25 June reportedly surrounded Huthi-held al-Hazm in al-Jawf governorate.  Meanwhile, simmering tensions between Huthis and local tribes in north of al-Bayda escalated mid-June; Huthis took control of village after clashes 17-18 June reportedly killed at least 23 people from both sides. Huthis mid-June intensified cross-border attacks into Saudi-Arabia: Saudi-led coalition 13, 22, 23 June reportedly intercepted Huthi drones and missiles they claimed were aimed at civilian targets in provinces along border; no casualties reported but one attack allegedly left some people injured. Huthi forces 23 June reportedly launched missiles at Saudi Defence Ministry, military base in Saudi capital Riyadh and military positions in Jizan and Najran cities; no casualties reported. In south, after Saudi Arabia 18 June reportedly presented new proposal to govt and Southern Transitional Council (STC) on implementation of Nov 2019 Riyadh Agreement, tensions escalated when STC forces 19 June captured Hadibo, capital of contested Socotra island in Gulf of Aden. Govt and southern separatists 22 June agreed to ceasefire in Abyan province, de-escalation in Socotra and talks on implementation of Nov 2019 Riyadh Agreement in Riyadh; President Hadi 27 June urged STC to adhere to agreement and “stop the bloodshed”. Meanwhile, UN Envoy Martin Griffiths 21 June condemned military escalation across Yemen, urging parties to “engage constructively with the UN efforts to reach an agreement”. Health authorities as of 21 June recorded over 1,000 COVID-19 cases and 250 deaths; fatality rate four times higher than global average. Donor countries 2 June pledged $1.35bn in funding for UN humanitarian projects in Yemen, falling $1bn short of what UN aid agencies sought.

Fierce fighting between govt forces and Huthis continued in north while escalating struggle between govt forces and southern separatists threatened to unravel Nov 2019 Riyadh Agreement; UN continued efforts at nationwide ceasefire and Saudi Arabia attempted to mediate in south but risk of intensified violence in south and north in June remains high. In north, Saudi Arabia’s 24 April announced extension of its purported unilateral ceasefire failed to halt military activities as fighting between govt forces and Huthis continued in al-Jawf and Marib, as did Saudi airstrikes, albeit without major shifts in territorial control. Huthis’ advance east toward Marib remained stalled in face of resistance from local tribes. In south, following Southern Transition Council’s (STC) 25 April declaration of self-administration, power struggle between govt and separatists centred on Abyan and Socotra island in Gulf of Aden; govt forces and STC 1 May reached de-escalation agreement on Socotra after STC’s attempt to seize checkpoints in Hadibo, capital of Socotra, sparked fighting. Meanwhile, fighting between govt forces and STC forces 11 May erupted in Abyan following govt-led offensive on outskirts of STC-held Zinjibar, capital of Abyan; clashes reportedly killed more than 20 soldiers on both sides. Saudi-led coalition 31 May reportedly downed two Huthi drones they claimed were aimed at civilian targets; Huthis did not claim attacks and same day reported coalition airstrikes in Marib. STC negotiation team 20 May arrived in Riyadh at Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s invitation to discuss implementation of Nov 2019 Riyadh Agreement. UN envoy Martin Griffiths in address to UN Security Council 14 May reported “significant progress” toward ceasefire agreement, raising hopes for comprehensive cessation of hostilities. World Health Organization early May warned of disastrous consequences of potential COVID-19 outbreak, predicting at least 55% infection rate and more than 40,000 deaths. Huthi authorities 5 May confirmed first COVID-19 cases in areas under its control; govt accused Huthis of covering up outbreak and 11 May declared Aden “infested city” following spike in COVID-19 cases.

Secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) announced autonomous self-administration in south Yemen after weeks of rising tensions with govt forces, increasing likelihood of renewed violence in south and placing Nov 2019 Riyadh Agreement, and efforts to broker a nationwide political settlement to end the war, in peril. Meanwhile, fighting between pro-govt forces and Huthis intensified in north despite Saudi Arabia’s announcement of military freeze and extension, raising prospect of continued escalation in May unless parties agree to nationwide ceasefire. Saudi Arabia 24 April extended two-week ceasefire announced 8 April in response to UN appeal to end hostilities amid COVID-19 pandemic. Huthis next day dismissed Saudi “ceasefire” announcement as sham, demanded Riyadh lift its blockade of airspace, land borders and ports in Huthi-held areas; President Hadi opposed demands. UN envoy Martin Griffiths 16 April told UN Security Council that agreement between warring parties on nationwide ceasefire, humanitarian measures and resumption of talks would be finalised in “immediate future”, raising hopes for comprehensive cessation of hostilities. Progress however limited by end of month; amid ongoing Saudi airstrikes throughout month despite ceasefire declaration, fighting between Huthis and govt forces persisted in al-Jawf, Marib and al-Bayda. Meanwhile, after flash floods in Aden city, STC 25 April announced autonomous self-administrationin south, prompting condemnation from govt and calls from Riyadh, Washington and UN for implementation of Riyadh Agreement. Previously, STC mid-April accused govt forces of preparing military offensive in Aden city, sparking concerns over collapse of Riyadh Agreement; Mahram al-Qubati, prominent commander in Hadi’s Presidential Guards, early April reportedly announced plan to “liberate” Aden while Saudi Arabia increased deployment of elite forces in Aden. Power struggle within govt late March also broke out: PM Saeed 27 March suspended Saleh al-Jabwani, transport minister and outspoken critic of Riyadh Agreement and Saudi Arabia; although President Hadi reportedly rejected PM Saeed’s decision, al-Jabwani shortly after resigned. Authorities 29 April reported total of five COVID-19 cases in south, raising fears of outbreak across country where local population already in midst of major humanitarian crisis; senior UN officials 21 April estimated seventeen million people face acute food insecurity.

Huthi forces continued their advance into govt-held Marib governorate in north and cross-border attacks between Huthis and Saudi Arabia escalated late month, raising risk of more intense fighting in April if parties do not heed UN’s call for ceasefire; fighting continued on other fronts including along Red Sea coast. In north, Huthis 2 March claimed to have taken control of al-Hazm, capital of al-Jawf governorate, and continued advancing east toward Marib governorate. Fighting between govt forces and Huthis in central Marib in March left hundreds injured and killed from both sides. Huthis and govt forces continued fighting in Sirwa district in western Marib and in areas of eastern al-Jawf. Clashes between Huthis and govt-aligned forces also ongoing along Red Sea coast. Govt 12 March said it was withdrawing military observers from UN outposts around Hodeida after Huthi sniper reportedly killed one; govt boycotted meetings of Redeployment Coordination Committee, UN-chaired body tasked with overseeing ceasefire around city. In south, with forces aligned with separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) repeatedly preventing Saudi forces from taking control of strategic locations in Aden, Saudi officials 15 March allegedly barred senior STC officials from flying from Jordanian capital Amman to Aden. STC leaders warned of further unrest in Aden if Riyadh did not adjust course. To slow spread of COVID-19, Huthis 14 March cancelled flights in and out of Sanaa; govt same day cancelled flights from Aden and Seiyoun. Discussions in Amman over prisoner swaps between govt and Huthis halted as meetings were cancelled due to COVID-19. Following his 23 March call for global ceasefire to limit COVID-19 outbreak, UN Sec-Gen Guterres 25 March urged Yemen’s warring parties to end hostilities and restart talks. Saudi-led coalition, govt, Huthis and other armed actors 25 March expressed support for UN appeal. But cross-border war escalated late March as Huthis 27-28 March launched drone and missile attacks on Riyadh and Saudi economic and military installations in provinces along border. Riyadh responded with airstrikes on Huthi positions in northern Yemen, Sanaa and Hodeida.

