Reports of indirect talks between U.S. and Iran suggested diplomatic momentum toward limited de-escalation understanding, while Tehran avoided censure at nuclear watchdog meeting.

U.S.-Iran engagement raised spectre of de-escalation. Iranian and U.S. officials mid-month confirmed in media reports that sides had held indirect talks in May in Oman likely aimed at de-escalatory understandings that could see prisoner swap and measure of nuclear restraint by Tehran in return for release of some frozen assets for humanitarian transactions; U.S. 13 June confirmed recent allocation of $2.7bn from Iraq-held Iranian funds but otherwise tempered expectations of major break-through.

Tehran avoided censure at nuclear watchdog meeting. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi 5 June told IAEA’s Board of Governors that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles had “risen by over a quarter in three months”; Grossi said Tehran had “provided a possible explanation” for presence of depleted uranium particles at ‘Marivan’” – one of three locations subject to agency probe into past nuclear activities at undeclared sites – and declared “the agency has no further questions” regarding origin of particles enriched up to 83.7 per cent. Consequently, U.S. and/or European allies did not introduce censure motion but nonetheless criticised Iran. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei 11 June backed engagement on safe-guards with IAEA while emphasising that nuclear “infrastructures [should] remain untouched”.

West continued steady stream of sanctions. U.S. 1 June sanctioned six individuals/entities linked to “terrorist plots” targeting “former U.S. government officials”, among others. U.S. next day designated four persons/entities linked to “censorship of the Internet”. U.S. Treasury Department 6 June blacklisted 13 persons and entities linked to “Iran's ballistic missile development”. EU 23 June sanctioned four Iranian entities linked to “manufacturing of UAVs and their provision to Russia” and 26 June designated seven Iranian officials over human rights concerns.

Maritime tensions persisted amid Iranian-Saudi normalisation. U.S. and UK naval forces 4 June reported “Iranian fast attack boats harassed [a] commercial ship” transiting Strait of Hormuz. Iran 6 June reopened its embassy in Saudi Arabia (see Saudi Arabia). FM Amirabdollahian 19-22 June discussed idea of “regional cooperation forum” touring Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and UAE.

Reports of indirect talks between U.S. and Iran suggested diplomatic momentum toward limited de-escalation understanding, while Tehran avoided censure at nuclear watchdog meeting.

U.S.-Iran engagement raised spectre of de-escalation. Iranian and U.S. officials mid-month confirmed in media reports that sides had held indirect talks in May in Oman likely aimed at de-escalatory understandings that could see prisoner swap and measure of nuclear restraint by Tehran in return for release of some frozen assets for humanitarian transactions; U.S. 13 June confirmed recent allocation of $2.7bn from Iraq-held Iranian funds but otherwise tempered expectations of major breakthrough.

Tehran avoided censure at nuclear watchdog meeting. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi 5 June told IAEA’s Board of Governors that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles had “risen by over a quarter in three months”; Grossi said Tehran had “provided a possible explanation” for presence of depleted uranium particles at ‘Marivan’” – one of three locations subject to agency probe into past nuclear activities at undeclared sites – and declared “the agency has no further questions” regarding origin of particles enriched up to 83.7 per cent. Consequently, U.S. and/or European allies did not introduce censure motion but nonetheless criticised Iran. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei 11 June backed engagement on safeguards with IAEA while emphasising that nuclear “infrastructures [should] remain untouched”.

West continued steady stream of sanctions. U.S. 1 June sanctioned six individuals/entities linked to “terrorist plots” targeting “former U.S. government officials”, among others. U.S. next day designated four persons/entities linked to “censorship of the Internet”. U.S. Treasury Department 6 June blacklisted 13 persons and entities linked to “Iran's ballistic missile development”. EU 23 June sanctioned four Iranian entities linked to “manufacturing of UAVs and their provision to Russia” and 26 June designated seven Iranian officials over human rights concerns.

Maritime tensions persisted amid Iranian-Saudi normalisation. U.S. and UK naval forces 4 June reported “Iranian fast attack boats harassed [a] commercial ship” transiting Strait of Hormuz. Iran 6 June reopened its embassy in Saudi Arabia (see Saudi Arabia). FM Amirabdollahian 19-22 June discussed idea of “regional cooperation forum” touring Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and UAE.

Govt sought to avoid censure vote ahead of nuclear watchdog meeting in June, while maritime tensions continued and West condemned govt’s support for Russia and execution of dual national.

Iran claimed progress on nuclear concerns ahead of key meeting in June. With International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting set for 5 June, Iranian media 30 May reported progress between govt and UN watchdog over safeguards concerns; IAEA did not confirm claims, while its forthcoming quarterly report could determine prospect of U.S. and European states introducing censure resolution at meeting. Israeli military’s chief of staff 23 May said Iran’s uranium enrichment is more advanced than ever, warning “there are possible negative developments on the horizon that could lead to action”. Iran 25 May successfully test-launched ballistic missile with potential 2,000km range.

Maritime tensions persisted. After U.S. late April reported that Iran’s navy had seized Marshall Islands-flagged tanker in Gulf of Oman, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 3 May detained another tanker sailing from Dubai to Fujairah in Strait of Hormuz. U.S. 12 May announced that it would increase presence of ships and aircraft with allies in Strait of Hormuz, adding that its Fifth Fleet would deepen cooperation with two parallel maritime security initiatives operating in area.

U.S. condemned Iran’s support for Russia. U.S. 15 May indicated that it would “continue to impose costs” on those involved in sending equipment to Russia and 19 May sanctioned four entities linked to Iran-Russia maritime transfers. Canada 3 May designated ten Iranian individuals and entities, four connected to drone manufacturer and six over human rights concerns. European Union (EU) 22 May adopted eighth set of designations over human rights violations since anti-govt protests began in Sept 2022.

Iran executed dual national and three citizens, sparking condemnation. Authorities 6 May executed Habib Chaab, dual Swedish-Iranian national who had been sentenced to death on charges of involvement with separatist group, triggering condemnation from Sweden, U.S. and EU. Authorities 19 May executed three men sentenced to death in connection with their alleged involvement in killing three security personnel in Isfahan city during nationwide protests in Nov 2022.

Efforts to revive nuclear accord showed no sign of progress, Tehran and Arab Gulf states continued normalisation, and hostilities in Levant and underscored looming conflict risks.

Holding pattern continued on nuclear talks as Western sanctions increased. Diplomatic track in April showed little sign of progress. U.S., E3 and other G7 members 18 April noted “a diplomatic solution remains our preferred solution” and described 2015 deal as “useful reference”, which underscored that 2015 agreement is in all likelihood not revivable. Meanwhile, West continued issuing Iran-related sanctions. U.S. 19 April blacklisted seven individuals and entities allegedly part of “a sanctions evasion network” supporting Iran’s drone and military programmes. In parallel to EU and UK sanctions, U.S. 24 April designated five Iranian authorities and entities, in addition to imposing visa restrictions on eleven more officials, over human rights violations. Washington 27 April sanctioned five Iranian officials and entity for “wrongful detention of U.S. nationals”.

Momentum continued toward de-escalation in Gulf. Following 10 March Saudi-Iranian normalisation deal, sides continued to improve ties. Tehran 4 April announced appointment of Reza Ameri, foreign ministry veteran, as ambassador to United Arab Emirates – filling position that had been vacant since 2016. FM Hossein Amirabdollahian 6 April met his Saudi counterpart in Chinese capital Beijing for first bilateral meeting in seven years; sides underscored intention to reopen diplomatic facilities by 9 May and subsequently exchanged visits by delegations.

Escalation in Levant and tensions at sea spotlighted risks. Following deadly hostilities in north-eastern Syria between U.S. forces and Iran-aligned groups late March, Tehran 3 April claimed that it had “never been involved, directly or indirectly, in any attacks against the U.S. military forces in Syria and Iraq”. Meanwhile, Israeli military 2 April downed alleged Iranian drone from Syria and early April launched multiple strikes in Syria, amid multi-front escalation (see Israel-Palestine, Lebanon and Syria); hostilities underscore risk that region remains potential theatre for future multi-actor escalation involving Iran-backed forces. In maritime domain, Iran’s navy 27 April seized Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker in Gulf of Oman; U.S. reportedly had seized China-bound Iranian oil shipment.

Engagement with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) forestalled international censure, govt and Saudi Arabia announced breakthrough normalisation deal, and tensions with U.S. flared in Syria.

Iran avoided censure at IAEA’s Board of Governors, Western sanctions mounted. Ahead of first Board of Governors meeting in 2023, IAEA chief Rafael Grossi 3-4 March visited capital Tehran for meetings with senior officials and President Raisi amid heightening concerns over longstanding safeguards issues as well as recent discovery of uranium particles enriched to near-weapons grade and undeclared modifications at Fordow facility; visit produced joint statement on increased cooperation. U.S. and E3 (France, UK and Germany) did not introduce censure resolution during board meeting on 7 March, but underscored serious concern of Tehran’s nuclear activity. Meanwhile, U.S. 2 March expanded its sanctions against Iranian petroleum and petrochemical export companies. European Union 7 March sanctioned Iranian prison over human rights concerns. UK next day sanctioned govt institution The Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil in Iran, as U.S. issued its tenth round of human rights-related sanctions since protests began in Sept.

Tehran and Riyadh announced breakthrough agreement. Following undisclosed talks in Chinese capital Beijing, Iran and Saudi Arabia 10 March announced deal to restore diplomatic relations seven years after they were severed, and following nearly two years of intermittent dialogue (see Saudi Arabia). Deal could mark constructive shift in de-escalating regional tensions, but may prove transitory unless Iran and West address nuclear standoff, hostages in Iran and Tehran’s military support for Russia.

Iran-U.S. tensions surged in Syria. Alleged Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated groups 23 March launched drone attack on base near Syria’s Hasakah city, killing U.S. contractor and injuring six U.S. troops; in retaliation, U.S. conducted airstrikes on alleged IRGC-affiliated groups, killing several militants (see Syria); President Biden asserted that “the U.S. does not … seek conflict with Iran” but would “forcefully” protect its people. Earlier, UK 2 March announced Royal Navy and U.S. 23 Feb interdicted vessel from Iran in Gulf of Oman carrying anti-tank guided missiles and medium-range ballistic missile components, likely intended for Huthis in Yemen.

Coordinated U.S. and European efforts against govt’s crackdown and military cooperation with Russia continued apace, while nuclear standoff deepened and regional tensions remained elevated.

West continued censure amid shrinking appetite for engagement. U.S. 3 Feb sanctioned eight individuals involved with already-designated drone manufacturer as well as two Iranian navy vessels, 9 Feb targeted Iranian energy exports. New Zealand 15 Feb issued sanctions against eight persons and entities involved in drone production, and widened its travel ban against Iranian officials implicated in human rights abuses. European Union (EU) 20 Feb expanded its human rights designations by targeting additional 34 Iranian persons and entities; UK same day designated eight individuals. Marking 24 Feb anniversary of Ukraine war, UK sanctioned five individuals, U.S. announced export control measures and EU designated seven Iranian entities all related to concerns over drones. Canada 27 Feb sanctioned 12 Iranian individuals over human rights violations.

Nuclear standoff deepened ahead of nuclear watchdog meeting in March. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 1 Feb expressed concern “that Iran implemented a substantial change in the design information of [Fordow Fuel enrichment plant] in relation to the production of high-enriched uranium without informing the Agency in advance”; Iran’s atomic energy chief maintained that there had been an error by IAEA’s inspectors. Adding to list of concerns, U.S. media 19 Feb revealed IAEA had detected uranium enriched to 84%; Iran’s atomic energy agency denied enriching over 60%. Senior IAEA officials 21 Feb visited Tehran for discussions; lack of progress before 6 March start of IAEA Board of Governors meeting could lead Western govts to introduce another censure resolution. CIA director 26 Feb assessed nuclear program expanding “at a worrisome pace”, though no indication of weaponisation.

Regional tensions remained elevated. After govt 1 Feb said early investigations in attack late Jan on Isfahan defence facility pointed to Israeli responsibility, reports 17 Feb emerged of apparent Iranian drone strike against commercial vessel linked to Israeli ownership week earlier; Israeli PM Netanyahu 19 Feb blamed Iran for attack and rocket fire against U.S. forces in north east Syria day earlier (see Syria).

Govt maintained harsh crackdown on protests as Western states continued censure and sanctions, further sapping appetite for engagement on nuclear file, while attack targeted Isfahan military facility.

Govt continued crackdown, further straining relations with West. Govt 7 Jan executed two individuals linked to protests, convicted as part of campaign that UN human rights chief described as tantamount “to state sanctioned killing”. Govt 14 Jan executed dual UK-Iranian national accused of espionage, prompting UK to temporarily recall its ambassador and blacklist prosecutor general. European Union (EU) continued diplomatic rebuke and preparing new sanctions. Notably, calls grew in UK and EU to label Islamic Republic Guard Corps (IRGC) as “terrorist organisation”, which Tehran threatened would evoke strong response; European Parliament 19 Jan passed non-binding resolution calling for designation. In first sanctions of 2023, U.S. 6 Jan targeted six individuals linked to Iranian company said to be engaged in drone proliferation, as well as director of organisation that is “responsible for overseeing Iran’s ballistic missile programs”. EU 23 Jan approved sanctions against 37 Ira-nian individuals and entities over human rights concerns; UK same day blacklisted seven individuals and entities and U.S. in parallel designated 11.

Nuclear talks remained moribund. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi 12 Jan asserted that nuclear negotiations “have broken down”, adding “the Agency – and I personally – do not want to leave this political vacuum around such a volatile and dangerous issue”; Grossi asserted willingness to meet Iranian officials but no meetings have been confirmed to resume discussions on outstanding safeguards concerns. Grossi 24 Jan called nuclear deal “an empty shell” as “every limit that existed [in deal] has been violated several times”.

Isfahan military facility targeted in drone attack. Govt 28 Jan confirmed bomb-laden drones struck defence facility in Isfahan but maintained damage was minimal; attack widely attributed in media to Israel. Earlier, U.S. Central Command 6 Jan intercepted 2,000 assault rifles aboard sailboat transiting “from Iran to Yemen”. Azerbaijan withdrew staff from Tehran embassy following 27 Jan attack that killed one and injured two.

Govt faced global condemnation for crackdown on protesters and drone supply to Russia as nuclear talks remained deadlocked, while tensions persisted in maritime domain.

International censure continued over govt’s harsh crackdown and drone provision to Russia. Amid ongoing protests across country, international NGO Amnesty International 16 Dec reported that at least 26 people were at risk of execution in Iran for alleged role in nationwide unrest; NGO Human Rights Activists News Agency 29 Dec estimated at least 500 protesters killed and 19,000 arrested, with real numbers likely higher. U.S. 9 Dec announced sanctions and/or travel bans against more than dozen Iranian officials over human rights abuses and 21 Dec blacklisted prosecutor general among additional six designees, while European Union 12 Dec approved sanctions against 21 Iranian persons and entities over human rights concerns, and further eight over govt’s provision of drones to Russia. U.S.-initiated resolution at UN Economic and Social Council 14 Dec passed to remove Iran from UN Commission on the Status of Women. U.S. and E3 (France, Germany and UK) 19 Dec voiced concern over both Iran’s nuclear escalation and provision of UAVs to Russia, with U.S. warning that Russia may consider “importing complete ballistic missiles from Iran”.