Fighting escalated in north as Huthis pursued counteroffensive against govt forces, seizing control of al-Jawf governorate and resuming cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia, raising risk that violence intensifies further in north in March; fighting erupted in east near border with Oman between Saudi-backed forces and local tribesmen; and govt and southern separatists failed to advance implementation of Riyadh Agreement in south. Huthis 14 Feb claimed responsibility for downing Saudi military jet in al-Jawf governorate; Saudi-led coalition next day retaliated with airstrikes killing 31 civilians. After Saudi Arabia agreed to join talks between Yemeni govt and Huthis on confidence building measures in Jordanian capital Amman, Yemeni govt 16 Feb agreed in principle with Huthis to organise exchange of up to 1,400 detainees. After govt forces launched major offensive toward rebel-held capital Sanaa in Jan, Huthis pursued counteroffensive in al-Jawf, Sanaa and Marib governorates begun late Jan. Intense Saudi airstrikes slowed Huthis’ progress toward capturing govt-controlled cities of al-Hazm, capital of al-Jawf, and making push to Marib city, govt’s main urban strongholds and operations centres. In response to Saudi airstrikes, Huthis resumed missile attacks on southern Saudi Arabia. In east, Saudi-led coalition forces late Feb clashed with local tribal forces in al-Mahra governorate after members of Hurayzi tribe attempted to stop Saudi-backed forces from taking control of Shehn border crossing with Oman. Govt attempted to calm situation by replacing al-Mahra governor. In south, govt and separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) failed to fulfil commitments in Saudi-brokered “Phase 2” roadmap to implement Nov Riyadh Agreement; notably, govt delayed appointment of security chief and governor in Aden following STC’s refusal to allow presidential guard to return to Aden. STC mid-Feb requested greater UN participation in implementation of agreement. Army regiment on island of Socotra 27 Feb switched sides and pledged allegiance to STC.

Suspected Huthi missile strike on govt forces in north led to intensification of fighting on several fronts including across Yemen-Saudi border, which could spread and escalate further in Feb; govt and southern separatists agreed on new roadmap to implement 5 Nov Riyadh Agreement; and troop build-up in Taiz province in south could augur escalation in Feb between Sunni Islamists and Salafists. In north, talks between Saudi Arabia and Huthis continued and for first half of month both sides largely refrained from cross-border violence. But Huthis increased tempo of fighting along key front lines in north and strike on govt forces’ base in Marib province 18 Jan that reportedly killed over 100 soldiers led to escalation between Huthis and their allies on one side and Saudi-led coalition on other in Al Jawf, Marib and Sanaa governorates. Both sides suffered heavy losses. In south, under pressure from Saudi Arabia, govt and separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) 9 Jan agreed on “Phase 2” plan to implement Nov Riyadh Agreement; parties had failed to fully implement deal within initial 90-day timeframe disagreeing on how to sequence security and political aspects, with clashes erupting early Jan. New plan requires govt-affiliated forces to redeploy from Aden to front lines in al-Dhale and Abyan provinces, and for STC forces to move from Aden to Lahj governorate within twenty days from 11 Jan. As part of “Phase 2” agreement, govt and STC exchanged 53 prisoners 12 Jan. Rival Yemeni groups 24 Jan completed transfer of heavy weapons in Aden to Saudi-controlled base in city within fifteen-day timeframe. After early redeployments from Aden, process again stalled late Jan, with local appointments still not made. In Taiz governorate, tensions mounted between Sunni Islamist Islah forces, which control Taiz city centre, and United Arab Emirates-backed forces based in Turbah south of city and on Red Sea coast. Islah reportedly building up forces near Turbah late month raising risk of major confrontation there.

Following signing of Riyadh Agreement in Nov, ceasefire between govt and southern separatists held and de-escalation talks between Saudi-led coalition and Huthi rebels continued. In south, while truce largely held, tensions remained over troop build-ups in strategic locations across south and failure to implement key aspects of agreement, including formation of unity govt and appointment of governor and security chief in Aden. Informal de-escalation talks between Huthi rebels and Saudi-led coalition continued as fighting along Saudi-Yemeni border and Saudi airstrikes decreased. Senior military commander Adnan al-Hammadi shot and killed by his brother in Taiz in south 6 Dec; dispute reportedly fuelled by split between factions loyal to Sunni Islamist group Islah and factions supportive of United Arab Emirates. Saudi govt accused Huthis of carrying out 10 Dec attack on medical facility in Saudi city of Jizan in south; no fatalities recorded in first reported cross-border attack since Sept. Huthis claimed 27 Dec missile strike on local Saudi military headquarters in Najran; Saudis denied strike. Yemeni govt and Huthi rebels exchanged prisoners in Taiz 19 Dec; govt released 60 Huthi rebels in exchange for 75 govt-affiliated detainees. U.S. navy 4 Dec announced seizure of “significant” shipment of Iranian missile components bound for Yemen. U.S. State Department 5 Dec announced $15mn reward for information on Yemen-based Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps senior commander Abdul Reza Shahlai.

Yemeni govt and southern separatists signed agreement to end hostilities in south and Saudis reduced airstrikes in Huthi-controlled areas. Yemeni govt 5 Nov signed Riyadh Agreement with southern separatist group Southern Transitional Council (STC) following Saudi-led mediation; agreement provides 90-day timeline for formation of new cabinet with equal representation of northerners and southerners, implementation of political and security arrangements across south, and STC representation in future UN-led peace talks with Huthis. Parties missed deadlines to carry out initial steps including appointment of new governor and security chief in Aden as well as withdrawal of govt and STC forces from front lines across south. Limited clashes erupted in Aden 18 Nov between STC-affiliated forces and unidentified assailants. Saudi military operations against Iran-aligned Huthi rebels continued to decline as indirect talks continued. UN Envoy Martin Griffiths 22 Nov announced 80% fall in Saudi airstrikes in preceding two weeks. In response to Huthi strikes on coalition locations in Mokha 24 Nov, Saudi-led coalition airstrikes 25 Nov killed unknown number of Huthi rebels in Ras Isa port in Hodeida province; clashes followed between Huthis and govt forces around Hodeida. Huthis continued to refrain from strikes into Saudi Arabia but launched missile attacks inside Yemen, in Mokha and Mareb governorates. Huthi forces 17 Nov seized one Saudi and two South Korean vessels in Red Sea; 19 Nov released crews and vessels. Huthis 29 Nov claimed to have killed two Saudi pilots in attack on Saudi helicopter near border. Saudi-led coalition 26 Nov said it was releasing 200 Huthi prisoners and reducing restrictions on Yemeni airspace to enable medical evacuations from Huthi-controlled capital Sanaa; International Committee of the Red Cross 28 Nov announced successful repatriation of 128 Huthi detainees from Saudi Arabia. Kuwait 22 Nov declared willingness to host UN-sponsored peace talks.

Saudi airstrikes against Iran-aligned Huthi forces in north reduced in intensity and scope, and Yemeni govt and southern separatists made headway in Saudi-mediated talks, creating opportunity to avoid further hostilities in south and pivot to national level peace talks. Saudi Arabia responded positively to Huthis’ Sept unilateral ceasefire, largely limiting airstrikes to front-line positions and, reportedly at Riyadh’s request, Yemeni govt 16 Oct allowed eight fuel shipments to enter Huthi-administered port of Hodeida. Saudi airstrike in Saada province in north 21 Oct killed five civilians. After Huthis’ unilateral prisoner release in Sept, Huthis 10 Oct proposed prisoner swap with govt, which has not yet responded. In south, sporadic fighting continued in Abyan and Shebwa governorates between govt forces and southern separatist groups including Southern Transitional Council (STC). But in Saudi capital Riyadh, negotiations to end rift between Saudi-backed Yemeni govt and UAE-backed STC advanced toward signing of so-called Riyadh Agreement (formerly known as Jeddah Agreement) that would see southerners gain equal representation with northerners in govt and place in future peace talks with Huthis. Govt repeatedly postponed signing ceremony due to differences over selection of interior and defence ministers, govt’s demand that UAE withdraw completely from south and request for security-first sequencing of implementation. Fighting between govt forces and STC escalated in Abyan province 31 Oct prompting parties to postpone signing of Riyadh Agreement without setting new date. Saudi forces progressively took control of Aden in south during month as UAE forces withdrew, completing withdrawal 30 Oct. Saudis brought in new troops and equipment 26 Oct. Huthi forces 29 Oct attacked convoy transporting defence minister in Marib province in centre, killing two soldiers.