Prospects of nuclear talks progress remained dim as govt expanded enrichment. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief early Dec said Iran had informed agency it was “tripling [its] capacity to enrich at 60 per cent, which is very close to military level… This is not banal”. IAEA 18-19 Dec visited capital Tehran in latest effort to make progress on longstanding investigation into past activities at undeclared nuclear sites, with little indication of success. Throughout Dec, U.S. repeatedly dismissed Iran’s suggestions of possible progress in nuclear negotiations.

Maritime tensions persisted. U.S. military 3 Dec announced that its naval forces had two days earlier uncovered 50-ton arms shipment, including ammunition and rocketry components, aboard ship in Gulf of Oman, blaming Iran. U.S. Central Command 6 Dec reported that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Navy patrol boat had previous day harassed two U.S. Navy ships in Strait of Hormuz, marking first reported instance of unsafe/unprofessional encounter since June.

Nationwide protests continued as Revolutionary Guards attacked Iranian Kurdish groups in Iraq, while govt stepped up nuclear activity in response to international censure for its nuclear intransigence.

Nationwide protests continued into their third month. Protesters held commemoration ceremonies for those killed by security forces and events marking mid-Nov anniversary of 2019 protests, as security forces maintained heavy-handed crackdowns, with reports late month indicating greater coercive force in Kurdish-majority regions. Human rights groups mid-month estimated that fatalities to date may exceed 400, including 50 children; senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander 20 Nov indicated around 60 fatalities among security personnel. Authorities continued to blame unrest on foreign agitation: notably, IRGC 14, 20-21 and 22 Nov resumed cross-border missile and drone attacks into northern Iraq on Iranian Kurdish outfits, while bolstering military presence in border regions (see Iraq).

Tehran expanded nuclear activity in response to atomic watchdog’s censure vote. At International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s quarterly Board of Governors meeting, Director General Rafael Grossi 16 Nov shared “serious concern” over lack of progress in resolving safeguards concerns related to past activities at undeclared nuclear sites; board 17 Nov passed censure resolution deeming Iranian cooperation “essential and urgent”, as Russia and China voted against. In response, govt 22 Nov began enriching uranium to 60% as its fortified Fordow facility and promised to install more advanced centrifuges there and at Natanz site. Earlier, IAEA’s 10 Nov survey showed growing stockpile of 60% enriched uranium reached 62.3kg.

U.S. and its Western allies imposed sanctions. In sign of concerted diplomatic pressure, U.S. 16 Nov blacklisted half dozen employees of Iran’s state media and 23 Nov designated three officials over crackdown; European Union and UK 14 Nov sanctioned individuals and entities for govt crackdown and drone provision to Russia. U.S. 15 Nov sanctioned three Iranian entities implicated in drone transfer to Russia. UN Human Rights Council 24 Nov voted to establish investigation into human rights violations; foreign ministry 28 Nov rejected cooperation. U.S. 16 Nov said Iran “likely” behind attack on Liberian-flagged Israeli-owned tanker off Oman’s coast previous day. Saudi Arabia warned of Iranian attacks (see Saudi Arabia).

Nationwide protests surpassed forty-day milestone despite ongoing repression, Western powers voiced concern over Iran’s military as-sistance to Russia, and Islamic State claimed deadly attack.

Anti-govt protests continued amid crackdown, as West imposed sanctions. Widespread unrest following death on 16 Sept of Mahsa Amini persisted as deeply-rooted discontent against govt, particularly among youth and university students, fueled nationwide protests that 26 Oct reached fortieth day. NGO Amnesty International 6 Oct reported security forces killed at least 66 people, including children, during violent crackdown after Friday prayers on 30 Sept in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan provinces home to Baluchi ethnic minority, labelling it “deadliest day on record since protests started”; total death toll during month likely surpassed 200, alongside 14,000 arrests. Western govts widely condemned govt’s crackdown. Notably, U.S. 6 and 26 Oct, Canada 3, 11, 19 and 31 Oct, UK 10 Oct, and EU 17 Oct blacklisted various officials; U.S. White House 26 Oct raised concern over Moscow “advising Tehran on best practices” of demonstration suppression.

Nuclear talks faded into background. Nuclear talks, already at impasse before protests erupted, appeared during month as afterthought for parties. UN’s nucle-ar watchdog IAEA 10 Oct informed member states that Iran had completed installing, but not yet activated, seven cascades of advanced centrifuges at Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, with work underway on two of three additional cascades. IAEA chief 28 Oct described Iran’s nuclear activities as “an even more relevant problem every day”.

Concerns grew over Tehran-Moscow military cooperation. Ukraine and Western powers grew increasingly concerned over transfers of Iranian drones to Russia: Kyiv 17 Oct estimated that Russia had used “more than a hundred Iranian kamikaze drones” in Ukraine war within past week, which Iranian officials continued to deny; U.S., UK and France asserted such transfers would violate UN Security Council resolution 2231, which in 2015 endorsed nuclear agreement.

In other important developments. Govt 26 Oct reported terrorist attack against shrine in Shiraz city, killing at least fifteen and injuring dozens, which Islamic State (ISIS) claimed responsibility for. Security officials 25 Oct reported “120 heavy cyber-attacks” targeting infrastructure over course of 20 days.

Authorities violently repressed nationwide protests ignited by death of young woman in police custody; talks to revive nuclear deal faltered once more.

Security forces’ crackdown on mass protests killed dozens. Morality police mid-month detained 22-year-old woman Mahsa Amini for failing to properly wear hijab (compulsory under Iranian law); Amini later died in hospital, allegedly out of severe injuries from police beating in custody. Death sparked widespread outrage and protests involving thousands in dozens of cities across country; security forces immediately responded with force, reportedly killing at least 40 protesters (and possibly dozens more), arresting hundreds and throttling nationwide internet access. Revolutionary Guards launched attacks against Kurdish dissident groups in northern Iraq, alleging role in unrest (see Iraq).

Nuclear negotiations appeared to stumble short of finish line, dashing hopes of imminent breakthrough. U.S. assessed Iran’s 1 Sept response following series of back-and-forth exchanges as “moving backwards”. EU High Representative Josep Borrell 14 Sept acknowledged “a kind of stalemate... I don’t have anything more to propose”; looming U.S. midterm elections could keep talks in holding pattern for foreseeable future, while Tehran’s demands to close International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards probe and have guarantees on sanctions relief likely to remain sticking points. Addressing IAEA Board of Governors on 12 Sept, Director General Rafael Grossi noted challenges in conducting oversight given curtailed access and reported no progress in clarifying safeguards concerns; 23 of board’s 25 members 14 Sept urged Tehran to “resolve all outstanding safeguards issues”.

Tensions persisted between U.S. and Iran. Albania 7 Sept severed diplomatic ties with Iran over 15 July cyberattack; U.S. National Security Council same day blamed Iran for “reckless and irresponsible” act. U.S. 8 Sept blacklisted several Iranian individuals and companies engaged in development of drones and their transfer to Russia and 14 Sept designated dozen persons and entities linked to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, citing “malicious cyber attacks”. In response to crackdown of protests, U.S. 22 Sept sanctioned Morality Police and seven officials. U.S. Navy 2 Sept announced Iranian Navy ship seized and subsequently released pair of U.S. unmanned surface vessels, following similar incident late Aug.

U.S. and Iran returned to EU-brokered talks in most substantive engagement to restore nuclear accord since March, leading to back-and-forth exchanges as prospects for final deal remained uncertain. After EU’s High Representative Josep Borrell late July said he had shared text for parties’ consideration that was “the best possible deal”, Borrell’s deputy Enrique Mora 3 Aug announced deliberations between U.S., Iran and other signatories of 2015 deal would resume next day in Austrian capital Vienna for first in-person talks since March. Borrell 8 Aug asserted “Behind every technical issue and every paragraph lies a political decision that needs to be taken in the capitals”. Iran’s lead negotiator, Ali Bagheri-Kani, 15 Aug briefed Supreme National Security Council in advance of Tehran communicating its response to Brussels. U.S. 24 Aug conveyed counter-proposal, which as of late Aug remained under review by Iranians. Meanwhile, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 3 Aug informed member states that Iran had installed three cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Natanz nuclear facility, and notified agency of its intent to install further six IR-2m centrifuge cascades. In fourth set of U.S. energy-related sanctions since late May, U.S. 1 Aug sanctioned six companies engaged in petroleum and petrochemical sales to East Asia. Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran same day said it would “launch and inject gas into hundreds of centrifuge machines, including advanced machines”; FM Hossein Amir-Abdollahian framed move as direct reaction to U.S. designations. U.S. forces and “Iran-backed militia groups” conducted tit-for-tat attacks in Syria (see Syria). U.S. Department of Justice 10 Aug charged Iranian national, identified as member of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), over plot to kill former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton; White House warned of “severe consequences” in event of attack against U.S. citizens, while Iran’s foreign ministry denounced accusations as “threadbare and baseless myths”. U.S. Sec of State Antony Blinken 14 Aug denounced Iranian govt’s incitement of violence against Salman Rushdie as “despicable” following 12 Aug attack against author, who was subject of 1989 fatwa by Ayatollah Khomeini. Both incidents could fuel political opposition in U.S. to negotiating with Tehran.

U.S. and Iran made no progress to resolve remaining issues necessary to revive 2015 nuclear deal, while Tehran continued to expand its nuclear activities. Prospects for reviving 2015 nuclear accord appeared moribund as neither Washington nor Tehran appeared willing or able during month to overcome remaining hurdles, which include International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguards probe, scope of sanctions relief and U.S. guarantees to remain committed to deal; lack of progress underscores possibility that deal may now be unsalvageable. EU deal coordinator 26 July asserted “space for additional significant compromises has been exhausted”, urging U.S. and Iran to accept proposed text. Meanwhile, IAEA 9 July confirmed that Iran had brought online cascade of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow facility enriching up to 20%. Senior adviser to Supreme Leader 16 July said “Iran has the capability to build [a] nuclear bomb but it has [taken] no decision”. During U.S. President Biden’s visit to Jerusalem (see Israel-Palestine), he and Israeli PM Yair Lapid voiced shared concern over Iran’s nuclear advancements; their 14 July joint declaration underscored U.S. “commitment never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon”, but while Biden maintained that “diplomacy is the best way to achieve this outcome”, Lapid posited that “the only way to stop them is to put a credible military threat on the table”. U.S. 11 July reported Iran arranging “to provide Russia with up to several hundred UAVs, including weapons-capable UAVs”. Iran 19 July hosted presidents of Russia and Tü-rkiye; coinciding with meeting was announcement of memorandum of understanding between Russian Gazprom and National Iranian Oil Company on developing oil and gas infrastructure. U.S. Treasury Dept 6 July blacklisted ten entities and individuals involved in Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical trade with East Asia; U.S. State Dept simultaneously sanctioned seven entities and vessels linked to Iran’s oil export. Iran’s foreign ministry 16 July blacklisted 61 U.S. officials and lawmakers, past and current, citing their support for Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), dissident group seeking regime change. Iran 23 July announced arrest of what it claimed was Mossad-linked group allegedly intending to sabotage “sensitive” centre in Isfahan city.

Govt ramped up nuclear activity and scaled down external monitoring, while resumption of indirect U.S.-Iran talks offered faint glimmer of hope in salvaging 2015 deal and tensions with Israel rose. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi 6 June told agency’s board that Iran had failed to provide adequate explanations regarding traces of uranium found at undeclared sites. Board by vote of 30 to two (Russia and China) 8 June passed resolution expressing “profound concern” over lack of progress and called on govt to address queries. Govt next day condemned censure, adopting measures to ramp up nuclear activity and restrict transparency: ahead of vote, govt began installing cascade of advanced IR-6 centrifuges at Natanz plant with plans for further two cascades, and took pair of IAEA cameras offline; govt 8 June began dismantling 27 IAEA cameras, which IAEA following day characterised as potential “fatal blow” to restore 2015 nuclear deal. Govt 14 June pointed to possible “external elements” that may be responsible for uranium traces at undeclared sites. In positive step, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell 25 June announced EU would mediate resumed indirect U.S.-Iran negotiations in Qatar; talks late June ended according to U.S. with “no progress”. Meanwhile, shadow hostilities with Israel grew more visible. News 3 June surfaced of death of Ali Esmailzadeh, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) colonel who, Iranian media asserted, “died after falling from a terrace in his house”; two other individuals – engineer at military aerospace facility and geologist – died on 31 May and 2 June in suspected poisoning. In sign of rising tensions that underscore growing risks of escalation, Israeli PM Naftali Bennett 8 June said “we’ve created a new equation by going for the head [of the octopus]”, referring to shift away from only targeting Iran’s tentacles, meaning regional proxies. Israel 13 June issued travel alert for Israelis to avoid visiting Türkiye, citing alleged Iranian threats. U.S. 16 June sanctioned Iranian companies and individuals allegedly supporting sale of oil to China and East Asia. U.S. reported IRGC vessels 20 June approached U.S. navy ships in “unsafe and unprofessional” manner, second such incident since March.

Efforts to restore 2015 nuclear deal remained stalemated as Tehran edged toward breakout capability; price hikes fuelled protests which left at least five killed. Revival of nuclear accord remained blocked over key remaining points of contention, namely 2019 U.S. designation of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as Foreign Terrorist Organization and economic guarantees on sanctions relief. EU facilitator of Vienna talks Enrique Mora sought to inject momentum into stalemated process by travelling to capital Tehran on 11 May – exactly two months after talks in Austrian capital Vienna were paused with technical text all but ready. Iranian and U.S. officials, however, still appeared to put onus on other; U.S. Biden administration 13 May maintained “Iran needs to decide whether it insists on extraneous conditions” or finalises agreement. Senior U.S. official 25 May described deal’s prospects “tenuous at best”; Treasury Dept same day sanctioned “international oil smuggling and money laundering network” linked to IRGC. Meanwhile, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi 10 May reported Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% stood at 42kg, up from 33.2kg tallied in IAEA’s 3 March quarterly report; Grossi also addressed agency’s ongoing safeguards probe into undeclared sites, asserting “Iran has not been forthcoming” with necessary information. President Raisi 9 May unveiled major economic reforms redirecting state subsidies from importers of basic staples, following abrupt cut on flour subsidies in late April that resulted in fivefold price increase; govt 12 May announced hikes on items including dairy products and chicken. Protests over costs erupted in Khuzestan and other provinces; as of 18 May, human rights groups had tallied five deaths, as security forces clamped down on demonstrators, with dozens detained. Police also clashed with protesters over govt handling of 23 May Abadan building collapse that killed at least 29. Unidentified assailants 22 May shot dead colonel of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force in capital Tehran. Incident at Parchin military facility 26 May caused one fatality; media reports blamed drone attack. Iran 27 May seized two Greek-flagged vessels in Gulf, possibly in retaliation for earlier U.S. confiscation of Iranian crude aboard tanker detained in April.

Talks between U.S., Iran and other world powers to revive 2015 nuclear accord reached one-year mark without breakthrough, while Iran-Saudi Arabia dialogue resumed for first time since Sept 2021. Nuclear talks remained at impasse despite technical elements of framework bringing U.S. and Iran back into compliance with deal all but agreed; as 6 April marked one year since start of talks in Austrian capital Vienna, impasse remained focused on bilateral political issue between Washington and Tehran, namely whether and under what conditions U.S. Biden administration will remove 2019 designation by Trump administration of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as Foreign Terrorist Organisation. U.S. State Dept 26 April indicated that EU coordinator “continues to convey messages back and forth”. Iranian atomic agency chief 6 April confirmed that, in line with timetable agreed with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) last month, Tehran had provided IAEA with documentation related to agency’s safeguards probe into undeclared nuclear activity; he also indicated “probably the agency’s representatives will travel to Iran for further talks”. Iran 4 April transferred centrifuge part production from TESA Karaj to Natanz facility; IAEA 14 April informed member states that it had put its cameras in place at workshop (though without access to footage) and Iran had commenced activity there. Govt 25 April confirmed fifth round of Iraq-hosted talks with Saudi Arabia, described as “positive”. U.S. 8 April tallied total number of Iran-related sanction designations under Biden administration at 107, of which 86 “have specifically targeted the IRGC-related persons as well as affiliates”. World Bank 14 April issued economic update on Iran, forecasting GDP growth in 2022/2023 at 3.7%, down from 4.1% in 2021/2022, with inflation projected at 37.6%.

Tensions with Israel peaked as both sides increasingly threatened to attack the other, fuelling regional security concerns; talks between Iran, U.S. and other world powers paused following 11th-hour Russian demands. Following alleged Israeli attack on drone facility in Iran’s Kermanshah province last month, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in rare announcement 8 March revealed death of two colonels in Israeli airstrike near Syrian capital Damascus previous day. In retaliation, IRGC 13 March fired dozen ballistic missiles at Erbil in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, targeting Israeli “strategic centre” (see Iraq). Reports 13 March surfaced that authorities uncovered alleged Israel spy network in north-western Iran; IRGC next day announced arrest of members of alleged Israeli intelligence-linked group plotting sabotage acts at Fordow nuclear facility. Israel 14 March announced it suffered “broad cyber attack” on govt sites. Israeli FM 28 March asserted that Negev Summit attended by counterparts from U.S., Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco and United Arab Emirates “intimidates and deters our common enemies – first and foremost Iran and its proxies”. Govt-affiliated media 13 March reported Tehran had “unilaterally suspended” talks with Saudi officials (see Saudi Arabia). Tehran and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 5 March resolved longstanding dispute over IAEA investigation into possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at four sites, jointly announcing roadmap addressing safeguards-related concerns. However, deep rift between West and Russia over latter’s invasion of Ukraine in Feb threw up hurdle in talks. Russian FM Sergei Lavrov 5 March stated Moscow expected that Western sanctions “will by no means affect our right to free and full-fledged trading, economic, investment, military and technical cooperation with Iran” if deal revived; EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell 11 March announced pause in talks “due to external factors”. Lavrov 15 March indicated much less maximalist demand related to civil nuclear cooperation projects that U.S. same day assured were part and parcel of deal. In positive move, UK govt 16 March announced UK nationals Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe and Anoosheh Ashoori detained in Iran since 2016 and 2017, respectively, were released; third UK national Morad Tahbaz arrested in 2018 was briefly furloughed but since returned to jail.

Marathon negotiations involving Iran, U.S. and other world powers reached inflection point that will determine whether 2015 nuclear deal is revived or collapses. Eighth round of talks in Austrian capital Vienna 8 Feb resumed after short hiatus beginning late Jan. Iran’s lead negotiator 16 Feb asserted that “we are closer than ever” to deal, but remarks from FM Hossein Amirabollahian published same day underscored that closer does not necessarily mean close; Iran continued emphasising U.S. guarantees against future withdrawal from nuclear deal and insistence on “total lifting” of Trump-era sanctions designations, both of which have been consistent Iranian terms since negotiations began and neither of which is likely to be attainable. Iran’s lead negotiator 23 Feb left Vienna for consultations in Tehran that could determine whether talks yield breakthrough or breakdown; while gaps between parties have narrowed, remaining areas of disagreement are significant enough to scupper breakthrough. Meanwhile, U.S. 4 Feb issued sanctions waivers, which Trump administration had issued after U.S. 2018 withdrawal from deal but revoked in 2020, on 2015 nuclear deal-linked nuclear cooperation project; U.S. asserted that decision was “designed to facilitate discussions” in Vienna and “serve U.S. non-proliferation and nuclear safety interests”; E3 (France, Germany and UK) next day welcomed announcement, while Iranian FM posited that “what happens on paper is good, but not enough”. South Korean officials 15-16 Feb held consultations with Iranian counterparts regarding Iran’s frozen assets, with Seoul noting that “sanctions-related issues, including the transfer of frozen funds, would be resolved when a deal is reached” in Vienna. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 9 Feb revealed new solid fuel-powered ballistic missile, with purported range of 1,450km; military chief of staff asserted that missile development would proceed “quantitively and qualitatively”.

Negotiations aimed at restoring 2015 nuclear deal neared critical juncture, while regional tensions with U.S. continued. Eighth round of talks in Austrian capital Vienna that started on 27 Dec continued throughout month, with all participants noting some measure of progress although U.S. and European parties emphasised necessity of faster progress; negotiations 28 Jan paused for consultations with capitals and set to resume early Feb. Amid continued expansion of Iranian nuclear capabilities, U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 13 Jan referred to “not months ahead, weeks ahead” before window for returning to mutual compliance with 2015 deal closes. Iran’s foreign ministry 17 Jan indicated that deliberations were centred around four draft texts, underscoring Tehran’s desire for deal that is “reliable and stable”. Senior South Korean diplomat early Jan visited Vienna “to explore ways to resolve the issue of frozen Iranian assets in Korea”; Seoul 23 Jan confirmed payment of outstanding Iranian UN dues using frozen funds. U.S. official 23 Jan said “very hard for us to imagine getting back into the nuclear deal” so long as four citizens remain imprisoned in Iran, as indirect talks on detainees take place. International Atomic Energy Agency 31 Jan announced Iranian notification on ceasing centrifuge parts production at Karaj facility and shifting that activity to Isfahan site. Meanwhile, around two-year anniversary of killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in U.S. drone strike, there was marked uptick in exchanges involving U.S. forces and Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria; notably, rocket fire and armed drone struck Ain al-Asad air base in western Iraq (see Iraq and Syria). Foreign ministry 8 Jan added 51 U.S. nationals, including currently serving military commanders and members of Trump administration, to its sanctions list, citing their involvement in Soleimani’s killing; White House next day warned Iran of “severe consequences” if it should attack U.S. nationals.

Nuclear talks continued in Austria without breakthrough, while Tehran and UN nuclear watchdog struck deal on surveillance at key nuclear site. Seventh round of talks, that began late Nov in Austrian capital Vienna, 3 Dec adjourned as European participants and U.S. asserted that Tehran’s opening bids substantially widened gaps previously narrowed during earlier rounds; E3 (UK, France and Germany) 3 Dec voiced “disappointment and concern” while U.S. 4 Dec accused Iran of walking back its positions. During talks, Iran 1 Dec announced deployment of cascade of IR-6 advanced centrifuges enriching to 20% at its Fordow facility. Negotiators 9 Dec reconvened as seventh round continued, concluding 17 Dec. EU representative Enrique Mora 17 Dec said: “We now have a text that with some minor exceptions is a common ground… But that does not mean by any means that we have an agreement on any text”, while Iran’s lead negotiator same day described “good progress” and U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan assessed talks as “not going well”. Eighth round 27 Dec kicked off with Mora highlighting “sense of urgency in all delegation”. Meanwhile, following weeks of stalled progress, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 15 Dec announced agreement with Iran’s atomic energy organisation to replace its surveillance cameras at Karaj centrifuge production facility and carry out “other related technical activity” by late Dec, forestalling possibility of censure resolution by IAEA Board of Governors; other safe-guard concerns however remained unresolved. U.S. 7 Dec sanctioned 13 Iranian persons and entities for human rights abuses and 16 Dec announced action against entities for “diverting or attempting to divert U.S. items to Iran’s military programs”. Authorities 4 Dec claimed reports of explosion near Natanz nuclear facility due to missile drill. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 24 Dec concluded five-day drill by testing multiple ballistic missiles and drones. Iran 30 Dec launched three re-search devices into space that failed to reach orbit; operation drew criticism from Germany, France and U.S. who said launch was in breach of UN Security Council resolutions. Clashes 1 Dec erupted at border with Afghanistan, leaving multiple casualties on both sides (see Afghanistan).

Tehran and world powers resumed talks on restoring nuclear deal after five-month-long hiatus, while Iran continued to expand nuclear programme amid flurry of diplomatic activity. After months-long pause in indirect talks between U.S. and Iran in Austrian capital Vienna, EU-coordinated negotiations resumed 29 Nov with meeting of nuclear deal’s current signatories. In lead up to talks, Deputy FM Ali Bagheri during second week of Nov undertook visits to UK, France, Germany and Spain while mid-month engaging with Russia and China. In likely attempt to underscore dividends of successful talks, U.S. and Gulf Cooperation Council 17 Nov issued statement that alluded to “efforts to build effective diplomatic channels with Iran” and prospect of “deeper economic ties” in event of deal’s revival, points which were stressed again next day with endorsement of UK, France and Germany following talks in Saudi capital Riyadh. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi underscored concerns around agency’s ability to monitor and verify nuclear activities; Grossi 2 Nov likened situation to “flying in a heavily clouded sky” and 12 Nov described lack of high-level contact with Tehran as “astonishing”; Tehran subsequently extended invitation to Grossi, who 23 Nov met FM Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and nuclear chief Mohammad Eslami. Grossi described discussions as inconclusive. IAEA Board of Governors next day convened in Vienna; ahead of meeting, agency mid-month reported significant expansion of enriched uranium stockpiles at 20 and 60 per cent over last quarter and objections to “excessively invasive physical searches” of inspectors. Tehran avoided censure resolution despite growing concerns, but U.S. told IAEA 25 Nov that emergency Board session may be required by end of year if Iran continues to stymie agency. Meanwhile, U.S. 2 Nov reported “unsafe interaction” in Strait of Hormuz involving suspected Iranian drones and amphibious assault ship USS Essex; U.S. 15 Nov reported second “unsafe” incident involving Iranian helicopter and USS Essex. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 3 Nov claimed to have thwarted U.S. attempt “to confiscate [Iran’s] oil” in Sea of Oman; U.S. called accusation “totally false”. Washington 18 Nov sanctioned seven Iranian persons and entities “for attempting to influence the 2020 U.S. presidential election”.

Indirect nuclear talks with U.S. still on hold as Washington warned of contingency plans. Four months since last round of indirect talks with U.S. in Austrian capital Vienna and two-and-a-half months since President Raisi took office, deadlock persisted despite continued diplomatic activity. After expressing concern late Sept about lack of access at Iran’s Karaj nuclear site “contrary to the agreed terms”, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi 19 Oct embarked on five-day visit to U.S. where he said he was “expecting news soon” about Iran trip. FM Amirabdollahian 27 Oct said such visit was on cards but insisted “the date is not important”. Enrique Mora, chief of staff of EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, 14 Oct visited Iran to “raise the urgency to resume [nuclear deal] negotiations”; foreign ministry same day announced “the two parties agreed to continue dialogue on questions of mutual interests”; Deputy FM Ali Bagheri 27 Oct met Mora and subsequently announced that: “We agree to start negotiations before the end of November”. Mutual frustration between U.S. and Iran persisted in meantime. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 13 Oct reiterated U.S. view that Iran is using lull in talks to expand nuclear activity, warning: “We are prepared to turn to other options if Iran doesn’t change course”. Raisi 18 Oct noted: “We are serious in result-oriented negotiations”, saying other parties should lift “illegal and oppressive sanctions”. U.S., UK, France and Germany 30 Oct warned “continued Iranian nuclear advances and obstacles to the IAEA’s work will jeopardize the possibility of a return” to deal, while welcoming U.S. commitment to return to deal and “to stay in full compliance, so long as Iran does the same”. Tensions surfaced with Azerbaijan. Armed forces 1 Oct held military drills, prompting Azerbaijani President Aliyev to question: “Why now, and why on our border?”; Iranian defence officials cited “overt and covert presence” of Israel’s proxies as well as jihadist threat as reasons for drills (see also Azerbaijan). Cyberattack 26 Oct attributed by Iranian authorities to Israel and U.S. hampered fuel distribution across country.

Tehran struck last-minute understanding with UN nuclear watchdog regarding access to surveillance equipment, deferring diplomatic showdown with U.S. and European powers. Iranian nuclear activity continued as indirect U.S.-Iran talks on mutual compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal remained deadlocked, marking three months since last round in June. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) quarterly report 7 Sept noted continued growth in Iranian uranium stockpiles enriched to 20% and 60%, shrinking breakout period to perhaps as little as one month. Concerns over nuclear activity raised prospect during month of possible censure resolution against Tehran by U.S. and/or European signatories of nuclear deal at IAEA Board of Governors’ meeting held mid-Sept; President Raisi 8 Sept warned that “non-constructive actions” at IAEA “naturally disrupt the negotiation process”. Amid flurry in diplomatic activity, IAEA chief Rafael Grossi 11 Sept visited Tehran and secured stop-gap three-point agreement granting agency access to its monitoring equipment, forestalling risk of censure resolution. At IAEA Board of Governors meeting, Grossi 13 Sept nonetheless raised concern over Iran’s cooperation, saying verification and monitoring activities were severely inhibited and Tehran had done little to address probe into past activities at four undeclared sites. IAEA 26 Sept indicated that Iran had denied UN body access at Karaj facility, “contrary to the agreed terms”; Iran’s IAEA representative 27 Sept insisted site was “under security and judicial investigations” to justify exclusion. U.S. Treasury Dept 3 Sept sanctioned four Iranians indicted in July 2021 for plotting kidnapping of U.S.-based journalist. U.S. 17 Sept unveiled tranche of designations against “members of an international network of financial facilitators” linked to Iran’s Islamic Rev-olutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Meanwhile, IRGC fired missiles at targets inside Iraq’s Kurdistan region (see Iraq). Raisi 16-17 Sept attended Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, where he announced Iran would join organisation as full member after receiving observer status in 2005.

President Raisi took office, Vienna talks remained paused as Tehran continued nuclear activities, and international powers condemned Iran over recent maritime incident. Ebrahim Raisi sworn in 5 Aug as country’s eighth president, completing conservative takeover of centres of powers across Islamic Republic; Raisi same day indicated that “sanctions against Iran must be lifted and we will support any diplomatic plan that achieves this goal”. Indirect U.S.-Iran negotiations in Austrian capital Vienna, however, remained on hold with new administration in capital Tehran yet to set date for resumption. Meanwhile, Iran’s nuclear activities continued apace. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 16 Aug reported that Iran’s production of enriched uranium metal had yielded 200g enriched to 20% and next day confirmed that number of centrifuge cascades enriching uranium to 60% had doubled to two; IAEA Board of Governors set to produce quarterly report on status of Iran’s nuclear activity in Sept. Amid diplomatic impasse, U.S. Treasury Dept 13 Aug blacklisted “individuals and business involved in an international oil smuggled network” linked to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Tensions in maritime theatre continued, fuelling international opprobrium against Tehran. Following late-July deadly attack on tanker off Oman coast, Tehran 4 Aug submitted letter to UN Security Council denying involvement. U.S. military investigation 6 Aug concluded explosive-laden Iranian-made drone caused “extensive damage”; G7 same day condemned Tehran, underscoring “all available evidence clearly points to Iran”, while U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 9 Aug told UN Security Council that “it is on all of our nations to hold accountable those responsible”. In separate incident, UK Maritime Trade Operations 3 Aug warned of “potential hijacking” of tanker off United Arab Emirates’ coast. As total COVID-19 fatalities rose, surpassing 100,000 deaths since Feb 2020 on 19 Aug, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei 11 Aug described pandemic as “country’s number one problem today”. Raisi 16 Aug said U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan (see Afghanistan) “should become opportunity to restore life, security and lasting peace”; UN during month warned in worst-case scenario as many as 150,000 Afghan refugees could flow to Iran in next six months (see Afghanistan).