Fighting continued in south between pro-govt forces and southern separatists and troop movements suggest parties readying for escalation in coming weeks; and cross-border attacks between Huthis and Saudi Arabia could intensify in Oct if Huthis’ offer of unilateral suspension of attacks fails to produce mutual de-escalation agreement. In south, govt forces and United Arab Emirates-aligned southern separatist group Southern Transitional Council (STC) continued to clash in Abyan and Shebwa governorates and reportedly assembled fighters and equipment in strategic areas in preparation for new round of major fighting. Govt and STC held indirect talks in Saudi city of Jeddah 4 Sept onwards aimed at power-sharing agreement to end fighting, no outcome end-month. While Huthis claimed responsibility for 14 Sept attacks on Saudi oil facilities, Saudi Arabia, U.S. and other foreign powers held Iran responsible. U.S. said attacks launched from Iran and described them as “act of war”. Saudi-led coalition 20 Sept launched airstrikes on Huthi positions near Hodeida targeting sites used to develop sea mines. Huthis 23 Sept claimed that coalition airstrikes in Amran governorate killed five civilians. Coalition airstrike in Qataba, Dhale province 26 Sept killed at least sixteen civilians including seven children. Huthis 18 Sept said they would cease attacks into Saudi Arabia; Saudi govt 27 Sept agreed to partial ceasefire in four Yemeni provinces including Huthi-controlled capital Sanaa. Huthis 29 Sept claimed that their 25 Aug cross-border offensive in Najran province, Saudi Arabia killed hundreds of Saudi soldiers and captured “thousands”; Saudi Arabia and Yemeni govt denied claim. Stalemate in Hodeida persisted: in 9-10 Sept meeting, Redeployment Coordination Committee comprising govt and Huthi representatives failed to agree on who would provide security in Hodeida port following redeployment of military forces. Huthis 30 Sept said they would release without conditions 350 prisoners in attempt to deliver on stalled UN-brokered prisoner exchange deal agreed in Dec; released 290 by end-month.

Southern separatists aligned with United Arab Emirates (UAE) seized city of Aden from govt forces 10 Aug and moved to consolidate control across south, raising risk that violence escalates in Sept between opposed factions in south. Fighting triggered by Huthi missile strike in Aden in south 1 Aug that killed Munir al-Mashali, commander of UAE-trained Security Belt force and prominent figure in separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC), and 29 other officers; STC alleged that members of Saudi-backed Islamist Islah faction facilitated strike. After reports emerged 7 Aug that President Hadi’s guards had fired at people attending al-Mashali’s funeral in Aden, STC launched offensive on city same day. STC 10 Aug said it had taken control of city, which govt confirmed. Fighting left at least 40 dead. Separatists sought to consolidate control elsewhere in south: in Abyan governorate, pro-STC Security Belt fighters 19 Aug seized military base in Zinjibar and 20 Aug captured al-Kawad military camp. Govt launched counterattacks, regaining bases in Shebwa governorate and control of Zinjibar. Govt forces 28 Aug moved on Aden, prompting clashes in eastern part. Saudi Arabia, which opposes Yemen’s partition, 12 Aug called for talks in Saudi city of Jeddah. STC 15 Aug said it would attend talks, but would not cede Aden unless Islah and northerners were removed from powerful positions in govt. Govt 20 Aug refused to participate in dialogue with STC unless latter retreated from Aden. UAE same day rejected govt’s accusations that it had supported separatists’ capture of Aden. Govt 29 Aug accused UAE of airstrike that killed 30 govt troops between Abyan and Aden; UAE same day claimed responsibility for airstrikes but said they targeted “terrorist militias”. Huthis drones 9 Aug targeted Abha airport in Saudi Arabia; airstrike 17 Aug started fire at Shaybah oil field near UAE border, prompting coalition airstrikes around Sanaa same day and around Saada 20 Aug. Huthis claimed to have made advances in north near Saudi border, including attack on coalition soldiers in Kitaf, Saada.

Huthi forces kept up cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia and fighting continued on Red Sea coast and between anti-Huthi groups in south, as United Arab Emirates (UAE) continued to withdraw forces from Red Sea coast. UAE 22 July publicly acknowledged its military drawdown from all its operations in Yemen, but appeared to retain lead for liaison with and advice to Yemeni forces on Red Sea coast. UAE FM Gargash 22 July reiterated commitment to political process, described drawdown as “confidence-building measure”, and said UAE and coalition “not leaving Yemen”. Main Yemeni forces – Giants Brigade, Guards of the Republic and Tihama Resistance – 2 July announced formation of command cell for “Joint Resistance Forces”. Huthis continued cross-border attacks into Saudi territory and reportedly stepped up attacks on towns south of Hodeida. Huthis and Saudi-led coalition held each other responsible for attack on market in Saada province in north 29 July that killed at least ten civilians, including children. UAE-backed forces continued to clash repeatedly with Hadi govt-affiliated units, particularly in al-Dhale and Taiz governorates. Hadi govt’s Economic Committee 25 June announced restoration of govt monopoly over fuel imports and distribution, angering Yemeni businessmen working in govt-controlled territory; Huthis early July claimed move was attempt to cut off fuel supplies in areas they control.

As tensions continued to rise between U.S. and Gulf states on one hand and Iran and its regional allies on other, Huthis increased pace of cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia, provoking Riyadh to step up bombing on Huthi areas in Yemen especially on capital Sanaa; further attacks could fuel escalation in July (see Iran). Huthis launched missile and drone strikes on Abha and Najran airports in Saudi Arabia, attacking Abha airport 12, 14, 15 and 23 June. In retaliation, Riyadh intensified bombing campaign in Huthi areas, particularly Sanaa. U.S. late May said Huthi cross-border attacks were part of Iranian regional campaign against Saudi and U.S. interests; Saudi officials described Huthis as Iran-backed terrorists. United Arab Emirates (UAE) has drawn down some forces along Red Sea coast, removed heavy weaponry from Hodeida and repatriated missile system, likely mitigating immediate risk that major fighting resumes in Hodeida. Following govt’s criticism of UN in wake of Huthi unilateral redeployment from Red Sea ports mid-May, international pressure on President Hadi helped avert collapse of UN-led effort to demilitarise Hodeida. After Hadi late May said he would meet UN Envoy Martin Griffiths, Griffiths 26 June met VP al-Ahmar to discuss implementation of Dec 2018 Stockholm Agreement. U.S. 16 June said Huthi surface-to-air missile had 6 June shot down U.S. drone over Yemen. World Food Programme 20 June began phased suspension of food aid deliveries in Huthi-controlled territory after negotiations between WFP and Huthi leadership repeatedly failed to resolve issue of Huthi aid diversion. Fighting reported 20 June around Ataq, capital of Shabwa governorate, between govt and UAE-backed secessionist forces, followed by pro-secessionist protests. Fighting also reported in Hodeida, Hajja, al-Dhale and al-Bayda governorates; pro-govt forces 27 June repelled Huthi offensive targeting residential areas in Hodeida outskirts, reportedly inflicting heavy casualties. Saudi military 25 June announced capture of Abu Osama al-Muhajer, Islamic State’s (ISIS) leader in Yemen, and three other associates.