Tehran announced pause of nuclear talks in Vienna as it continued to expand its nuclear activities, while protests over water access erupted in south west. After sixth round of indirect U.S.-Iran negotiations in Austrian capital Vienna concluded 20 June, reportedly making notable progress, Deputy FM Seyed Abbas Araghchi 17 July said talks must “await our new administration” when President-elect Ebrahim Raisi takes office on 5 August, putting talks on hiatus for at least six weeks. Iran continued its nuclear activities, further straining fraught relations with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and international powers. IAEA 6 July received and conveyed to Board of Governors Iran’s notification of its intent to move ahead with production of uranium metal enriched to 20 per cent, which is banned until 2031 under 2015 nuclear deal; E3 (UK, France and Germany) same day called moved “serious violation of Iran’s commitments” under deal, while U.S. same day described it as “unfortunate step backward”. Meanwhile, U.S. Treasury Dept 2 July delisted three Iranians allegedly linked with Iran’s missile programme sanctioned in Sept 2020, underscoring that move is unrelated to nuclear talks; Commerce Dept 9 July blacklisted eight entities “for facilitating the export of U.S. items to Iran” in violation of sanctions; federal court 13 July indicted four Iranians on charges of planning kidnapping of U.S. citizen; Tehran next day called allegations “baseless and ridiculous”. Following late June U.S. airstrikes in Syria and Iraq that allegedly targeted Iran-linked militias, Iran’s UN envoy 3 July in letter to UN Security Council president condemned operation “in strongest terms” and denied Iranian involvement in attacks on U.S. targets in Iraq. Armed drone 29 July attacked tanker in Arabian Sea, killing two crew members; Israel, U.S. and UK 1 Aug blamed Iran, which denied responsibility. Protests over access to water 15 July broke out in south-western Khuzestan province; at least three deaths reported and UN human rights chief 23 July described situation as “catastrophic”.

Sixth round of nuclear talks made progress while UN temporary inspections agreement into nuclear sites expired with unclear next steps; Ebrahim Raisi elected president. Following sixth round of indirect U.S.-Iran negotiations in Austrian capital Vienna held 12-20 June, Iran’s lead negotiator Abbas Araghchi 20 June announced “we are closer to an agreement than ever” while U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan same day remarked there remained “a fair distance to travel”; it remains to be seen if agreement will emerge in remaining five weeks of Rouhani administration. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi 7 June briefed board of governors, emphasising Iran’s lack of cooperation on addressing safeguards concerns at four undeclared nuclear sites. Arrangement concluded in Feb on facilitating continued IAEA monitoring of Iranian nuclear activity expired 24 June; IAEA next day called for “immediate response” on status of technical understanding, but Tehran had yet to agree on extension by end of month. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant 21 June underwent electricity shutdown due to “technical problem”; Iranian media 23 June reported “an act of sabotage” against building owned by the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran. Regarding sanctions, U.S. Treasury 10 June blacklisted “members of smuggling network” allegedly linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards-Quds Force and Huthis in Yemen and same day removed sanctions on five individuals and entities, citing “verified change in behaviour or status”. Treasury 17 June published COVID-19-related general licenses clarifying scope of humanitarian transactions with Iran. U.S. Justice Dept 22 June announced seizure of 33 websites linked to Iranian media. Following passage of two Iranian vessels late May suspectedly bound for Venezuela, U.S. State Dept 10 June warned Tehran against transfering weapons or illicit materials to Caracas. Meanwhile, ahead of presidential election 18 June, three of seven candidates pulled out of race; electoral authorities 19 June announced victory for judiciary chief Ebrahim Raisi who won 61.9% of vote, with voter turnout at 48.8% - lowest in Islamic Republic’s history; Raisi will take office as Iran’s eighth president 3 August.

Indirect U.S.-Iran talks to revive nuclear deal continued as Tehran advanced its nuclear activities and regional maritime tensions with U.S. persisted. U.S. and Iran continued to participate in international negotiations in Austrian capital Vienna aimed at reviving Iran nuclear deal, as gaps between two sides narrowed but significant hurdles, including scope of sanctions relief, remained; fifth round of talks in Vienna 25 May began with meeting of Joint Commission of nuclear deal. With roadmap toward mutual U.S. and Iranian compliance with deal emerging but still elusive, Tehran continued to advance its nuclear capacities. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 11 May informed member states of “an enrichment level of up to 63 per cent”. Separately, IAEA and Tehran reportedly held further discussions on resolving outstanding safeguards concerns; IAEA 24 May announced one-month extension of deal reached in Feb for monitoring and verification of nuclear sites; IAEA 31 May said Tehran yet to explain traces of uranium found at undeclared sites. Amid deadly fighting in Israel and Gaza (see Israel-Palestine), U.S. criticism of Biden administration’s diplomatic efforts to engage with Iran on nuclear deal rose as 44 Senate Republicans 12 May signed letter calling on Washington to immediately end talks with Iran, accusing Tehran of “supporting terrorist activity” against Israel; letter portends bitter domestic debate if and when nuclear deal is revived. Meanwhile, Iran-U.S. maritime tensions continued. Over dozen Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps speedboats 10 May approached six U.S. navy vessels accompanying U.S. submarine through Strait of Hormuz, leading U.S. vessels to fire warning shots; encounter follows similar incidents last month, potentially signalling shift toward increased sabre-rattling which raises risk of miscalculation at sea. Ahead of presidential election scheduled for 18 June, over 590 candidates 11-15 May registered to enter race; Guardian Council, an oversight body, 25 May disqualified many – including First VP Eshagh Jahangiri, former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and former parliament speaker Ali Larijani – and approved seven candidates, five of whom are conservatives, most notably judiciary chief Ebrahim Raisi. Foreign ministry 31 May said talks with Saudi Arabia are continuing, aimed at reaching “common understanding”.

U.S. and Iran participated in expert-level negotiations as sabotage attack targeted nuclear facility, prompting Tehran to ramp up enrichment activities.  New diplomatic process commenced as Iran and P4+1 (UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) 2 April held virtual session of nuclear deal’s Joint Commission, which concluded with commitment to continue discussions in person in Austria’s capital Vienna in P4+1/EU format; U.S. same day confirmed it would send diplomats there. Talks 15 April held in Vienna and third round of negotiations 27 April began with parallel working groups discussing nuclear steps, sanctions relief and sequencing. President Rouhani 20 April suggested that “talks have progressed about 60, 70 per cent”. Complicating diplomatic efforts, Iran’s atomic energy organisation 11 April reported “incident” at Natanz nuclear facility that knocked “a number” of centrifuges offline, subsequently describing it as “sabotage”; Iranian FM Javad Zarif next day called attack “nuclear terrorism” and suggested Israel as likely suspect. In response, Tehran 13 April announced expansion of enrichment rates at Natanz from 20% (on par with pre-deal levels) to 60% using IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges. UK, France and Germany next day expressed “grave concern” over decision while U.S. Sec of State Antony Blinken called it “provocative”. Meanwhile, IAEA 21 April verified installation of six cascades of IR-2m and two cascades of IR-4 centrifuges; IAEA 19 April confirmed parallel talks with Iran on clarifying safeguards concerns. Regional tensions continued with U.S. and Israel. Foreign ministry 7 April acknowledged reports that Iranian ship Saviz had been hit by explosion in Red Sea; U.S. official, according to New York Times, confirmed Israel carried out operation. Israeli-owned vessel 13 April reportedly struck by missile in Gulf of Oman. U.S. navy reported 2 and 26 April Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy’s “unsafe and unprofessional” manoeuvres near U.S. vessels, raising “risk of miscalculation and/or collision”; incidents are first reported cases of U.S.-Iran naval tension since April 2020. EU 12 April sanctioned eight individuals and three entities for “violent response” to Nov 2019 demonstrations. Iranian and Saudi officials 9 April commenced talks in Iraqi capital Baghdad (see Saudi Arabia). 

Tehran continued to ramp up its nuclear activity and regional tensions stayed high as U.S. and Iran remained at odds over how to return to mutual compliance with 2015 nuclear deal. Efforts to jumpstart nuclear negotiations with U.S. fell flat as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei 21 March reaffirmed that Iran would return to its nuclear commitments only after effective lifting of sanctions. Iran continued to expand nuclear activity. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)Director General Rafael Grossi 1 March said Tehran was still not satisfactorily answering questions on safeguards concerns at four separate undeclared sites, visits to three of which had revealed man-made uranium particles. IAEA’s quarterly report 4 March revealed Tehran’s stockpile of enriched uranium stands at 14 times nuclear deal limit. IAEA 8 March confirmed operationalisation of new IR-2 centrifuge cascade at Natanz site – third such cascade, with another three in works – and cascade of IR-4s. Iran’s atomic energy organisation 19 March announced plan to “cold test” Arak nuclear reactor. Meanwhile, U.S. Biden administration 9 March unveiled first Iran-specific sanctions, designating two individuals identified as Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps interrogators for human rights abuses during 2019-2020 protests. U.S. National Intelligence Council 15 March issued report asserting that Iran conducted “multi-pronged covert influence campaign intended to undercut former President Trump’s re-election prospects” during 2020 elections. Regional tensions remained fraught. Iran’s UN envoy 14 March condemned U.S. 25 Feb strikes in Syria on sites U.S. said linked to “Iranian-backed militant groups”, denied Iranian involvement in attacks on U.S. interests in Iraq. U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley 17 March observed: “It’s not really helping the climate in the U.S. to have Iranian allies take shots at Americans in Iraq or elsewhere”. Following late Feb explosion on Israeli-owned ship in Gulf of Oman, for which Israel blamed Tehran, Israeli PM Netanyahu 1 March said: “We are striking at [Iran] all over the region”. Iranian cargo ship in Mediterranean Sea 10 March reportedly suffered explosion that Iranian shipping official 12 March called “terrorist attack”; incidents could signal maritime domain becoming new front where Israel and Iran engage in tit-for-tat attacks.

Tehran expanded nuclear activity and edged closer to reducing international monitoring of nuclear sites despite diplomatic efforts to resurrect nuclear deal. Authorities continued to expand nuclear activity in violation of 2015 deal: Iran’s envoy to International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) 2 Feb announced operationalisation of two centrifuge cascades, or sets of centrifuges, at Natanz facility, with work under way on centrifuge cascades at Fordow facility; IAEA 8 Feb reported production of 3.6g of uranium metal, banned for 15 years under 2015 deal, at Isfahan site; IAEA 17 Feb said Iran informed it of intention to set up two centrifuge cascades at Natanz site; E3 (UK, France and Germany) 12 Feb expressed “grave concern”. In indication of Tehran’s willingness to move beyond restrictions solely aimed at nuclear capabilities, IAEA 15 Feb announced Iran will limit agency inspection access to nuclear sites from 23 Feb; IAEA chief Rafael Grossi 20 Feb visited capital Tehran and next day reached temporary measures to ensure “necessary degree of monitoring and verification”. On diplomatic front, U.S. and Iran expressed support for resurrecting 2015 nuclear deal but both called on other to move first: U.S. Sec of State Antony Blinken 16 Feb said “first step would be Iran returning to compliance” and then “we would do the same” while Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei next day said “if we see action on the part of the other side, we will take action, too”. Incoming U.S. ambassador to UN 18 Feb informed presidency of Security Council that U.S. was rescinding Trump administration’s contention of having snapped back all pre-nuclear deal UN sanctions on Iran; Biden administration also relaxed Trump-era restrictions on Iranian diplomats in New York. FM Javad Zarif next day reaffirmed U.S. must first “unconditionally and effectively lift all sanctions”. Iran and U.S. expressed support for EU diplomatic role: Zarif 14 Feb said EU could “choreograph” next steps while U.S. 18 Feb indicated it would attend EU-proposed meeting of nuclear deal parties; Iranian Foreign Ministry 28 Feb said “time isn’t ripe” for informal meeting. U.S. 25 Feb launched airstrikes in Syria on Iran-linked targets (see Syria).

Tehran continued to violate 2015 nuclear deal and tensions with outgoing Trump administration ran high; new U.S. administration could take steps to re-enter nuclear deal in Feb. Iran 4 Jan began enriching uranium at 20 per cent – major increase from current 4.5 per cent cap and on par with pre-nuclear deal levels; FM Javad Zarif same day underscored that move and Iran’s other violations “are fully reversible upon full compliance by all”. U.S. 4 Jan called move “nuclear extortion” while UK, France and Germany (E3) 6 Jan said it “carries very significant proliferation-related risks”. International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi 11 Jan underscored that “we have weeks” to salvage nuclear deal. IAEA 13 Jan reported Iran was working on components for production of uranium metal at Isfahan plant, banned by nuclear deal until 2031; E3 16 Jan said move “has potentially grave military implications”. Meanwhile, outgoing Trump administration continued to impose unilateral sanctions, including 13 Jan on two Iranian foundations, and 15 Jan on Iranian shipping and metals with potential military application, as well as on three Iranian organisations. Regional tensions persisted: FM Zarif 2 Jan claimed that “Israeli agent provocateurs are plotting attacks against Americans” in Iraq; Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) same day described Lebanon as “front line of confrontation” (see Lebanon) and 4 Jan detained South Korean-flagged tanker along with its crew. U.S. 8, 17 and 27 Jan dispatched B-52 bombers to region. U.S. Sec State Mike Pompeo 12 Jan alleged existence of “Iran-al-Qaeda Axis”; FM Zarif same day called accusation “warmongering lies”. Iran launched multiple military drills, including 15 Jan test firing ballistic missiles and drones. As U.S. President Biden’s new administration 20 Jan entered office, hopes rose of U.S. taking steps to re-enter nuclear deal in Feb in case of Iran’s full compliance, as Biden previously pledged; FM Zarif 22 Jan suggested that U.S. had to take initiative, while warning that window of opportunity “will not be open forever”; U.S. 29 Jan appointed Robert Malley, Obama-era official previously involved in negotiations on 2015 nuclear agreement, as special envoy for Iran.

Parliament passed law mandating further steps away from 2015 nuclear deal, while U.S. continued to roll out unilateral sanctions. In response to killing of senior Iranian nuclear scientist in Nov, parliament 2 Dec approved law described as “strategic action to lift sanctions” mandating govt to immediately expand uranium enrichment rates to 20 per cent – major increase from current 4.5 per cent and on par with pre-nuclear deal levels – and suspend enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access if sanctions relief fails to materialise by Feb 2021; President Rouhani same day said legislation is “detrimental to the process of diplomatic activities”. UK, France and Germany 7 Dec expressed “great concern” over envisioned steps and denounced Iranian moves to deploy advanced centrifuges at Natanz facility in violation of nuclear deal. After U.S. President-elect Biden 1 Dec expressed willingness to rapidly re-enter nuclear deal once in office, Rouhani 14 Dec remarked “if the P5+1 returns to all its commitments, we will immediately return to all our commitments”. Joint Commission of nuclear deal 16 Dec met at political director level and 21 Dec at ministerial level; joint statement underscored “commitment to preserve the agreement” and noted “prospect of a return of the U.S.” to deal. Iran 31 Dec informed IAEA of intent to enrich at 20 per cent at Fordow facility. Meanwhile, U.S. administration throughout month continued to expand unilateral sanctions designations, including: 8 Dec sanctioning Tehran’s envoy to Huthis in Yemen; 14 Dec designating two Iranian intelligence officials implicated in 2007 disappearance of U.S. citizen; and 16 Dec sanctioning five companies and one individual for involvement in Iranian energy exports. Following 20 Dec rocket attack against embassy in Iraq’s capital Baghdad blamed on “Iranian-backed rogue militia group”, U.S. President Trump 23 Dec warned U.S. would “hold Iran responsible” if U.S. citizen killed; U.S. dispatched B-52 bombers to Persian Gulf and submarine to Middle-East region ahead of first anniversary on 3 Jan of U.S. killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani. Govt 12 Dec executed Ruhollah Zam, manager of popular social media platform critical of govt during 2017 protests, prompting international condemnation.

Iran remained in breach of 2015 nuclear deal, while U.S. administration maintained maximum pressure policy on Tehran. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director general 18 Nov informed agency’s Board of Governors that traces of uranium “at a location in Iran not declared to the Agency still needs to be fully and promptly explained by Iran”. IAEA next day derestricted latest report on Iranian compliance with Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); report concluded that Iran continued to exceed limitations on uranium stockpile, which as of 2 Nov stood at 12 times JCPOA’s cap. Tensions with U.S. continued. The New York Times 16 Nov reported President Trump 12 Nov had considered military action against Iran’s main nuclear site; reporting underscored risk of growing friction between Iran and U.S./U.S. allies during Trump’s final months in office. Iran 27 Nov confirmed death of senior nuclear scientist in ambush east of capital Tehran; FM Zarif claimed “serious indications of Israeli role”. Meanwhile, U.S. continued to roll out unilateral sanctions designations: Treasury 10 Nov sanctioned “a network of six companies and four individuals that facilitated the procurement of sensitive goods” for Iranian military company as well as intelligence minister; Treasury 18 Nov targeted Islamic Revolution Mostazafan Foundation, describing it as “a key patronage network for the Supreme Leader”; State Dept same day blacklisted two Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps officials for role in suppressing Nov 2019 protests; U.S. 25 Nov sanctioned four China and Russia-based companies “for supporting Iran’s missile program”. Following U.S. election victory of Democratic candidate Joe Biden, FM Zarif 17 Nov reiterated Iran “will resume honouring its commitments under the JCPOA” if new U.S. administration lifts sanctions in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Meanwhile, third wave of COVID-19 prompted authorities 21 Nov to implement lockdown in Tehran and 150 other cities for initial two-week period; cases and fatalities continued to reach record levels throughout month, with 948,700 cases and 47,875 fatalities reported as of 29 Nov. 

As country faced worsening economic crisis and enduring COVID-19 effects, Tehran hailed technical expiration of UN arms restrictions while U.S. continued to roll out unilateral sanctions. Following U.S. efforts in Aug-Sept to “snap back” pre-nuclear deal sanctions on Iran and thereby extend UN arms embargo, UN arms restrictions on Tehran technically expired 18 Oct; Iran’s MFA same day hailed expiration as “a momentous day” and assuaged fears of major weapons procurement by stating “a buying spree of conventional arms ha[s] no place in Iran’s defence doctrine”; Iranian defence officials predicted sales would outpace purchases. Meanwhile, U.S. rejected expiration of embargo; Sec State Pompeo 17 Oct said “virtually all U.N. sanctions on Iran returned” when Washington unilaterally triggered “snapback” on 19 Sept; Pompeo next day warned, “We are prepared to use domestic authorities to sanction individuals or entities contributing to these arms sales.” U.S. also continued to expand its sanctions designations against Iran and Iran-linked targets. U.S. Treasury 8 Oct blacklisted 18 Iranian banks; Iranian FM Javad Zarif same day accused Washington of wanting “to blow up our remaining channels to pay for food and medicine”. U.S. 19 Oct blacklisted eight additional companies and persons linked to Iran’s Shipping Lines company; 22 Oct sanctioned “five Iranian entities for attempting to influence U.S. elections” and Iranian ambassador in Iraq; 26 Oct blacklisted energy targets on counter-terrorism authorities; and 29 Oct sanctioned eight entities for “their involvement in the sale and purchase of Iranian petrochemical products”.  Iran continued to face worsening economic hardship and rampant third wave of COVID-19 cases: national currency mid-Oct hit new historic low of 322,000 rial to U.S. dollar before regaining some ground; authorities 27 Oct announced highest single-day death toll from COVID-19 with 346 confirmed dead. Central bank governor 12 Oct announced agreement with Baghdad on release of estimated $5bn in Iranian assets held in Iraq, part of tens of billions in funds govt says are blocked worldwide. MFA 7 Oct announced it had issued letters of protest to Armenia and Azerbaijan after stray mortars and rockets fell within Iranian territory amid hostilities between two countries (see Nagorno-Karabakh).

U.S. ratcheted up pressure on Iran by unilaterally declaring restoration of all pre-nuclear deal UN sanctions on Iran, despite widespread international opposition to move. After triggering “snapback” mechanism of Resolution 2231 in Aug, U.S. 19 Sept declared “the return of virtually all previously terminated UN sanctions” on Iran that were lifted following Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), warning that it will use its “domestic authorities” if UN member states fail to implement sanctions. However, UK, German and French (E3) UN envoys 20 Sept reiterated their view that U.S. snapback notification “is incapable of having legal effect” and restoration of pre-2231 sanctions “would also be incapable of having any legal effect”. Given wide divergence between U.S. on one side and UN Security Council members and JCPOA signatories on other, President Rouhani 16 Sept said U.S. “was left alone” at UN, and hailed its failure as “great and historic victory”. U.S. rolled out sanctions throughout month: Treasury 3 Sept blacklisted six entities linked to already-sanctioned petrochemical company; Treasury 17 Sept unveiled sanctions against “Iranian cyber threat group Advanced Persistent Threat 39 (APT39)”; executive order 21 Sept accompanied by “sweeping” nuclear, missile and conventional arms designations; State Dept 24 Sept blacklisted Iranian judicial officials and entities for human rights violations. Meanwhile, Joint Commission of JCPOA 1 Sept convened with all sides underscoring continued commitment to salvaging nuclear deal; in positive sign, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General 14 Sept confirmed that agency had already visited one of two sites previously in dispute with Iran and expected to inspect second site soon. Non-nuclear tensions persisted with U.S.; President Trump 14 Sept echoed media report that Iran may be planning attack against U.S. in retaliation for killing of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander Qassem Soleimani in Jan and vowed retaliation “1,000 times greater in magnitude!”; IRGC head 19 Sept remarked “we will target those who had an either direct or indirect role” in attack. Amid concern of third wave of COVID-19 infections, national currency 20 Sept hit a historic low of 273,000 rial to dollar.

U.S. triggered mechanism under UN Security Council Resolution 2231 endorsing 2015 nuclear deal to reimpose all pre-agreement UN sanctions on Iran, raising prospect that tensions could escalate in Sept. UN Security Council 14 Aug resoundingly rejected U.S. resolution aimed at indefinitely extending UN arms embargo on Iran set to expire in Oct; U.S. 20 Aug triggered “snapback” mechanism of Resolution 2231 to reinstate within 30 days all UN sanctions in place prior to Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at midnight GMT 20 September; all remaining JCPOA parties and majority of Security Council members disputed U.S.’s legal standing to invoke “snapback”, citing U.S. withdrawal from deal in 2018. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran 26 Aug announced “agreement on the resolution of the safeguards implementation issues specified by the IAEA”; deal facilitates IAEA access to two sites following months-long standoff. U.S. 14 Aug announced that it had seized Iranian petroleum of four tankers bound for Venezuela; in apparent attempt to retrieve seized fuel, Iranian security forces two days earlier had briefly boarded Liberian-flagged tanker near Strait of Hormuz. U.S. 19 Aug sanctioned two United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based companies and one UAE-based Iranian national for links to U.S. blacklisted Iranian airliner. Regional tensions with both U.S. and its allies remained high: Iran 7 Aug called on UN to hold U.S. accountable for intercepting Iranian airliner in Syrian airspace in July; Israel’s army chief of staff 7 Aug said Israel had “thwarted a squad sent by Iran” during 2 Aug incident at Israel-Syria border that prompted retaliatory airstrikes. President Rouhani 15 Aug described normalisation of Israel-UAE relations as “a big mistake”; in response to Rouhani’s “inflammatory” remarks, UAE next day summoned Iranian envoy to Abu Dhabi; Emirati coast guard 17 Aug opened fire on Iranian fishermen, killing two; Iran same day seized Emirati vessel for “illegally entering Iranian waters” and 18 Aug summoned UAE’s envoy to Tehran over fishermen’s killing. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran 23 Aug said July explosion at Natanz nuclear facility was result of “sabotage”. Guardian Council 24 Aug scheduled presidential elections for June 2021.

Amid ongoing U.S. “maximum pressure” campaign on Tehran, tensions over implementation of 2015 nuclear deal continued while sensitive Iranian facilities suffered spate of incidents. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell 3 July announced receipt of Iranian letter triggering Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) Dispute Resolution Mechanism; Iran foreign ministry same day said move was motivated by last month’s resolution from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submitted by France, Germany and UK (E3) urging Iranian cooperation on agency access requests and E3’s “continued non-abidance” with their JCPOA commitments; Borrell 17 July announced extension of resolution mechanism timeline. Meanwhile, IAEA director general 15 July underscored “absolute necessity” for Iran to cooperate on agency access to two sites of concern; discussions with Tehran ongoing. Washington continued diplomatic efforts to garner support for Security Council resolution extending UN arms embargo on Iran due to expire in Oct 2020. Following late June explosions in “public area” of Parchin and at medical centre in Tehran that killed 19, Iran suffered spate of further incidents, including 2 July blast at Natanz nuclear facility, 15 July combustion of more than six ships at Bushehr shipyard and 19 July explosion at Isfahan power plant. Iranian officials confirmed Natanz incident caused “significant damage” and warned of response if foreign govt responsible, while Israel’s defence minister Benny Gantz 5 July said Israel was not “necessarily” behind every incident in Iran; while unconfirmed, incidents at sensitive sites hint at possibility of new, covert phase of “maximum pressure” campaign by U.S. and/or its regional allies. U.S. military 23 July reported “visual inspection” of Iranian airliner over Syria; Iranian officials described incident as “illegal and dangerous”. Iran continued to struggle with COVID-19 pandemic: authorities 28 July reported deadliest day to date with 235 deaths; economically, rial currency continued to lose value through most of month.

Dispute continued between Iran and UN’s nuclear watchdog and European signatories of 2015 nuclear deal over Iran’s past and present nuclear activities, while Iran and U.S. made rare diplomatic breakthrough on prisoner exchange. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 5 June issued quarterly report on Iran’s compliance with 2015 nuclear deal, documenting Iran’s continued uranium enrichment and stockpiling beyond deal’s limits; second report same day noted “serious concern” over Iran’s lack of cooperation on access to two sites; Iran’s IAEA envoy 17 June said country had maintained “constructive engagement” with IAEA’s requests for access but cited concern about “endless process of verifying and cleaning-up of ever-continuing fabricated allegations.” IAEA Board of Governors 19 June passed resolution, submitted by France, Germany and UK (E3) and voted against by Russia and China, urging Tehran “to fully cooperate with [IAEA] and satisfy [IAEA’s] requests without further delay”; E3 foreign ministers same day issued joint statement calling for ministerial meeting with Iran. In rare instance of constructive diplomatic engagement, U.S. and Iran 4 June exchanged prisoners: Tehran released Michael White, U.S. citizen detained in 2018, while U.S. allowed Majid Taheri, Iranian-American dual national jailed for sanctions violations, to visit Iran; in purportedly unrelated act, U.S. 2 June released Iranian national Sirous Asghari detained in 2017. U.S. Sec State Pompeo 4 June said “while we are pleased that Iran was constructive in this matter, there is more work to do”; President Trump next day tweeted “Thank you to Iran, it shows a deal is possible!”. U.S. sanctions against shipping company Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and China-based E-Sail Shipping Company, announced in Dec 2019, came into effect 8 June. U.S. 24 June sanctioned captains of five Iranian vessels who delivered fuel to Venezuela and next day sanctioned nine companies linked to Iranian metal industry. In joint news conference 29 June, Saudi  FM and U.S. Iran envoy called for extension of UN arms embargo on Iran, due to expire in Oct. Israel PM Netanyahu 25 June said Israel “taking action without respite” against Iran and Iran-allied forces in Syria (see Syria).

U.S. continued to expand its sanctions designations against Iran and Iran-linked targets and warned of reimposing pre-nuclear deal sanctions, while regional tensions with both U.S. and Israel persisted. President Rouhani 6 May said govt “will give a crushing response if the arms embargo on Tehran is extended” beyond Oct expiry date. U.S. special representative for Iran 13 May confirmed plans to reinstate all pre-Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action sanctions if UN Security Council votes against upcoming U.S. resolution to extend arms embargo; Chinese and Russian UN missions next day separately voiced opposition to planned resolution. U.S. govt 27 May announced termination in 60 days of sanctions waivers for civil nuclear projects but extended waiver for Bushehr plant by 90 days; Iran next day said decision “will not in practice have any effect on Iran’s work” while UK, France and Germany 30 May said they “deeply regret the U.S. decision”. U.S. govt imposed series of sanctions, including: 19 May on Chinese company Shanghai Saint Logistics Limited for acting as general sales assistant for U.S. blacklisted airline Mahan Air; 20 May on Iranian Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli over alleged role in human rights abuses during Nov 2019 anti-govt protests; and 27 May on two Iranian nuclear officials. Israeli military 9 May reportedly launched cyberattack on Iran’s largest port facility at Bandar Abbas in retaliation to alleged 24-25 April cyberattack on Israeli water infrastructure. Supreme Leader Khamenei 17 May insisted that “Americans cannot stay for long in Iraq or Syria, and they will be expelled”; outgoing Israeli Defence Minister Naftali Bennett next day claimed Israeli airstrikes on Iranian-backed forces were forcing Iran to begin withdrawing from Syria (see also Israel and Syria). Tanker Fortune 25 May arrived in Venezuela; first of reported five tankers delivering gasoline from Iran. Authorities 16 May sentenced French-Iranian academic Fariba Adelkhah to six years imprisonment on national security charges; French govt same day condemned arrest as politically motivated and called for Adelkhah’s release. New parliament inaugurated 27 May; Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf next day elected to speakership.

Elevated tensions with the U.S. continued in Iraq and the Gulf, while govt remained in breach of 2015 nuclear deal although it did not intensify nuclear-related activities during month. President Trump 1 April tweeted that Iran and proxies plan to attack U.S troops or assets in Iraq, warning “Iran will pay a very heavy price”. Iranian naval forces 14 April boarded Hong Kong-flagged tanker in Sea of Oman and briefly detained vessel in Iranian waters. U.S. military next day said eleven Iranian ships “repeatedly conducted dangerous and harassing approaches” toward six U.S. vessels in international waters; Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) 19 April dismissed claims, accused U.S. forces of “illegal, unprofessional, dangerous and adventurist” manoeuvres. Trump 22 April tweeted that he has instructed U.S. navy to “destroy any and all Iranian gunboats that harass our ships”. IRGC 22 April launched military satellite Noor; U.S. 25 April urged extension of UN embargo and sanctions against missile program. U.S. 26 April extended by 30 days Iraq sanction waiver for Iranian electricity imports. Govt continued nuclear-related activities at same tempo as in March, and International Atomic Energy Agency continued inspections of nuclear facilities. Chief of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran 5 April announced intention to install new centrifuges at Natanz fuel enrichment plant. During 20 April meeting with Syrian President Assad in Damascus, FM Zarif criticised U.S. for maintaining sanctions on Iran and Syria throughout COVID-19 crisis. Govt continued to await official response from International Monetary Fund for March request for $5bn emergency loan to tackle COVID-19; U.S. Sec State Pompeo 14 April said Iran should not receive financial assistance “which will be used to fund its proxy wars”. President Rouhani 5 April announced gradual lifting of COVID-19 lockdown restrictions; 19 April extended furlough for prisoners temporarily released in March to 20 May.