Huthis launched drone strikes on oil pipeline in Saudi Arabia and fighting escalated on several fronts in Yemen; military escalation and rising tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran raise risk of worse fighting in Yemen and more Huthi attacks on Saudi and Emirati assets in coming weeks. Huthis unilaterally redeployed from Hodeida, Ras Issa and Saleef ports 11-14 May under UN monitoring. Saudi-led coalition reportedly consented to Huthi move, but govt accused UN of Huthi bias; govt 23 May sent letter to UN Sec-Gen criticising UN envoy Martin Griffiths. Cross-border attacks intensified: Huthis claimed drone attacks in Saudi Arabia on oil pipeline 14 May, on Najran airport 21 and 23 May (latter was intercepted), and on airport in Jizan 26 May (also intercepted). Saudi Arabia accused Iran of guiding Huthi actions, and 20 May accused Huthis of targeting Jeddah and Mecca with ballistic missiles that Saudi military intercepted; Huthis denied cities were targets. Saudi Arabia 16 May launched airstrikes targeting Sanaa in apparent retaliation for drone attacks, reportedly causing civilian deaths. Fighting on other front lines intensified; clashes took place in Durayhimi district south of Hodeida city; battles between United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed southern forces and Huthis continued in al-Dhale, Abyan and Lahj governorates; fighting reportedly intensified near Sanaa and in Taiz, and along Saudi border. Tensions between rival factions in anti-Huthi bloc persisted; govt publicly denounced UAE influence after UAE-backed forces 8 May landed on Socotra, Yemeni island in Arabian Sea; local media reported that members of Presidential Guard clashed with UAE-backed forces in al-Dhale.

Fighting escalated along multiple front lines as negotiations over military redeployments around Hodeida remained stalled, increasing risk that fighting resumes there, while tensions within anti-Huthi camp could spark further conflict in south. Govt and Huthi delegates to UN-led Redeployment Coordination Committee, body tasked with implementing Hodeida agreement, agreed plan for first phase of redeployments 13 April. But both govt and Huthis said phase one will not take place until they agree on phase two redeployments and on composition of local security forces due to control of city and ports after redeployments. Violence around Hodeida continued while clashes escalated along Red Sea coast, in particular in Tuhayta and Hays districts. UK FM Hunt 26 April held meeting in London with Saudi and Emirati counterparts and U.S. and UN representatives to discuss next steps in UN-led process. Fighting intensified across much of country, including in Hajja governorate in north west along border with Saudi Arabia, and in al-Jawf governorate in north. Coalition airstrikes on capital Sanaa 10 April reportedly killed thirteen, highest number of civilian casualties in capital in over a year. Clashes between Huthis and southern fighters also intensified in al-Dalia governorate in south. Secessionists allied to Southern Transitional Council (STC), organisation working for secession of south, accused army of withdrawing from key positions and ceding ground to Huthis, exacerbating tensions between rival factions in anti-Huthi bloc. President Hadi 13 April held parliamentary session in Seyoun in east; pro-STC activists organised protests against meeting, having said they would block proposed session in Aden. Huthis also opposed what they called “illegitimate” session on grounds that it did not meet quorum; Huthis responded with elections for 24 parliamentary seats in areas they controlled. U.S. President Trump 16 April vetoed War Powers Resolution that would have withdrawn U.S. support to Saudi-led coalition, despite U.S. Congress passing bipartisan bill 5 April.

Fighting escalated in Taiz and Hajja governorates and continued elsewhere, and implementation of Dec Stockholm Agreement stalled, raising risk that warring parties resume combat around Hodeida port and city. Govt and Huthis failed to redeploy forces away from front-line positions in and around Hodeida, as agreed in Feb, as both sides raised objections to redeployment plan; primary point of contention was composition of local security forces due to assume control of city and ports after redeployment. UK FM Hunt 3 March warned Stockholm process “could be dead within weeks” if sides did not stick to commitments. U.S. Envoy Matthew Tueller 21 March publicly blamed Huthis for delays in implementation and said weapons in non-state actors’ possession posed threat to “neighbouring countries”. Huthis 17 March said they had intelligence that Saudi-led coalition planned to escalate violence in Hodeida and that they were ready to strike capitals of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates if implementation of deal is breached. Other components of Stockholm Agreement also remained stalled, including prisoner exchange and talks over contested city of Taiz in south. Fighting escalated in Taiz in second part of month between nominally allied pro-govt Yemeni groups; medical facilities late March received two dead and 49 wounded in four days. After flaring in Feb, fighting intensified in Hajja governorate in north west between al-Hajour tribes and Huthis; UN 11 March reported 22 civilians killed in attacks in Hajja’s Kushar district, and Saudi-led coalition reported Huthi shelling of houses killed several tribesmen. Huthis prevailed in Kushar, allegedly killing several key local leaders. NGO Save the Children said missile 26 March struck petrol station near entrance to hospital it supports about 100km from Saada in north killing seven people, including four children; U.S. 28 March urged Saudi-led coalition to conduct transparent investigation into bombing. U.S. Senate 13 March adopted resolution aimed at ending U.S. support to Saudi-led coalition in Yemen; legislation President Trump has said he would veto. Germany 6 March extended temporary ban on arms exports to Saudi Arabia until end month, citing concerns over Saudi Arabia’s conduct in Yemen.

Govt and Huthis agreed to redeploy their forces from front-line positions in and around Hodeida, opening opportunity in coming weeks to implement deal, but disagreement over details could lead to breakdown of talks and trigger fighting in and around city, and intense fighting along and across Yemen-Saudi border could escalate further. Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) comprising UN, govt and Huthis reached deal 16 Feb on first phase of redeployments by both sides from Red Sea ports and infrastructure around Hodeida. But debate over who will secure Hodeida once both sides have made redeployments delayed implementation. World Food Programme 26 Feb regained access, blocked for five months by fighting, to Red Sea Mills, major wheat facility in outskirts of Hodeida. UAE FM Gargash 3 Feb called for implementation of Dec Stockholm Agreement and to make 2019 “the year of peace in Yemen”. “Quad” comprising Saudi Arabia, UAE, U.S. and UK 13 Feb denounced Iranian support for Huthis and blamed latter for lack of progress in implementation of Dec agreement. Fighting intensified on Yemen-Saudi border, with govt and Huthis claiming military successes in Hajja, Saada and al-Jawf governorates; clashes escalated in Hajja in north west between al-Hajour tribesmen and Huthis. Huthi Head of Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum (SCER) in Huthi-held capital Sanaa 1 Feb announced plans to hold elections to fill vacant seats in parliament; President Hadi 3 Feb said he would relocate SCER headquarters to Aden, as he moves to reconvene parliament in temporary capital. In Mukalla in east, Southern Transitional Council (STC), organisation working for secession of south, 16-17 Feb held third meeting of what it calls its National Assembly; its chair warned Hadi that STC would block any attempt to convene parliament in Aden. U.S. House of Representatives 13 Feb adopted resolution aimed at ending U.S. support for Saudi-led coalition. Saudi FM al-Jubeir 10 Feb denounced congressional efforts to curtail U.S. allies’ fight against “terrorist organisations supported by Iran and Hezbollah”. Moroccan officials 7 Feb said Morocco had frozen its involvement in Saudi-led coalition.

Despite hundreds of reported infractions, fragile ceasefire in Hodeida port city stemming from Stockholm Agreement in Dec eased fighting there and offers chance for further de-escalation in Feb; but collapse of deal or too slow implementation could see battle for city resume. UN Security Council 16 Jan unanimously approved creation of UN Mission to support the Hodeida Agreement (UNMHA), mandating 75 monitors to oversee implementation of agreement and ceasefire initially for six months. Govt-aligned and Huthi forces failed to redeploy from Hodeida by 8 Jan deadline. Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) – group comprising UN, govt and Huthis to oversee implementation of Hodeida agreement – yet to agree on ceasefire terms and joint verification mechanisms for redeployment. Third RCC meeting failed to convene because Huthis refused to meet in coalition-controlled territory. UN Envoy Martin Griffiths shuttled between capital Sanaa and Saudi capital Riyadh late Jan, reportedly securing both sides’ buy-in for redeployment plan. UN 24 Jan said it would replace RCC chair, retired Dutch General Patrick Cammaert, in Feb. Talks between Huthis and govt in Jordan 16 Jan on possible prisoner exchange ended without final agreement, but sides agreed on timeline for future steps, reportedly including second meeting in Jordan in coming week. In letter to UN Security Council 17 Jan, UAE restated commitment to Stockholm Agreement, but also warned it would resume hostilities if no progress made on redeployment. Suspected mortar fire 24 Jan started fire that damaged vital World Food Programme wheat storage, milling and distribution facility on Hodeida’s outskirts. Huthi media 30 Jan reported coalition airstrikes in Hodeida governorate in breach of ceasefire; UAE said airstrikes outside ceasefire zone; FM Gargash 30 Jan said coalition prepared to use “more calibrated force” to pressure Huthi compliance with Stockholm Agreement. Germany 16 Jan pledged €5.4mn (about $6.2mn) to help create UN office to support civilian aspects of Hodeida agreement, including administration of Hodeida, Salif and Ras Issa ports and demining. UK 22 Jan pledged £2.5mn (about $3.3mn) for same purpose. U.S. lawmakers 30 Jan re-introduced bipartisan resolution to end U.S. support for Saudi-led coalition in Yemen; two-thirds majority needed in both houses of Congress to overrule potential presidential veto. In continued fighting, Huthi drone 10 Jan hit military parade in Lahj province, killing three senior military officials; govt 15 Jan claimed to have arrested Huthis responsible. Coalition 19 Jan launched airstrikes on Huthi military targets in Sanaa. Heavy fighting took place during month at key frontlines, including on Saudi-Yemeni border, around Taiz city in south, and in Damt district, al-Dhalea governorate. Local media early Jan reported clashes between rival southern Yemeni groups in Shabwa governorate.

At UN-led peace consultations in Sweden, govt and Huthis agreed to redeploy forces from Hodeida city and port, and wider Red Sea trade corridor. If ceasefire in Hodeida governorate holds, further talks planned for Jan could open path to wider de-escalation, but if it fails or implementation falters, rival forces could restart battle for Hodeida port and city. Consultations led by UN special envoy Martin Griffiths 6-13 Dec culminated in Stockholm Agreement comprising agreement on Hodeida city and Hodeida, Salif and Ras Issa ports; agreement for prisoner exchange; and statement of understanding on city of Taiz. Texts said parties made deals for humanitarian purposes only and are not to be seen as part of broader political process. Hodeida and ports agreement includes ceasefire; redeployment of all forces from city and ports to agreed-upon locations within 21 days of start of ceasefire; and agreement for revenue from ports to flow to Hodeida branch of Central Bank. Parties agreed to reconvene in Jan in yet to be agreed location to discuss framework for political negotiations. Ceasefire in Hodeida governorate took effect 18 Dec and held with mostly minor violations till end-month. UN Security Council 21 Dec passed UK-drafted resolution that calls on all parties to uphold Stockholm Agreement; on UN to oversee implementation; and on parties to keep working with UN envoy Griffiths to stabilise economy and reopen Sanaa airport. Resolution approves 30-day deployment of UN team to monitor ceasefire in Hodeida region. UN source and Huthis 29 Dec said Huthi forces had begun redeploying from Hodeida port as per Stockholm Agreement. Redeployment Coordination Committee including govt and Huthi representatives will oversee ceasefire and demilitarisation, and report weekly to UN Security Council. In largely symbolic move, U.S. Senate 13 Dec passed bill that, if enacted, would end all U.S. military support for Saudi-led campaign in Yemen. New U.S. House of Representatives will consider legislation in 2019.

UN-led talks between warring parties expected early Dec offer chance to restart negotiations toward political settlement, but fighting could also escalate in coming weeks, especially in Huthi-held Hodeida. Yemeni forces backed by United Arab Emirates (UAE) 31 Oct launched new offensive along Red Sea coast, moving from south of Hodeida to encircle eastern half of city, within striking distance of port. Saudi-led coalition 15 Nov reported “pause” in offensive, in apparent response to calls from international community. UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths 16 Nov told UN Security Council that warring parties had given “firm assurances” of their commitment to attend peace talks. Huthis 19 Nov said they would cease drone and missile attacks on coalition forces at Griffiths’s request and said they were ready for broader ceasefire. Fighting continued in north, most intensely along Yemen-Saudi Arabia border. Saudi-led coalition reported intercepting four ballistic missiles fired by Huthis into Mareb governorate mid-Nov. Hodeida residents 20 Nov reported fighting around city had increased. As part of continued push for talks, Griffiths 22-23 Nov met Huthi leader Abdulmalik al-Huthi in capital Sanaa and Huthi officials in Hodeida. U.S. Sec Defense Mattis 9 Nov said U.S. would no longer refuel Saudi-led coalition aircraft in support of “decision by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, after consultations with the U.S. Government”. U.S. Senate 29 Nov voted to advance resolution ending U.S. support for Saudi-led coalition. UK FM Hunt 13 Nov said he had brokered deal with Saudi Arabia for evacuation of injured Huthi fighters from Sanaa to Muscat as part of confidence-building measures. UN Security Council 20 Nov began debate on UK’s draft resolution aimed at humanitarian objectives; Saudi-led coalition told allies that new resolution was unhelpful. UN 23 Oct warned of imminent famine, increasing estimate of people severely food insecure from 8 to 14 million. UN World Food Programme 27 Nov warned of “nearly 50% decrease in operations at Hodeida port over last two weeks … because of the high levels of insecurity in the city”. Saudi Arabia and UAE 20 Nov announced joint pledge of $500mn in aid.

Campaign by UAE-backed Yemeni forces to strangle Huthi-held Hodeida city slowed, as UN envoy pursued confidence-building measures to improve conditions ahead of possible new talks in Nov; fighting could escalate in Nov around Hodeida and on other frontlines. UAE-backed forces continued efforts to surround Hodeida and squeeze Huthi supply lines, pushing as far north as Kilo 16, junction linking city with road to capital Sanaa. Campaign appeared to have slowed mid-Oct, but Saudi-led coalition had reportedly deployed reinforcements around Hodeida by end Oct, possibly signalling forthcoming escalation. New frontlines threatened delivery of humanitarian aid to north, where conditions worst, and aid storage facilities around Hodeida. In south, separatist group Southern Transitional Council (STC) 3 Oct called for uprising against govt in Aden and southern provinces. Govt urged STC to stop mobilising non-state military units and join political process. Pressure from Saudi Arabia on separatists calmed situation. After UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths’ planned consultations with warring parties failed to start in Sept, he worked toward bringing parties together in Nov, again to build consensus on framework for peace talks. U.S. Defence Secretary James Mattis 30 Oct called for ceasefire within 30 days. U.S. Sec State Pompeo 31 Oct echoed statement, calling for missile and drone strikes from Huthi-controlled areas into Saudi Arabia and UAE to stop and “subsequently” for Saudi-led coalition airstrikes to cease in all populated areas. Griffiths worked to roll out confidence-building measures, including opening air routes from Sanaa airport to evacuate patients with chronic conditions, prisoner exchanges, evacuation of injured Huthi fighters, and payment of civil service salaries. Huthis 3 Oct released two sons of ex-President Saleh, who were transferred to Jordan. Saudi Arabia and UAE 23 Oct donated $70mn to UNICEF program that pays salaries of 135,000 Yemeni teachers. Saudi Arabia 2 Oct announced $200mn deposit in Central Bank to stabilise Yemeni riyal, but price of goods such as diesel and cooking oil continued to rise. President Hadi 14 Oct replaced PM Bin Daghr over failure to stem economic deterioration.