New tensions between govt and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over possible undeclared nuclear sites fuelled U.S.-Iran antagonism, attacks escalated between Iran-backed militia and U.S. in Iraq, and COVID-19 spread rapidly with serious humanitarian and economic consequences. IAEA’s 3 March quarterly report on implementation of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action said Iran had trebled its stockpile of enriched uranium between Nov and Feb. IAEA Director General 3 March circulated separate report identifying three sites potentially used for undeclared nuclear-related activity and requesting access to two; govt denied requests and refused to clarify situation. U.S. 16 March imposed sanctions on five Iranian nuclear scientists due to “unacceptable nuclear escalations”; 18 March put sanctions on twelve entities and individuals involved in transporting Iranian petrochemicals; next day U.S. Treasury levied sanctions on five other companies. U.S. 26 March announced additional sanctions against twenty companies and individuals in Iran and Iraq. In Iraq, rocket attack on Taji military camp hosting anti-Islamic State (ISIS) coalition personnel 11 March killed two Americans and one British soldier; U.S. next day accused “Iranian-backed Shia militia groups”. U.S. 12 March launched retaliatory strikes targeting five weapons depots used by Iranian-backed militia Kataib Hizbollah. Second rocket attack on Taji camp 14 March wounded coalition and Iraqi soldiers. In 12 March letter to UN Sec-Gen, FM Zarif called for lifting of U.S. sanctions in light of COVID-19 outbreak; U.S. 26 March extended sanctions waiver for Iraqi imports of Iranian electricity, but did not lift sanctions. COVID-19 had killed over 2,900 by 31 March, university study concluded outbreak had not yet peaked, and health ministry said it urgently needed medical supplies and equipment. Media reported significant declines in domestic business including complete collapse in tourism and official reported 18% drop in trade. Govt 9 March released 70,000 prisoners to reduce COVID-19 spread in prisons; 17 March announced temporary release of further 85,000 detainees including political prisoners; 29 March furlough of 100,000 prisoners confirmed up to 19 April.

Govt slowed escalation on nuclear front after E3 (France, Germany and UK) triggered 2015 nuclear deal’s dispute resolution mechanism mid-Jan and conservative coalition won a majority in parliamentary elections. President Rouhani assured EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell, who visited Tehran 3-4 Feb, that Iran would continue to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring. IAEA 5 Feb assessed that Iran’s uranium production and enrichment was not at critical level. U.S. 9 Feb seized significant haul of weapons “of Iranian design and manufacture” in Arabian Sea. Following Iran’s failed satellite launch 9 Feb, U.S. Sec State Pompeo 11 Feb accused govt of using satellite launches to enhance ballistic missile technology; Iran next day rejected allegations. U.S. 13 Feb implemented 45-day sanctions waiver to allow Iraq to import gas from Iran; U.S. Senate same day passed war powers resolution aimed at preventing President Trump from engaging in military action against Iran without declaration of war or specific authorisation by Congress, Trump vowed to veto bill. Iran-Israel tensions persisted following reports by Syrian state media that missile attacks into Syria 6 and 13 Feb came from Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Israeli defence minister 8 Feb said U.S. and Israel had agreed they would counter Iran in Iraq and Syria respectively. Guardian Council 13 Feb published final list of 7,100 vetted candidates for 21 Feb parliamentary elections having disqualified over 8,000 including 75 sitting lawmakers. Rouhani 16 Feb said elections in 44 of 208 districts were not competitive and criticised mass disqualification of moderate candidates; U.S. 20 Feb sanctioned five Iranian officials for their roles in disqualifying candidates. Alliance of conservative candidates won most seats, enough to hold majority in 290-seat parliament. Turnout at 42.5% was lowest since 1979.

Iran-U.S. tensions soared early Jan as U.S.’s killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani provoked Iran to strike U.S. military installations in Iraq, and in response to Iran’s further breach of nuclear deal, three European states triggered dispute resolution mechanism, which could potentially lead to deal’s collapse. In Iraq, U.S. drone strike at Baghdad airport 3 Jan killed Major General Soleimani, leader of Iran’s Quds Force, expeditionary wing of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC); strike also killed Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, commander of Iran-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hizbollah. Iranian missile strikes 7 Jan hit U.S. bases at Ain al-Assad and Erbil in Iraq but killed no personnel; Pentagon said 64 U.S. soldiers injured. Iran 5 Jan for fifth time breached Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by announcing it would no longer observe deal’s limits on number of centrifuges Iran may operate. In response, UK, France and Germany 14 Jan activated deal’s dispute resolution mechanism, which could eventually result in restoration of pre-JCPOA EU and UN sanctions on Iran. U.S. 30 Jan extended by 60 days four waivers for Iran civil nuclear cooperation projects and sanctioned Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and its head. U.S. 10 Jan imposed further sanctions on Iran’s heavy industries and blacklisted over two dozen firms and ships linked to its metals trade; U.S. 17 Jan imposed sanctions against IRGC general for human rights violations during violent suppression of Nov 2019 protests. Hundreds of thousands joined Soleimani’s funeral procession in provincial capital Kerman 8 Jan, stampede left 56 dead. Anti-govt protests re-erupted nationwide when IRGC, after initial attempts to cover up its involvement, 11 Jan admitted that it had unintentionally shot down Ukrainian airliner near capital Tehran 8 Jan, killing all 176 civilian passengers. Authorities 12 Jan used live ammunition to disperse protesters in Tehran. Guardian Council 12 Jan published initial list of approved candidates for 21 Feb parliamentary elections; council approved 5,000 of 14,000 would-be candidates.

Iran-U.S. tensions rose as U.S. responded to series of attacks on U.S. assets in Iraq with strikes on Iran-backed militia there; tensions could spiral further in Jan, especially around Iran’s planned further violation of nuclear deal 6 Jan. In Iraq, attacks on U.S. assets intensified: unidentified assailants 3, 5, 9 and 11 Dec launched rockets at military bases housing U.S. troops; rocket attack on base outside Kirkuk 27 Dec killed U.S. contractor. U.S. Sec State Pompeo blamed “Iran’s proxies”. U.S. airstrikes 29 Dec hit bases in Iraq and Syria of Iran-backed Kataib Hizbollah militia, part of paramilitary Popular Mobilisation Units, killing at least 25 fighters. In response, supporters and members of Kataib Hizbollah protested outside U.S. embassy, 31 Dec broke into compound. Chair of joint commission of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during meeting in Austria 6 Dec noted “serious concern” in relation to Iran’s incremental violations of nuclear deal. Russia’s State Nuclear Energy Corporation Rosatom 5 Dec announced suspension of work ostensibly for technical reasons at Fordow nuclear facility, where in Nov Iran restarted uranium enrichment. U.S. 15 Dec withdrew sanctions waiver for international civil nuclear cooperation at Fordow. Iran and U.S. exchanged prisoners in Switzerland 7 Dec; Iran released Princeton University doctoral student Xiyue Wang in exchange for release of Iranian scientist Masoud Soleimani held since 2018 for sanctions violations. U.S. 11 Dec announced new sanctions against Iranian shipping and aviation industries. NGO Amnesty International 16 Dec reported that nationwide protests over fuel prices in Nov had led to violent clashes between protesters and security forces that left 304 demonstrators dead. Govt 11 Dec said it had foiled “state sponsored” cyberattack on national banking system; 15 Dec said it had foiled another cyberattack.

Violent crackdown on protests over rise in fuel prices led to deaths of over 100 demonstrators and govt further breached 2015 nuclear deal. Govt raised fuel prices 15 Nov sparking protests nationwide, which security forces sought to disperse forcibly; NGO Amnesty International 29 Nov reported deaths of at least 161 protesters. U.S. 22 Nov sanctioned Iran information minister following internet blackout during protests. President Rouhani 5 Nov announced Iran was going ahead with further violation of nuclear deal, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), by resuming uranium enrichment at Fordow nuclear facility. European parties to JCPOA (France, UK and Germany) and EU 11 Nov raised possibility of invoking agreement’s dispute resolution mechanism. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 7 Nov claimed Iran had temporarily prevented one of its inspectors from leaving country. IAEA 17 Nov affirmed Iran had accumulated more heavy water than JCPOA’s 130 tonne limit. U.S. Treasury Department 4 Nov imposed sanctions on Iranian armed forces general staff and nine individuals associated with Supreme Leader Khamenei including his son and Iran’s judiciary chief. Govt 8 Nov said it had intercepted drone in south west without commenting on its provenance.

Iran-U.S. tensions remained high, relations between Iran and United Arab Emirates (UAE) continued to ease and unclaimed explosions damaged Iranian tanker in Red Sea. President Rouhani 13 Oct repeated that opening of Iran-U.S. negotiations depended on U.S. first lifting its sanctions on Iran and returning to nuclear deal. Govt 16 Oct denied that U.S. carried out cyber-attack on Iran in Sept as reported by Reuters. UAE 20 Oct unfroze $700mn of Iranian funds. On request of U.S. President Trump, Pakistan PM Khan 13 Oct visited Iran and 15 Oct Saudi Arabia in bid to ease tensions between two states; visits yielded no breakthrough. Iranian official 31 Oct announced Saudi Arabia had released nineteen Iranian fishermen, eleven detained since Dec 2018, eight since Jan. Two explosions 11 Oct damaged Iranian tanker in Red Sea off Saudi coast; FM Zarif 15 Oct said “one or a number of governments’’ had attacked tanker. Australia 5 Oct said Iranian authorities had released two of its citizens arrested for allegedly photographing “military and banned zones” and same day freed Iranian whom U.S. was trying to extradite. France 16 Oct said Iran was detaining French scholar Roland Marchal and urged his release; Iran has been detaining another French scholar with dual Iranian nationality since June.

Alleged Iranian attack on Saudi oil facilities caused tensions to rise sharply between Iran on one side and Saudi Arabia and U.S. on other and significantly raised tensions in region. Iranian delegation met French officials in Paris 2-3 Sept to discuss France’s proposed deal, namely that Europe provides Iran $15bn credit line until end of 2019 enabled by U.S. sanctions waivers in return for Tehran returning to full compliance with nuclear deal and negotiating table to discuss broader agreement. U.S. 4 Sept ruled out sanctions waivers. Following 14 Sept missile and drone strikes on Saudi oil facilities, Yemen’s Huthis claimed they launched attacks but Saudi Arabia and U.S. held Iran responsible, Tehran denied. FM Zarif 19 Sept warned that any strike on Iran would trigger “all-out war”. U.S. 20 Sept said it would deploy military forces and equipment to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to deter Iran. E3 (France, Germany and UK) 23 Sept held Iran responsible for attacks. Despite efforts by French President Macron to facilitate face-to-face meeting, Presidents Rouhani and Trump declined to meet during UN General Assembly. Iran 7 and 16 Sept seized two ships in and near Strait of Hormuz which it accused of smuggling fuel. UK 10 Sept accused Iran of selling oil to Syria in breach of EU sanctions. Rouhani 22 Sept launched regional cooperation initiative to enhance Gulf maritime security. Govt made good on threat to further violate nuclear deal if by 6 Sept parties had not mitigated economic impact of U.S. sanctions; 7 Sept said it had started using more advanced centrifuges. Rouhani said Iran would further violate deal if parties did not provide economic relief by 5 Nov. U.S. continued to impose additional sanctions on Iran, including on its central bank. In north west near Iraqi border, clashes between border guards and unidentified gunmen in Marivan 6 Sept left at least two dead.

Iran-U.S. tensions remained high over maritime security and Iran’s continued threat to further breach in Sept 2015 nuclear accord if European parties do not mitigate economic impact of U.S. sanctions. Iran 4 Aug said it had detained Iraqi tanker in Persian Gulf 31 July, accusing it of smuggling fuel. UK, Bahrain and Aus-tralia joined U.S.-led maritime security initiative for Middle East; Israel 6 Aug re-portedly indicated it was supporting with intelligence. FM Zarif 12 Aug said naval build-up in Persian Gulf would increase “risk of combustion”. Gibraltar 15 Aug re-leased Iranian tanker it had detained since early July on suspicion of transporting oil to Syria; U.S. 16 Aug issued warrant for tanker’s seizure, which Gibraltar reject-ed 18 Aug. Iran 26 Aug said it had dispatched one destroyer and one aircraft carri-er to Gulf of Aden. Iran continued to threaten that it would further breach 2015 nuclear deal on 6 Sept if agreement’s European parties failed to mitigate econom-ic impact of U.S. sanctions. Former German ambassador to Iran who was due to head mechanism to facilitate trade with Iran bypassing U.S. sanctions (INSTEX) 8 Aug withdrew from post. After Iran breached deal’s cap on low enriched uranium stockpile in July, Iranian nuclear official 13 Aug said its stockpile was “growing rapidly”. Israeli media 5 Aug reported that Iran increased its financial assistance to Hamas to $30mn per month. Delegation of Yemen’s Huthi movement in Teh-ran 11-17 Aug met FM Zarif, Supreme Leader Khamenei and Western ambassa-dors. Huthis 17 Aug announced appointment of ambassador to Iran. FM Zarif held discussions with French officials in Paris 23 Aug and returned to France 25 Aug for further consultations with E3 (France, Germany and UK) on sidelines of G-7 summit in Biarritz, France. President Rouhani 27 Aug said U.S. should lift sanc-tions as condition for talks. Kurdish militants 27 Aug killed member of paramili-tary force in Piranshahr in north west; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) next day said it had killed two militants responsible. U.S. 28-30 Aug imposed several further sanctions on Iran, including on Iranian tanker released from Gi-braltar.

Relations between Iran and its allies on one side and U.S. and its allies on other remained tense as maritime confrontations intensified and Iran breached limits of 2015 nuclear deal, raising risk of military clash in Aug. British navy 4 July detained tanker off Gibraltar suspected of trying to smuggle Iranian oil to Syria. In Strait of Hormuz, Iranian boats 10 July allegedly tried to impede British tanker before British warship warned them off, Iran denied responsibility; U.S. President Trump 18 July said U.S. had downed Iranian drone, Iran denied; Iran 18 July claimed to have seized Panamanian tanker; Iranian security forces 19 July seized British-flagged tanker and temporarily detained another British-owned tanker. U.S. 19 July said it was developing multinational maritime security framework for Middle Eastern waterways. UK 23 July unveiled plan for separate European-led maritime security coalition to defend shipping in Middle East. Iran 24 July test-launched medium-range missile. United Arab Emirates officials attended 6th Iran-UAE meeting on maritime affairs in Tehran 30 July, first such meeting since 2013. Iran’s stockpile of low enriched uranium exceeded nuclear deal’s limit 1 July. Iran 7 July said it had raised uranium enrichment beyond limit and set 6 Sept as new deadline for deal’s parties to protect it from U.S. sanctions, threatening further violations. EU foreign policy chief Mogherini 15 July said infringements would not push P4+1 (UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) to activate dispute resolution mechanism for non-compliance, which could lead to re-imposition of sanctions. U.S. 18 July sanctioned individuals and firms it said were involved in acquiring materials for Iran’s nuclear program; 31 July sanctioned FM Zarif and announced extension of sanction waivers allowing countries to continue civil nuclear projects with Iran for 90 days. Suspected Kurdish militants 9 July killed three soldiers in Piranshahr in north west near Iraq. In south east near Pakistan border, clashes between Iranian border guards and unidentified gunmen 21 July left two guards dead.