UN-led consultations planned for early Sept failed to start and fighting escalated on outskirts of Huthi-held port city of Hodeida raising risk of further escalation in Oct; but opportunities to mediate confidence-building measures remain. Huthi representatives 8 Sept told team of UN envoy Martin Griffiths they would not leave capital Sanaa for talks in Geneva; they asked to travel in Omani instead of UN plane and to take wounded with them, but complications arose in negotiating details of procedure among Saudi-led coalition, Omanis and Huthis. Griffiths continued efforts to bring parties to talks; 18 Sept announced Saudi-led coalition would allow flights to leave Sanaa to evacuate those in need of urgent medical care. Forces backed by United Arab Emirates (UAE) on Red Sea coast early Sept launched assault to take control of road between Hodeida and Sanaa and 12 Sept claimed they had captured it; Huthis later said they had retaken it. Huthi rebels 30 Sept claimed they had launched attacks on Dubai international airport and boats off coast of Saudi port city Jizan. UAE 14 Sept delivered letter to UN Security Council arguing only way to bring Huthis to negotiating table was to continue offensive on Hodeida. Saudi-led coalition 1 Sept acknowledged that it had made mistakes in Aug airstrike on school bus in north that left 51 dead, including 40 children. Amid growing international criticism of coalition’s conduct in Yemen, U.S. Sec State Pompeo 11 Sept defended campaign, telling Congress that “Saudi Arabia and UAE are undertaking demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm … resulting from military operations”. UN Human Rights Council 28 Sept voted to extend international probe into alleged war crimes committed in country; govt, Saudi Arabia and UAE denounced decision.

Intense fighting continued ahead of UN envoy’s planned consultations with President Hadi’s govt and Huthi leaders in Geneva 6-8 Sept; initiative could increase parties’ commitment to restarting peace talks, but fighting could also escalate in Hodeida port city and elsewhere if initial discussions end in acrimony. Efforts by UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths slowed United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed campaign to capture port city Hodeida, but UAE-backed forces 19 Aug said they had taken Durayhimi, town south of Hodeida, from Huthis, opening route to main Hodeida-Sanaa road. Infighting between Yemeni forces in Saudi-led coalition intensified: UAE-backed Salafists clashed with Saudi-linked Islamists with ties to Hadi govt in Taiz city in south 15 Aug, leaving dozens dead and injured; Security Belt forces, UAE-backed faction largely comprised of southern secessionists, clashed with Hadi govt forces in Aden 18 Aug after flag of unified Yemen was raised at military graduation ceremony. Huthi spokesperson, Mohammed Abdulsalem, 18 Aug met Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Lebanese Iran-linked movement Hezbollah reportedly in Lebanese capital Beirut. In Hodeida, alleged Saudi-led coalition mortar fire 2 Aug (apparently aiming at Huthi attack boat) hit busy shipping wharf, killing at least 28 civilians. Coalition airstrike 9 Aug hit school bus in Saada region in north, killing some 30 schoolchildren; coalition spokesperson said target was legitimate, claiming two senior Huthi commanders were on board. Under international pressure including from senior U.S. Pentagon officials and military commanders, Saudi-led coalition investigated incident. Coalition airstrike in pro-Huthi district near Hodeida 23 Aug killed at least 22 children and four women. Associated Press 6 Aug alleged that Saudi-led coalition has been recruiting and making deals with members of radical group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; key figures involved said that U.S. was aware of arrangements and held off drone attacks on group.

Yemeni forces backed by United Arab Emirates (UAE) preparing to take Hodeida city on Red Sea coast from Huthis consolidated positions south of city and fighting intensified elsewhere; UN proposal presents opportunity to avoid battle for Hodeida and restart talks, but fight for Hodeida could also intensify in Aug. UAE-backed forces held positions south of Hodeida, claiming it had paused offensive to facilitate UN mediation, but continued to fight Huthis in Hays, Tuhayta and Durayhimi along Red Sea coast south of Hodeida. UAE-led fighters and Hadi govt forces also gathered in Mokha, port town south of Hodeida, apparently preparing for attacks on Huthi positions on inland road between Mokha and Hodeida, including Zabid town; fighting for Zabid intensified end month with dozens reportedly killed on both sides. Saudi-led coalition resumed air strikes late July in and around Hodeida and in Zabid damaging water facility there that supplies most of Hodeida’s water. UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths mid-July submitted to Huthis, Hadi govt and Saudi-led coalition for comment his proposal to avert battle for Hodeida: plan proposes UN oversee Hodeida port and two ports north of city; Huthis undertake phased withdrawal from Hodeida; UAE-led forces pull back from city; reopening of Sanaa airport; national de-escalation and resumption of talks. Govt and Huthis proposed changes. Griffiths shuttled between parties to organise “consultations” between Hadi govt and Huthis in Geneva late Aug or early Sept. Fighting intensified elsewhere. Huthi fighters redoubled efforts to take back territory in Taiz city lost earlier in 2018 and pushed into Lahj province, while govt forces 17-19 July made progress south east of Taiz. In north, Saudi-backed forces made gains in Huthis’ home Saada province and in neighbouring Hajja, while Huthis launched missiles into Saudi city of Najran. Huthis 18 July claimed drone attack on oil refinery in Saudi capital, Riyadh; refinery same day said minor fire on site was due to “operational incident”. Huthis 25 July allegedly attacked two tankers in Bab al-Mandeb strait, prompting Saudi Arabia to suspend oil shipments through strait; 31 July said they would halt attacks in Red Sea for two weeks from 1 Aug and could extend and expand ceasefire if Saudi-led coalition reciprocates. Huthis 26 July claimed to have launched drone attack on Abu Dhabi airport, UAE denied attack. Tensions between UAE-backed forces and Hadi govt rekindled as Abu al-Yamamah, commander of UAE proxy Security Belt forces, 15 July threatened to attack Hadi govt in Aden.

Yemeni forces backed by United Arab Emirates (UAE) ramped up offensive to take Huthi-held port city of Hodeida, seizing much of airport south of city. July brings risk of fighting reaching Hodeida port and city but also opportunities for parties to mitigate humanitarian and political fallout through UN-mediated deal. Despite pressure from UN to negotiate settlement, UAE 12 June announced start of operations to take control of port and city. UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths pushed Huthis to withdraw from Hodeida to prevent loss of life; group reportedly said they were open to withdrawal from port, and for it to be jointly managed with UN, but not from city. Griffiths met President Hadi 27 June in Aden, who echoed coalition calls for Huthis to withdraw from both port and city. Elsewhere, Huthis and Saudi-led coalition claimed to have made gains; coalition intensified efforts in Nihm, north east of Huthi-held capital Sanaa. Saudi air defence 24 June shot down over Saudi capital Riyadh two missiles launched by Huthis in Yemen. President Hadi visited UAE 12 June, as Hodeida campaign began, in show of unity after months of rising tensions between UAE and Hadi govt. Hadi then travelled with govt members to Aden where he announced new mobile telecoms network, Aden Net, which UAE set up.

Fighting intensified as United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemeni allies mid-May launched offensive toward Huthi-held Hodeida port on Red Sea coast and Saudi-led coalition and Huthi forces upped airstrikes and missile attacks respectively, raising risk of further escalation in June. UAE-led forces claimed victories in al-Jahari and al-Khokha districts about 120km south of Hodeida. Fighting intensified 30 May less than 10km from Hodeida airport reportedly leaving 53 rebels and seven coalition-led fighters dead. UAE-led forces also claimed victory in Taiz governorate in south. Saudi-led coalition airstrike on presidential palace in Huthi-controlled capital Sanaa 7 May reportedly targeted head of Huthi revolutionary committee Mohammed Ali al-Huthi and newly appointed Huthi President Mahdi Mashat, strike killed at least six civilians, unclear if reported targets killed. Huthis continued missile attacks on targets in Saudi Arabia, Red Sea and Yemen: Saudi security forces 9 May shot down two missiles over capital Riyadh and over southern city of Jizan 21 May; missile reportedly struck Turkish vessel in Red Sea carrying wheat to Yemen 10 May; missile reportedly killed five civilians in govt-held Marib city 22 May. UAE’s late April deployment of troops and armoured vehicles to Socotra island in Gulf of Aden without consulting Hadi govt sparked spat between nominal allies; Hadi govt accused UAE of occupying territory. Saudi delegation 4 May travelled to island to mediate dispute. Yemeni PM Bin Daghr 14 May said dispute resolved. Govt declared state of emergency for Socotra as cyclone Mekunu hit island 24 May. Saudi-led coalition 14 May said it would allow two flights a month between Cairo and Sanaa for those needing urgent medical care. UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths continued talks with local and regional actors intending to present framework agreement for reviving talks to UN Security Council mid-June.

As Saudi-led coalition escalated campaign on multiple fronts, including on Huthis’ home province of Saada in north, Huthi forces increased missile attacks on Saudi infrastructure and assets; escalation could continue in May. In response to coalition strike on Hodeida port 2 April that reportedly killed at least a dozen civilians, Huthi forces next day attacked Saudi oil tanker in Red Sea, causing slight damage. Huthis 11 April attempted armed drone strike on oil facility in southern Saudi city of Abha, but Saudi forces shot down drone. Coalition airstrikes took high civilian toll: strike on vehicle in west of Taiz province 20 April killed 21 passengers; strike on wedding party in south west of Hajja province 22 April killed at least twenty, including bride; strike on fuel station in Hajja 23 April killed thirteen civilians. Coalition airstrike in Hodeida 19 April killed president of rebel Supreme Political Council, Saleh al-Sammad. Day before and day of his funeral 27-28 April Saudi-led coalition heavily bombarded capital Sanaa, hitting blood bank and around Sabaeen square where thousands gathered for funeral. Coalition 27 April claimed that its strike on Sanaa killed two Huthi commanders and dozens of militiamen. In retaliation for Sammad’s death, Huthis claimed to have fired eight missiles at Saudi’s southern Jizan province 28 April; Saudi govt said it had intercepted four missiles and one Saudi citizen killed by debris. Divisions within coalition persisted; United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed separatist Southern Transition Council which largely controls Aden in south remained at odds with Hadi govt. PM Daghr returned to Aden 12 April. UAE-aligned security services killed Islamic State (ISIS) leader Saleh Nasser Fadhl al-Bakshi in Aden 28 April. Newly appointed UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths, following initial meetings with warring parties, briefed UN Security Council 17 April; said he would return to Yemen within two months with plan to revive talks, but that military escalation risked derailing peace efforts.

Fighting continued between Huthis and anti-Huthi forces including around Hodeida port on Red Sea coast, Taiz city and al-Baydah town in south, and Nehm and Saada in north, and Huthis escalated missile launches into Saudi Arabia. Saudi forces claimed to have shot down seven missiles fired from Yemen into Saudi Arabia 25 March, three over Riyadh and four others fired at Najran, Jizan and Khamis Mushait in south; shrapnel from one missile killed Egyptian resident of Riyadh, first death caused by conflict in Saudi capital. Saudi-led coalition claimed to have shot down two other Huthi missiles, one fired at Jazan 29 March and another fired at Najran 31 March. Airstrike by Saudi-led coalition in Saada province 22 March killed ten civilians. Car bombing on military kitchen in Aden in south 13 March, claimed by Islamic State (ISIS), killed seven people. Suspected member of al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula killed nine soldiers of UAE-backed Hadrami elite forces at checkpoint outside Mukalla city in south east 28 March. Saudi Arabia 15 March reportedly renewed its promise to deposit $2bn in Central Bank of Yemen to shore up currency. UN Security Council presidential statement 15 March called for all ports, including Huthi-controlled Hodeida and Saleef, to remain fully open to humanitarian and commercial shipments and for increased access to Sanaa airport. Former UK diplomat Martin Griffiths began as new UN special envoy 20 March. U.S. Senate 20 March voted against bi-partisan bill that would have ended U.S. support for Saudi-led military intervention; supporters of bill argued President Trump did not have authorisation from Congress to support intervention.

After United Arab Emirates (UAE)-aligned separatist Southern Transition Council (STC) took control of Aden from govt forces late Jan, UAE and Saudi Arabia imposed truce; STC is demanding changes to govt, to have input on appointment of local officials in south and to take part in any UN-led peace talks. Fighting continued on all major fronts; anti-Huthi fighters 5 Feb captured Hays district in southern part of Hodeida province on Red Sea coast and made gains in eastern part of Bayda province in south. Saudi-led coalition maintained airstrikes on Huthi-held areas in north, especially around Saada, west and south, reportedly killing tens of people including civilians. Saudi-led coalition said Saudi Arabia 5 Feb shot down ballistic missile fired by Huthis toward Khamis Mushait city in south-west Saudi Arabia and that Saudi forces repelled several ground incursions across border into Saudi’s Najran and Jizan regions. Tarik Saleh, former Special Forces commander and nephew of late President Saleh, met southern and local Tihama fighters in coastal city of Mokha 19 Feb to coordinate efforts in campaign against Huthis. At least fourteen people killed and over 40 injured in Islamic State (ISIS)-claimed attack on Yemeni counter-terrorism headquarters in Aden 24 Feb. UN Security Council 15 Feb approved appointment of former UK diplomat and Executive Director of European Institute of Peace Martin Griffiths as UN envoy for Yemen from March.

United Arab Emirates (UAE)-aligned southern separatists late Jan forcefully took control of Aden city in south from govt forces, dozens killed in clashes. UAE-aligned separatist Southern Transition Council (STC) 21 Jan accused Hadi govt of corruption and mismanagement and gave President Hadi until 28 Jan to replace cabinet; Hadi govt 27 Jan banned public gatherings in Aden; ignoring ban, STC held protests against govt 28 Jan resulting in clashes between STC forces and govt troops 28-30 Jan, STC forces reportedly took control of Aden 30 Jan, confining govt to al-Maasheeq palace, dozens killed. Following collapse in Dec of alliance between Huthi rebels and General People’s Congress (GPC), party of former President Saleh, Huthis 1 Jan reshuffled govt in capital Sanaa, replacing GPC supporters with Huthi loyalists. During visit of UN deputy special envoy to Sanaa 6-10 Jan, Huthis said they were open to UN-led talks but warned they would block shipping in Red Sea if Saudi-led coalition continued military push to Hodeida port. Huthis mid-Jan released from prison several GPC politicians and prominent activist. GPC 7 Jan announced new president, Sadik Amin Abu Ras, who said GPC would continue to oppose “Saudi aggression”. Nephew of former President Saleh and former Special Forces commander, Tarik Saleh, whom GPC said Huthis killed in Dec, appeared in Shebwa province 11 Jan, then reportedly went to Aden in south to work with UAE forces in fight against Huthis. Saudi-led coalition’s military advances in Shebwa province in east, Jawf province in north and along Red Sea coast slowed in Jan. Saudi forces claimed to have intercepted three ballistic missiles fired by Huthis into Saudi Arabia toward civilian areas in Najran region in south west 5 Jan, toward military base in Jizan region in south 16 Jan, and toward airport in Najran region 20 Jan. To slow major depreciation of Yemeni riyal, Saudi Arabia 17 Jan pledged to put $2bn in Yemeni central bank.

Collapse of alliance between Huthis and supporters of former President Saleh deepened conflict in north, as both Saudi-led coalition and Huthis looked set to ramp up attacks in Jan. After clashes in capital Sanaa late Nov between Huthi fighters and pro-Saleh forces, Saleh 2 Dec said he would “turn a new page” with Saudi-led coalition and called on followers to turn against Huthis. Huthis killed Saleh in Sanaa 4 Dec. In following weeks, Huthis tightened control of Sanaa, cracking down on Saleh’s family members and his General People’s Congress (GPC) party. Huthis 19 Dec fired missile at Riyadh, Saudi govt intercepted. Saudi-led coalition significantly increased airstrikes in north; UN reported airstrikes killed at least 115 civilians in four northern provinces 6-16 Dec and 109 more 18-28 Dec. United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Yemeni forces made military gains against Huthis: captured Khawka port on Red Sea coast 7 Dec and town of Bayhan, Shebwa province, Huthis’ last foothold in south 15 Dec. Saudi Arabia and UAE leaders met Yemeni Islamist party Islah in Riyadh 13 Dec. Saudi Arabia maintained blockade on Yemen despite U.S. call 6 Dec to let through humanitarian and commercial goods. Saudi-led coalition 20 Dec said it would allow relief and commercial goods through Hodeida port for at least 30 more days.