Tensions between Iran and U.S. and its Gulf allies rose to alarming levels, raising risk of more intense political and military confrontation in July. Unidentified assailants 13 June caused explosions on two tankers (one Norwegian-owned, one Japanese-owned) in Gulf of Oman; U.S. blamed Iran, which denied responsibility. U.S. 14 June released video it said showed Iranian vessel removing unexploded ordinance from side of one of tankers after attack. U.S. 16 June said Iranian missile 13 June had tried but failed to hit U.S. drone surveying damaged tankers and that Iranian-backed Huthis in Yemen had downed U.S. drone there 6 June. U.S. 18 June said it would deploy 1,000 additional troops to Middle East. Iran 20 June downed U.S. drone off Iranian coast; Iran claimed drone was in Iranian airspace, U.S. said it was in international airspace. President Trump 20 June approved airstrikes in Iran; next day Trump said he had called off attack because it would have been disproportionate. Foreign leaders including German FM, Japanese FM and high level EU official visited Tehran to ease Iran-U.S. tensions and salvage 2015 nuclear deal. Mechanism created by E3 (France, Germany and UK) to facilitate trade with Iran 13 June held consultations in Tehran; same day E3 ambassadors to Iran said “both sides have agreed a roadmap to expedite progress”. FM Zarif 1 July said Iran’s stockpile of low enriched uranium had exceeded deal’s limit. E3 28 June said mechanism to facilitate trade with Iran avoiding U.S. sanctions, Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), was operational. U.S. issued more sanctions to squeeze Iran’s economy: 7 June on exporters of Iran’s petrochemicals; 11 June on companies facilitating Iranian oil exports to Syria; and 12 June on company alleged to have trafficked weapons to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. U.S. 15 June extended Iraq’s sanctions waiver, allowing it to continue importing Iranian energy for another 120 days. U.S. 24 June imposed sanctions on Supreme Leader Khamenei.

Tension between Iran and U.S. increased markedly. Citing “troubling and escalatory indications and warnings” from Iran, U.S. 5 and 10 May announced it would bolster military assets in Middle East, including naval and air forces and missile defence systems. U.S. 24 May announced additional deployment of 1,500 troops, a dozen fighter jets and drones to Middle East. U.S. Sec State Pompeo 7 May visited Iraq to meet senior officials, referring to indications of imminent attacks on U.S. assets. Tension rose further following unclaimed attacks on four oil tankers (two Saudi, one Emirati, one Norwegian) off United Arab Emirates coast 12 May and drone attacks on pipeline in Saudi Arabia 14 May claimed by Huthi forces in Yemen; Saudi officials accused Iran of guiding Huthis’ actions. U.S. 15 May ordered non-essential U.S. personnel to leave Iraq. In Iraq, rocket landed in Baghdad’s Green Zone about a mile from U.S. embassy 19 May causing no casualties. President Trump 19 May tweeted that “If Iran wants to fight, that will be the official end of Iran”. U.S. waivers allowing countries to import Iranian oil expired 2 May. U.S. revoked nuclear-related waivers 3 May, no longer permitting countries to purchase Iran’s surplus heavy water and low enriched uranium (LEU). Tehran 8 May responded by downgrading compliance with LEU and heavy water limits in Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and also threatened to step up uranium enrichment if P4+1 (UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) failed to protect Iran’s oil and banking sectors from sanctions within 60 days; U.S. same day announced restrictions on Iran’s metal industries. EU/E3 (France, Germany and UK) 9 May said they rejected any Iranian ultimatums but underscored their commitment to JCPOA.

Tehran maintained focus on strengthening regional ties particularly with Iraq as U.S. stepped up “maximum pressure” campaign toward Iran. International Atomic Energy Agency 5 April reiterated assessment that Iran was complying with terms of 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Nevertheless, U.S. designated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iranian security force primarily responsible for Iran’s regional policies, as Foreign Terrorist Organisation, effective 15 April; Iran promptly blacklisted U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S.’s military command covering Middle East and Central Asia, and President Rouhani 9 April approved for now mostly symbolic installation of more advanced IR-6 centrifuges in Natanz. U.S. Sec State Pompeo 22 April said U.S. would not grant any more sanctions waivers allowing countries to import Iranian oil; current waivers due to expire 2 May. Iraqi PM Mahdi in Tehran 6 April met Supreme Leader Khamenei and Rouhani. Iranian FM Zarif 16 April met Syrian President Assad in Damascus, and visited Ankara 17 April. While in New York 23-28 April Zarif proposed swap of Iranians jailed in U.S. for U.S. detainees in Iran. Iran, Russia and Turkey held new round of talks on Syria in Nursultan, renamed capital of Kazakhstan (formerly Astana) 25-26 April, no significant outcome. In response to flooding that reportedly caused 80 deaths, foreign aid included donations from Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates; Pompeo 2 April expressed condolences to victims while blaming Tehran for mismanagement in urban planning and emergency preparedness; govt blamed U.S. sanctions for impeding humanitarian relief.

International Atomic Energy Agency 6 March published quarterly report confirming Iran has continued to abide by terms of 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Special Trade and Finance Institute (STFI), Iranian sister organisation of Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), mechanism created by European JCPOA members in Jan to facilitate Iran’s purchases of humanitarian goods, formally registered in Iran 19 March. President Rouhani 11-13 March visited Iraq, first time as president, meeting senior Iraqi politicians, businessmen and religious leaders, including Grand Ayatollah Sistani. Iran and Iraq signed five memoranda of understanding to deepen economic and diplomatic ties. Iranian officials and counterparts from France, Germany, UK and Italy convened 18 March under Iran-E4 framework in Brussels to discuss regional issues, notably Yemen. Supreme Leader Khamenei 7 March appointed hardliner Ebrahim Raisi as new Chief Justice, to replace Sadeq Larijani, appointed as new chairman of Expediency Council – constitutional arbitrator between parliament and Guardian Council. U.S. 22 March issued sanctions designation against 31 individuals and entities linked to Iranian nuclear program; 26 March issued sanctions on additional companies and individuals in Iran, Turkey and United Arab Emirates for alleged sanctions evasion. Israel 27 March carried out airstrike near Aleppo in northern Syria reportedly targeting Iranian weapons depot and killing several Iraqi and Iranian fighters.

On 40th anniversary of 1979 revolution, govt insisted on right to develop “defensive power”, meanwhile rift between U.S. and Europe over Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) widened. Following 31 Jan launch by European JCPOA participants (Germany, France and UK) of Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), mechanism to facilitate trade with Iran avoiding unilateral U.S. sanctions, U.S. VP Pence at Munich Security Conference 16 Feb urged Europeans to “stop undermining U.S. sanctions” and to “withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal”. U.S. and Poland chaired ministerial meeting in Polish capital Warsaw 13-14 Feb titled Ministerial to Promote a Future of Peace and Security in the Middle East, which focused on countering Iran’s regional policies; meeting failed to deliver diplomatic breakthroughs, but Israeli PM Netanyahu attended alongside Arab leaders. Iran 11 Feb commemorated 40th anniversary of 1979 revolution; President Rouhani said “we have not – and will not – ask for permission from anybody for improving our defensive power” and Supreme Leader Khamenei 13 Feb counselled against trusting European govts and negotiating with U.S.. FM Zarif resigned 25 Feb without giving reasons; Rouhani 27 Feb rejected resignation and Zarif continued duties. Satellite launch failed 5 Feb. Suicide attack claimed by Sunni militant group Jaish al-Adl against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps vehicle 13 Feb killed 27 in south east, govt accused Pakistan of sheltering group and accused Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) of involvement.

As implementation of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) entered fourth year 16 Jan, deal’s future became increasingly uncertain. U.S. sanctions on Iran have significantly reduced its crude oil exports and dissuaded international companies from doing business there. Remaining JCPOA participants continued efforts to ease trade with Iran: European participants 31 Jan launched Special Purpose Vehicle to support trade with Iran, originally expected late 2018. Govt’s purported hand in series of assassinations and attempted attacks against Iranian political dissidents in several European countries further strained EU-Iran relations, leading EU 8 Jan to impose sanctions on unit of intelligence ministry and two Iranian individuals. U.S.-Iran tensions continued: U.S. Sec State Pompeo 10 Jan pledged to pursue American campaign “to stop Iran’s malevolent influence and actions” and 15 Jan protested Iranian launch of satellite, accusing govt of using it as cover for developing ballistic missile capabilities. Israel carried out airstrikes in southern Syria against installations it claimed Iran and pro-Iranian militias were using south of Damascus 25 Dec and 11, 20 and 21 Jan; latter strike targeted Al-Quds Force and Syrian air defences, twelve reported dead. Expediency Council – constitutional arbitrator between parliament and Guardian Council – 5 Jan approved second of four bills aimed at shoring up measures against money laundering and terrorism financing.

UN Sec-Gen Guterres 6 Dec issued sixth report on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 that endorsed 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), noting Iran continued to adhere to deal’s commitments in “face of considerable challenges”. Guterres also applauded efforts to protect economic freedoms for “legitimate business” (likely referring to EU’s unrealised Special Purpose Vehicle) but report highlighted possible Iranian weapons transfers to proxies and seven Iranian ballistic missile tests in 2018. U.S.-Iran tensions continued: U.S. Sec State Pompeo 1 Dec reported and condemned Iran’s test same day of medium range ballistic missile and 12 Dec pledged to continue “building coalition of responsible nations” confronting Iranian “ballistic missile activity”; Iran responded that U.S. had breached UNSCR 2231, Iran was not responsible for arms transfers and missile tests did not break resolution. Israeli PM Netanyahu 16 Dec hinted Israeli intelligence operations inside Iran were continuing. Insecurity in Iran’s border areas persisted as Baluchi jihadist group Ansar al-Furqan killed two and injured more than two dozen in suicide attack in city of Chabahar in south near Pakistan border 6 Dec; FM Zarif claimed perpetrators were “foreign-backed”. Govt and Pakistan 13 Dec signed MoU to enhance border security. Iranian official visiting Afghan capital Kabul 26 Dec said Iran had been holding talks with Taliban on security issues in Afghanistan; govt 31 Dec said it had held talks with Taliban representatives in Tehran previous day.

U.S. reimposed on Iran remainder of sanctions it had lifted in 2016 under 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and imposed new ones. International Atomic Energy Agency 12 Nov confirmed Iran’s continued full compliance with JCPOA. U.S. 5 Nov unveiled new or re-imposed previous sanctions against over 700 individuals and entities in Iran’s energy, banking and maritime sectors. Iran and U.S. faced off over effect of sanctions on supply of food and medicine; FM Zarif 10 Nov accused U.S. Sec State Pompeo of “threatening to starve Iranians” while U.S. officials maintained that humanitarian goods are exempt. U.S. 5 Nov gave eight countries (China, India, South Korea, Japan, Italy, Greece, Taiwan and Turkey) temporary waivers to continue importing Iranian oil, and gave Iraq 45-day exemption to continue importing Iranian electricity and gas. Three Iranian nuclear sites and port of Chabahar also spared from sanctions. Sanctions expected to have significant economic impact; International Monetary Fund 6 Nov predicted Iranian GDP will contract by 3.6% in 2019 and inflation will reach 34%, up from under 10% in 2017. Creation of EU’s Special Purpose Vehicle – announced in Sept to support trade with Iran – stalled as no EU member state stepped forward to host it; senior Iranian official 26 Nov warned of “ominous” situation if Iran loses JCPOA’s economic dividends. Govt 14 Nov executed two gold traders accused of corruption as part of anti-corruption drive that has reportedly led to some 170 arrests for economic crimes in past three months. Army 15 Nov said Sunni militant group Jaish al-Adl had freed five of fourteen Iranian border guards it kidnapped in Oct; fate of remaining hostages unknown. Senior army official 4 Nov suggested Saudi Arabian involvement in kidnapping.

Govt scored legal win against U.S. but latter imposed new sanctions. Govt 3 Oct won case in International Court of Justice (ICJ) against U.S. over humanitarian sanctions; President Rouhani described ruling as “great victory” while U.S. same day accused Iran of abusing ICJ for “political and propaganda purposes” and withdrew from 1955 bilateral treaty upon which Iran built legal case. U.S. 16 Oct announced new sanctions on banking, industrial and other entities reportedly linked to Iranian Basij paramilitary force. Re-imposition of U.S. energy-related sanctions in early Nov could heighten Iran-U.S. tensions. EU late Sept announced that it was setting up Special Purpose Vehicle to support trade with Iran, providing economic benefits for continued Iranian compliance with 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Following militant attack on military parade in Ahvaz late Sept, army 1 Oct carried out ballistic missile and drone strikes against reported Islamic State (ISIS) targets near al-Bukamal in east Syria and, separately, 16 Oct claimed to have killed alleged mastermind of attack in Iraq. Sunni militant group Jaish al-Adl 16 Oct kidnapped fourteen Iranian border guards close to Pakistani border and reportedly took them across border; govt 20 Oct called on Pakistan to help rescue abductees. Financial Action Task Force 19 Oct gave Iran until Feb 2019 to carry out outstanding elements of action plan to counter money laundering and terrorism financing; parliament 7 Oct approved Iran’s accession to UN terrorism financing agreement. Denmark 30 Oct accused Iran of plotting assassination attempt of exiled leader of Iranian separatist group Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz (ASMLA) in Copenhagen in Sept, recalling ambassador from Tehran and calling for EU sanctions.

Militants launched deadly attack on military parade in Ahvaz in south west as govt continued to negotiate future of nuclear deal in light of U.S. withdrawal. International Atomic Energy Agency 30 Aug confirmed Iran’s full compliance with 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Govt discussed regional issues with EU/E4 (UK, Germany, France and Italy) in meeting in Brussels 12 Sept. U.S. 14 Sept placed sanctions on Thai aviation company linked to Iran’s Mahan Air. Govt 29 Sept said it expected EU to establish legal framework to bypass U.S. sanctions by 4 Nov when U.S. oil-related sanctions to be re-introduced. Militants opened fire on army parade in Ahvaz in south west 22 Sept, killing 25 people, twelve Revolutionary Guards and thirteen civilians; both anti-govt Arab group Ahvaz National Resistance and Islamic State (ISIS) claimed attack. President Rouhani 23 Sept said U.S. and “puppet” Gulf allies enabled attack, which U.S. denied. Iraqi protesters allegedly angry at Iran’s role in Iraqi politics 7 Sept burnt down Iran’s consulate in Basra. Militants fired mortars at U.S. embassy in Iraqi capital Baghdad 6 Sept and U.S. consulate in Basra, southern Iraq 8 Sept; U.S. 11 Sept blamed Iran-backed militias. Army 8 Sept launched seven missiles against headquarters of Kurdish militants Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) in Iraqi Kurdistan, killing twelve; in response, protesters demonstrated at Iranian embassies in Helsinki, Paris and Athens. Israel 4 Sept said it had carried out over 200 airstrikes against alleged Iran-related targets in Syria since early 2017. After Facebook, Twitter and YouTube suspended hundreds of Iranian accounts allegedly used in disinformation operations in Aug, FM Zarif 16 Sept claimed companies closed real accounts but allowed “regime change propaganda” bots to continue.