Following Huthi missile strike on Riyadh, Saudi-led coalition escalated bombing in Yemen and tightened blockade and fighting between Huthis and pro-Saleh forces threatened to continue in Dec. Huthi rebels 4 Nov fired ballistic missile at Saudi capital, Riyadh which Saudi military intercepted and destroyed over city; launch followed Saudi airstrikes in Huthis’ home governorate of Saada that reportedly killed 38 people early Nov. In response, Saudi Arabia increased airstrikes in areas controlled by Huthis and supporters of former President Saleh, including capital Sanaa, and 6 Nov announced temporary closure of all entry ports to Yemen in bid to stop alleged Iranian weapons shipments to Huthis. Saudi Arabia 13 Nov started lifting restrictions on airports and ports nominally controlled by President Hadi’s govt, but tightened blockade on Huthi/Saleh-controlled territories, with grave humanitarian consequences. International Committee of the Red Cross 17 Nov said that three cities had run out of clean water due to blockade, as fuel needed for pumping and sanitation insufficient. Huthis 30 Nov vowed to retaliate for blockade and same day launched missile targeting Saudi city of Khamis Mushait in south west, which Saudi military intercepted and destroyed without casualties. International criticism of war and its humanitarian toll rose, with U.S. House of Representatives 13 Nov passing non-binding resolution stating that Congress never authorised U.S. assistance to Saudi’s intervention in Yemen. UN 16 Nov called on Saudi-led coalition to lift blockade, accusing it of threatening lives of “millions of vulnerable children and families”. Saudi-led coalition 25 Nov began easing restrictions on rebel-held areas, allowing plane carrying vaccines and aid workers to land in Sanaa. Flour shipment arrived to Hodeida port 25 Nov, next day vessel carrying wheat docked at Saleef port. UN 27 Nov called on coalition to fully open ports to commercial and humanitarian goods. Fighting broke out 29 Nov between fighters loyal to former President Saleh and Huthis around Saleh mosque in Sanaa, killing at least four, and continued 30 Nov. Tensions remain high within uncomfortable Huthi-Saleh alliance. Hadi-appointed governor in southern city of Aden 17 Nov resigned citing his inability to perform role due to govt corruption. Islamic State (ISIS) intensified attacks on pro-govt security forces in Aden 5-14 Nov, killing at least 56. ISIS-claimed attack on finance ministry building in Aden 29 Nov killed five. U.S. drone attack on suspected al-Qaeda members 26 Nov on road between Shabwa and Bayda provinces killed seven. Unidentified gunmen 28 Nov ambushed Hadi forces patrol near Ataq in central Shabwa province, killing five.

Fighting continued between on one side Huthi rebels and allied forces loyal to former President Saleh and on other Saudi-led coalition, especially along Saudi border. Tensions mounted in Aden in south between forces loyal to President Hadi and Emirati-aligned security forces associated with separatist Southern Transition Council (STC). Pro-Hadi and secessionist groups held competing rallies 17 Oct commemorating southern fight against British occupation; Hadi forces clashed briefly with Emirati-backed faction over Hadi govt raising Yemeni flag, signifying national unity. STC leader Aydaroos Zubaydi 14 Oct said at rally that STC would organise referendum on southern independence soon and continue fight against extremists. Emirati-backed security forces 10 Oct raided HQ of Hadi-aligned Islamist party Islah in Aden and arrested several members for terrorism. In north, tensions between Huthis and allied pro-Saleh forces continued; Huthis 7 Oct raided Saleh-aligned foreign ministry in Sanaa. U.S. 16 Oct claimed its drone strikes had destroyed Islamic State (ISIS) training camp in Bayda province in south, but locals said attacks targeted local al-Qaeda-affiliated fighters. Five suspected al-Qaeda male suicide bombers 23 Oct attacked checkpoint in Abyan province in south, killing four soldiers. UN 5 Oct put Saudi Arabia on blacklist for grave violations against children in conflict, list also includes Huthis and Hadi govt forces.

Huthi rebels and forces loyal to former President Saleh continued to clash with Saudi Arabia-led coalition along Saudi border and vie for control of Taiz city in south. Govt 10 Sept said 145 Huthis killed 1-10 Sept in Saudi airstrikes and clashes with loyalist forces. Saudi airstrikes 15-16 Sept reportedly killed twenty Huthi fighters in city of Medi on Saudi border; airstrike 16 Sept hit civilian vehicle in Hareeb al-Qarameesh district, Marib governorate killing all twelve passengers. UN 19 Sept condemned Huthi-Saleh shelling of Taiz city that killed three and injured seven children 15 Sept and 16 Sept Saudi-led coalition airstrike in Marib that killed five children, four women and three men from same family. Saudi Arabia 22 Sept said Huthi rockets fired previous day landed in village in Saudi Arabia’s Al-Arda governorate, causing no casualties. Saudi Arabia 24 Sept reportedly intercepted Huthi-fired missile targeting King Khaled air base in Saudi’s Asir province. Tensions between supporters of Huthis and of Saleh’s allied General People’s Congress (GPC) party remained high following 25 Aug clash in capital Sanaa, despite leaders on both sides giving public assurances that alliance will continue. In Aden in south, forces loyal to President Hadi 16 Sept clashed with faction nominally loyal to Hadi but backed by United Arab Emirates (UAE), one civilian killed. UAE-backed forces’ campaign against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), begun in Shebwa governorate in south-centre in Aug, continued in adjacent Abyan governorate; by mid-Sept forces had dislodged militants from many areas including Wadea, Hadi’s home district, but AQAP fighters reportedly fled into Mafadh district ahead of offensive. UN Human Rights Council 29 Sept passed resolution establishing group of “international and regional experts” to investigate human rights violations in conflict dating back to Sept 2014.

Significant escalation of tensions in capital Sanaa between supporters of Huthis and former President Saleh, alongside increase in Saudi Arabia-led coalition airstrikes. Saleh 24 Aug staged large rally in Sanaa to celebrate 35th anniversary of creation of General People’s Congress party (GPC); Huthi leadership previous day called for state of emergency, said political mass gatherings should be made on battlefront, not in public squares. Immediately prior to and after GPC rally, coalition airstrikes hit several military and non-military targets around Sanaa. Airstrikes hit Huthi security checkpoint in Arhab and hotel in same district 23 Aug; UN human rights office reported 33 civilians killed in latter. Saudi coalition airstrike hit residential area of Sanaa 24 Aug, killing sixteen civilians including seven children; coalition expressed regret, calling it “technical mistake”. Senior GPC official and three Huthi fighters killed in clashes at Huthi-controlled checkpoint in Sanaa 25 Aug; Saleh 31 Aug called for arrest of Huthi gunmen responsible for killing his aide. Fighting continued in Taiz governorate in south and along Saudi border. In Taiz, Huthi/Saleh rebels continued to vie with United Arab Emirates (UAE) forces and Yemeni allies for control of Khaled bin Waleed military base and surrounding areas. Huthis said they launched attacks on two UAE military vessels in Mokha port using remote-controlled explosives-laden boats 12 and 16 Aug, claiming first ship hit “with precision”; UAE said it thwarted both attacks. Huthis claimed to have intensified attacks on Saudi territory, including on Najran city and in Asir and Jizan regions. Saudi-led coalition retaliated with airstrikes, including in Hajjah and Saada governorates; coalition 7 Aug claimed to have killed over 70 Huthi fighters in Hajjah 3-4 Aug. Huthis 4 Aug said Saudi airstrikes killed at least twelve civilians in Saada governorate; Saudi-led coalition denied reports. Yemeni forces 3 Aug began campaign to drive al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) militants out of Shebwa governorate in south-centre; Yemeni forces 4 Aug claimed victory but locals say AQAP fighters evacuated ahead of military operation.