U.S. 7 Aug reinstated on Iran unilateral sanctions lifted by 2015 nuclear deal, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); U.S. to re-impose sanctions on Iran’s oil exports in Nov. Supreme Leader Khamenei 13 Aug declared “there will be no war, nor will we negotiate with the U.S.”. German, French and UK FMs and EU foreign policy chief Mogherini 6 Aug issued joint statement regretting re-imposition of sanctions and updating Blocking Statute to shield European firms from U.S. penalties; next day, Mogherini encouraged European companies to increase business with Iran. U.S. 16 Aug announced creation of Iran Action Group within State Department and appointed Brian Hook as Special Representative on Iran. Iranian navy held major training exercise in Persian Gulf and army tested Fateh-110 ballistic missile early Aug. Economic situation deteriorated with value of rial falling to 100,000 to the dollar mid-Aug. Parliament 28 Aug questioned President Rouhani on his govt’s handling of economic crisis and removed labour minister 8 Aug and finance minister 26 Aug in no-confidence votes. Insecurity continued in north west near borders with Iraq and Turkey; following clashes near Oshnavieh 11 Aug Kurdish militants Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) claimed to have killed twelve Revolutionary Guards, while govt claimed to have killed eleven militants. Kurdish militants 16 Aug claimed to have killed four Iranian border guards in ambush on border post near city of Baneh. Heads of all five states on Caspian Sea – Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan – met 12 Aug in Kazakh city, Aktau and signed convention on Caspian’s legal status with implications for each country’s rights to extract resources from it; contents of convention not disclosed (see Kazakhstan).

UK, France, Russia, China and Germany (P4+1) reiterated commitment to Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at ministerial-level JCPOA Joint Commission meeting in Vienna 6 July. U.S. 2 July said it had issued sanctions against 53 Iranian and Iran-related persons and entities since May; U.S. 9 July imposed sanctions on Malaysian sales agent for Iran’s Mahan Air, and 10 July designated al-Ashtar Brigades, Shiite militant group in Bahrain, which U.S. characterised as Iranian proxy, as terrorist organisation. Iran 16 July lodged complaint against U.S. sanctions with International Court of Justice. President Rouhani and Revolutionary Guards 5 July threatened to close Strait of Hormuz if Iran was prevented from exporting oil. Insecurity in border areas continued. Iran 18 July said it had finished building factory for production of centrifuge rotors. Rhetoric escalated between Iran and U.S. when Rouhani’s 22 July warning to President Trump that “war with Iran is the mother of all wars” prompted Trump to tweet that if Iran threatened U.S. again it could “suffer consequences the likes of which few throughout history have ever suffered before”. Trump 30 July said he was willing to meet Rouhani; Iranian govt 31 July rejected offer seeing “no value” in it. In north west on border with Iraq, Revolutionary Guards 14 July claimed to have killed three unidentified militants; Kurdish militants 21 July killed ten Revolutionary Guards in attack on border post in Marivan area, several militants also killed. In south east near Pakistani border, security forces clashed with Pakistan-based Iranian Sunni extremist group Jaish al-Adl in Lar 19 July, Iranian border guard killed. Belgian authorities 2 July said they had detained Iranian diplomat and couple with Iranian heritage for involvement in terrorist plot against 30 June Iranian opposition rally in Paris; govt said incident was ploy by opposition to damage Iran’s reputation.

Repercussions from U.S. President Trump’s decision to withdraw from Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) continued. Iran 5 June said it was taking preparatory steps so that it can increase uranium enrichment capacity if deal collapses, and 27 June restarted production facility in Isfahan. European officials 4 June affirmed to U.S. their commitment to deal and said they expected effect of additional U.S. sanctions “will not be enforced on EU entities and individuals”. European Commission 6 June said it was updating its Blocking Statute to shield European firms from U.S. penalties and agreed to allow European Investment Bank (EIB) to do business in Iran; but EIB same day said it could not ignore U.S. sanctions. Experts from P4+1 (UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) 7 June held technical meeting in Tehran. Inter-governmental body Financial Action Task Force 29 June gave Iran four months to complete its action plan to bring it into line with global norms. Security forces 9 June claimed to have killed nine militants in north west on border with Iraq; Iran 12 June protested to Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq that militants had entered Iran across shared border. Govt 11 June claimed to have arrested 27 members of alleged terrorist cell suspected of planning attacks on Tehran and Qom, 125km south west of Tehran. Israel continued to confront Iran militarily in Syria: Israel reportedly bombed area near al-Bukamal in eastern Syrian near Iraq border 17 June, killing or injuring dozens of Syrian and Iraqi forces aligned with Iran.

U.S. President Trump withdrew from Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 8 May, increasing risk of confrontation between U.S. and Iran and their respective allies in coming weeks. In days preceding 8 May, leaders of E3 (France, Germany and UK) visited Washington to try to persuade Trump to remain in deal. Withdrawal started countdown to reimposition of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran waived under deal, with wind-down periods of 90 or 180 days. U.S. Treasury 15 May announced new sanctions against Iranian individuals, notably Central Bank governor. U.S. Sec State Pompeo 21 May outlined plan to implement “strongest sanctions in history”. Deal’s remaining signatories began efforts to convince Iran to remain committed to it. E3 issued joint statement 8 May regretting Trump’s decision and reiterating support for JCPOA. Iranian FM Zarif met E3 counterparts and EU foreign policy chief Mogherini in Brussels 15 May. EU 18 May announced steps to preserve European business in Iran, including European Investment Bank funding for Iran-related financing and oil payments. Zarif described preliminary discussions in Beijing, Moscow and Brussels as “positive start”. Israeli govt claimed to have hit all Iranian infrastructure in Syria in airstrikes 10 May, reportedly killing 23; Israel said attacks were response to Iran firing rockets at Israeli forces in Golan Heights between Syria and Israel (see Syria). Protests in Kazeroon, west of Shiraz, over plans to divide city in two, left one dead 17 May. Morocco cut ties with Iran 1 May, accusing govt and Lebanese Shiite movement Hizbollah of training and providing weaponry to Western Sahara independence movement Polisario Front.

U.S. and E3 (France, Germany and UK) 11 April held fourth round of talks to find way to assuage U.S. concerns over Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); despite reported progress, it remained uncertain whether they could find solution to satisfy White House without violating deal before President Trump’s 12 May deadline when he has threatened to withdraw from deal. President Rouhani 24 April warned there would be “severe consequences” if U.S. leaves deal. European Council 12 April did not adopt E3-led proposals for new Iran sanctions but extended for one year sanctions first imposed in 2011 responding to serious human rights violations. French President Macron during White House visit 24 April proposed talks with Trump on a new deal that would expand JCPOA, potentially curbing Iran’s ballistic missiles and regional activities. German Chancellor Merkel also tried during her 27 April visit to Washington to persuade Trump to stay in deal. President Rouhani 25 April questioned right of U.S. and allies to renegotiate deal. Israeli PM Netanyahu 30 April revealed cache of intelligence that allegedly showed Iran pursued nuclear weapons in past; information did not seem to add much to knowledge of UN nuclear inspectors. Attack, reportedly launched by Israel, on air base in central Syria 9 April killed seven Iranians; senior Iranian officials warned incident would “not remain unanswered”. Strikes on three bases in northern Syria 29-30 April, described by Syrian opposition as Israeli and by pro-Syrian govt website as Western, reportedly killed 38 Syrian soldiers in Hama and eighteen Iranian fighters. Iran condemned U.S.-led airstrikes against suspected Syrian chemical weapons facility 14 April, Supreme Leader Khamenei called it “major crime”. In south east, clash between border guards and alleged terrorist cell near border with Pakistan 17 April left three terrorists, one police officer and two security force members dead.

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action joint commission met for eighth time in Vienna 16 March; chairman highlighted 22 Feb report by International Atomic Energy Agency indicating Iran’s full compliance with 2015 nuclear agreement. U.S., French, German and UK representatives met in Berlin 15 March to discuss changes to agreement demanded by Trump administration; Europeans reportedly indicated willingness to sanction Iran’s ballistic missile program and involvement in Syria, but it remained uncertain whether talks could find solution that could satisfy White House without violating deal before Trump’s 12 May deadline. President Trump 12 March extended by one year national emergency regarding Iran. Iranian security forces claimed to have killed four members of Jaish al-Adl, Sunni-Balouchi militant group, in clashes in south east near border with Pakistan 11 March.

U.S. sought commitment from European signatories of 2015 nuclear deal (UK, France and Germany) to address what it sees as flaws in deal in return for renewing U.S. sanctions relief in May, Reuters reported 18 Feb. EU 8 Feb said it could reintroduce “blocking regulations” to protect European firms doing business in Iran if U.S. restores extraterritorial sanctions. Tensions escalated between Iran and Israel. Israel 10 Feb claimed to have shot down Iranian drone, which it said entered Israeli airspace; Iran denied. In response, Israeli jets same day carried out airstrikes in Syria; Syrian anti-aircraft missile shot down one jet on its return, which crashed in northern Israel. Israel launched second, more intense bombing raid on Syrian and Iranian targets in Syria. Israeli PM Netanyahu 18 Feb warned Israel would “if necessary” act against Iran itself, not just its proxies. Members of Sufi order protesting against detention of members clashed with security forces in Tehran 19 Feb, five security force personnel killed. Russia 26 Feb vetoed UN Security Council resolution saying Iran had violated arms embargo on Yemen by supplying weapons to Huthi fighters; next day France, Germany, UK and U.S. in joint statement called on Iran to cease all activities inconsistent with arms embargo on Yemen.

U.S. 12 Jan said it would continue to suspend nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, but said this would be last time unless Congress and European parties to 2015 nuclear deal met U.S. conditions regarding snap inspections of Iranian military sites, sunset clauses for nuclear restrictions and Iran’s ballistic missile program. FM Zarif met EU foreign policy chief Mogherini and E3 counterparts in Brussels 11 Jan; Mogherini said Europe remains committed to full implementation of nuclear deal. U.S. Treasury 12 Jan blacklisted fourteen Iran-related individuals and entities, including head of judiciary. Nationwide anti-govt protests that began 28 Dec subsided mid-Jan: some officials including President Rouhani and Supreme Leader Khamenei acknowledged protestors’ economic and political grievances, but latter claimed foreign powers including U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia had instigated protests. U.S. House of Representatives 9 Jan passed bill condemning crackdown on protests.

Tens of thousands protested against govt in several cities 28-31 Dec and clashes with security forces reportedly left at least thirteen protestors dead. Protests against price rises and economic stagnation in city of Mashhad 28 Dec spread to other towns and cities, with protestors criticising govt corruption and some calling for Supreme Leader Khamenei to step down. Crowds attacked state buildings in capital Tehran 30 Dec. President Rouhani 31 Dec said people had right to criticise authorities but warned govt would not tolerate those who use violence. U.S. President Trump expressed support for protestors and warned Tehran that “the world is watching”. U.S. Congress let pass 13 Dec deadline for re-imposing on Iran sanctions waived under July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); deadline triggered by U.S. President Trump’s 13 Oct non-certification of Iran’s compliance with nuclear deal. JCPOA Joint Commission members, including U.S., emphasised their commitment to deal in Vienna 13 Dec. U.S. House of Representatives 14 Dec passed bill requiring Treasury to “make certifications with respect to U.S. and foreign financial institutions’ aircraft-related transactions involving Iran”. Iranian officials 6 Dec denounced Trump’s decision to recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Iran rejected claims by U.S. ambassador to UN 14 Dec that Iran had provided military support to Yemeni Huthi rebels.

Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia heightened after Yemen’s Huthi rebels 4 Nov fired ballistic missile which reached Riyadh, and Saudi and U.S. accused Tehran of supplying missile; Revolutionary Guards denied involvement. After Lebanese PM Hariri 4 Nov resigned in statement aired from Saudi Arabia denouncing Iran’s influence in Lebanon, Iran said it hoped PM Hariri would stay in office. Russian President Putin hosted President Rouhani and Turkish President Erdoğan at summit on Syrian conflict in Sochi, Russia, 22 Nov; presidents jointly invited Syrian govt and moderate opposition to attend congress in Sochi, without specifying date. International Atomic Energy Agency 13 Nov issued ninth quarterly report, confirming Iran’s compliance with nuclear commitments set by July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). U.S. Senate bill to unilaterally amend nuclear deal on President Trump’s request failed to attract bi-partisan support. EU and UK FMs 6-7 Nov met with members of U.S. Congress in Washington and continued to press for preservation of nuclear deal.

President Rouhani and Turkish President Erdoğan 4 Oct met in Tehran and pledged to preserve borders in region in light of Iraqi Kurdistan’s 25 Sept independence referendum. U.S. President Trump 13 Oct failed to reissue congressionally-mandated certification of Iran’s compliance with July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); Congress has until 14 Dec to decide whether to restore sanctions waived under JCPOA. Supreme Leader Khamenei 18 Oct said govt would remain committed to agreement until other signatories withdraw. U.S. Treasury 13 Oct blacklisted Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” organisation for supporting its expeditionary Quds Force; in response, IRGC said U.S. military bases within 2,000km missile range were at risk and that Iran would consider U.S. army “ISIS around the world”. Quds Force Commander Soleimani reportedly facilitated Iraqi govt forces’ 16 Oct takeover of Kurdish-held Kirkuk city by convincing Kurdish peshmerga commanders not to fight back (see Iraq).

After International Atomic Energy Agency late Aug reported that govt had complied with obligations under 2015 nuclear deal, U.S. President Trump 14 Sept extended waivers suspending nuclear sanctions for additional 120 days. U.S. Treasury same day imposed sanctions on eleven Iranian individuals and entities accused of hostile “provocations” including support for ballistic missile program and cyber-attacks on U.S. financial institutions. U.S. House of Representatives 13 Sept passed bill to prevent U.S. companies selling commercial aircraft to Tehran; if bill becomes law, move would breach nuclear deal. Iran and P5+1 met at ministerial level on sidelines of UN General Assembly 20 Sept; all agreed that Iran was in technical compliance with nuclear deal and U.S. repeated its desire to renegotiate agreement that Trump 19 Sept called “an embarrassment”. Iranian military vessel 10 Sept reportedly “confronted” U.S. warship in Persian Gulf, cautioning it to stay away from Iranian fishing boat in distress; U.S. Navy denied having direct contact with Iranian forces. Revolutionary Guards 13 Sept said it had arrested in Tehran Islamic State (ISIS) member at centre of plot to stage 300 suicide attacks in Iran. In joint statement with Turkey and Iraq, govt 20 Sept warned Iraqi Kurdistan not to hold independence referendum 25 Sept, saying “countermeasures” would follow if it did; govt 24 Sept halted flights between Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan.

U.S. President Trump 2 Aug signed bill placing new sanctions on Revolutionary Guards and individuals believed to be facilitating govt’s development of ballistic missiles, prompting Iran’s strong opposition: President Rouhani said U.S. had breached 2015 nuclear agreement and warned govt could restart its nuclear program “within hours” if U.S. imposes more sanctions. Parliament 13 Aug voted to increase Revolutionary Guards’ military budget by $260mn, and allocated another $260mn to advance ballistic missiles program. Rouhani inaugurated for second term as president 5 Aug; parliament 20 Aug approved new all-male ministerial cabinet. Iranian drone 8 Aug approached within 40 metres of U.S. jet preparing to land on U.S. aircraft carrier patrolling in Persian Gulf, forcing evasive action; U.S. officials called encounter “unsafe and unprofessional”. Qatar 23 Aug announced plan to return ambassador to Tehran in attempt to strengthen bilateral relations.